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INTRODUCTION

"When an entity must be classified for purposes of a Federal
income tax statute, policy considerations of Federal income tax
law should govern that classification...."' Thus spoke the Tax
Court, honoring federal income tax policy with its pen, but
remaining far from it in application.2 In fact, although the federal
definition of tax3 partnership has been at issue in over 150
statutes, cases, regulations, and rulings,' it is the rare occasion
that tax policy has governed attempts to define tax partnership.5
This neglect of tax policy has contributed to the vast tangle of
legal authority that addresses the definition of tax partnership.
This Article unravels that tangled mess, identifies the several
tests that have been used to define tax partnership, and
evaluates each of them using a tax policy platform. 6 It then

1.
Wheeler v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH)883, 889 (1978).
2.
Id. at 889-91 (citing precedent for a multifactor test and then looking to the
parties' contributions to hold that the arrangement was a tax partnership, but failing to
discuss why the factors or contributions are relevant under tax policy); see also Mark 7:6
("Well hath Esaias prophesied of you hypocrites, as it is written, 'This people honoureth
me with their lips, but their heart is far from me.'").
3.
All subsequent references to "tax" are to federal income tax, unless stated
otherwise.
4.
This number is based on the Author's count of statutes, cases, regulations, and
rulings discussed and cited in this Article and others the Author either read or came
across in his research. These sources will hereinafter be referred to as "ArticleSources &
Author's Research Findings."
5.
Congress and a small handful of courts have directly addressed tax policy. See,
e.g., Haley v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 815, 818 (5th Cir. 1953) ("Substance rather than form
controls in applying the federal tax statutes, and 'the realities of the taxpayer's economic
interest, rather than the niceties of the conveyancer's art, should determine the power to
tax.'" (quoting Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56, 58 n.1 (1942))); Maletis
v. United States, 200 F.2d 97, 97-98 (9th Cir. 1952) (discussing the tax policy of the
estoppel test); H.R. REP. No. 72-708, at 53 (1932) (indicating that Congress enacted a
broad definition of tax partnership to require arrangements that are similar to
partnerships to make similar returns and account for their operations similarly); see also
infra Part III.B (concluding that congressional mandates regarding partnership
accounting aimed to increase equity, simplicity, and administrability).
6.
Some commentators have considered the definition of tax partnership, but those
considerations usually only cover a few cases and adopt an approach similar to that
adopted by the courts and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). See, e.g., Richard M.
Lipton, When Is a PartnerNot a Partner?,in 1 TAX PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN
PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 845, 849-60
(Louis S. Freeman & Clifford M. Warren eds., 2005) (examining a handful of cases that
have addressed the definition of tax partnership); E. John Wagner Il & Susan Barrett
Hecker, Evaluating and Making a Choice of "No Entity" for Real Property Held for
Investment or Lease, FLA. B.J., July-Aug. 2001, at 43, 44-45 (advising on how to avoid tax
partnership classification in real property co-ownership situations and citing a handful of
cases as support); Donald J. Weidner, The Existence of State and Tax Partnerships:A
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proposes a policy-based definition of tax partnership. In essence,
the Article reviews and evaluates the results of almost a century
of lawmaking and proposes that the law take a new direction.7
Although the definition of tax partnership has a significant
history, three recent developments have drawn renewed
attention to it. First, taxpayers have used elaborate partnerships
to create artificial tax losses and allocate income to foreign
entities not subject to U.S. income tax.8 The Internal Revenue
Primer, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 18-24 (1983) (discussing several general tax partnership
concepts and examining through the lens of a handful of cases whether an assignee of a
partnership interest becomes a partner, whether tenants in common are partners, and
whether certain other arrangements create tax partnerships). Other commentators claim
to consider the definition of the tax partnership but focus instead on the definition of tax
corporation and the distinction between tax partnership and tax corporation. See, e.g.,
Richard S. Bobrow, Steve Montgomery & David R. Cohen, Washington Tax Watch, 6 J.
PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 68, 68-70 (1989) (distinguishing between tax partnerships and tax
corporations); William B. Brannan, Lingering Partnership Classification Issues (Just
When You Thought It Was Safe to Go Back into the Water), 1 FLA. TAX REV. 197, 199-204
(1993) (contrasting tax partnerships and tax corporations). This Article, for the first time,
systematically analyzes and evaluates the definition of tax partnership by conducting a
comprehensive coverage of the legal authority addressing the issue and distilling the
numerous tests that have been used to find tax partnerships.
7.
In 1913, Congress enacted the first income tax to pass constitutional muster.
See sources cited infra note 69; see also Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 9,
25-26 (1916) (upholding the constitutionality of the Tariff Act of 1913). That first income
tax bill specifically disregarded partnerships for all tax purposes other than reporting. See
infra text accompanying note 72. The IRS considered the definition of tax partnership as
early as 1923. See infra note 270 and accompanying text (discussing whether parties who
co-owned, operated, and shared the profits from a farm constituted a partnership). Thus,
the definition of tax partnership has been an issue for the last ninety-three years.
Without forsaking hope that this Article will have an immediate effect on the
development of the definition of tax partnership, the Author predicts that the issue will
most likely be at play on the fast-approaching 100th anniversary of the income tax.
8.
See, e.g., Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, 314 F.3d 625, 627-29, 632
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (unwinding an elaborate arrangement where a U.S. taxpayer claimed to
have formed a tax partnership in the Netherlands Antilles, a favorable tax jurisdiction,
with an unrelated foreign financial institution). The recent increased use of tax shelters
has received considerable attention. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106th CONG.,
COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS MADE BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY AND THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION

(2000) (comparing legislative proposals addressing corporate tax shelters); OFFICE OF TAX
POLICY, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PENALTY AND INTEREST
PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (1999) (examining the widespread use of

tax shelters and recommending changes to the Internal Revenue Code's penalty and
interest provisions); DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS

ix-xxi (1999) (proposing changes to disclosure requirements and penalty provisions aimed
at curbing the proliferation of the corporate tax shelter); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
106th CONG., STUDY OF PRESENT-LAw PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED
BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT
OF 1998 (INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS) (Comm. Print

1999) (reporting on then-current Internal Revenue Code penalty and interest provisions
and recommending changes to curtail corporate tax shelters); Joseph Bankman, The New
Market in

Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES

1775, 1775-77,

1792-95

(1999)

(presenting an overview of tax shelters and likely governmental responses to their
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Service (IRS)Y and Department of Justice have challenged that
use of the partnership tax rules, claiming the arrangements ' do
not come within the definition of tax partnership." Second, to
qualify for section 1031 2 nonrecognition, real estate investors are
creating new ownership structures to invest in real estate with
others without becoming tax partnerships." Third, some states

increased use in the past few years); Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak,
Essay, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1939-42
(2005) (critiquing current governmental efforts to prevent tax shelters); James S. Eustice,
Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old "Brine" in New Bottles, 55 TAX L. REV. 135, 139-40
(2002) (arguing that corporate tax shelters are a problem that may lead to the erosion of
the corporate tax base); John Hembera, ITEP Report Exposes Corporate Tax Avoidance,
89 TAX NOTES 439, 439 (2000) (finding that while corporate profits of the 250 largest
corporations rose by 23.5% from 1996 through 1998, federal corporate income tax rose by
only 7.7% during that same period); Anthony C. Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut: Surveying
Erosion in the Professionalism of the Tax Bar, 22 VA. TAX REV. 589, 609-12 (2003)
(arguing that lawyers who help structure tax shelters are violating the duty of
professional responsibility owed to the clients they assist); Richard Lavoie, Subverting the
Rule of Law: The Judiciary'sRole in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV.
115, 117, 119-20 (2004) (asserting that "the judiciary's... strict statutory construction
has ... created a legal environment that fosters unethical behavior" such as the use of
corporate tax shelters); Sheldon D. Pollack, Revenge of the Muckrakers, 75 TAX NOTES
255, 256-57 (1997) (describing the attention garnered by elaborate tax regulations);
Lawrence H. Summers, Summers Speech on Corporate Tax Shelters, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Feb. 29, 2000, available at LEXIS 2000 TNT 40-34 (estimating that by closing a small
percentage of the tax shelters, the government will save an estimated $80 billion in tax
revenue over the next ten years); see also Symposium, Business Purpose, Economic
Substance, and Corporate Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 1 (2001) (presenting articles
discussing recent uses of corporate tax shelters); Symposium, Corporate Tax Shelters, 55
TAX L. REV. 125 (2002) (presenting various articles and points of view on the use of
corporate tax shelters and partnerships).
9.
This Article uses the term "IRS" to refer to the Internal Revenue Service and its
predecessor organization, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which was renamed as part of
the 1953 reorganization. THE AMERICAN WAY IN TAXATION: INTERNAL REVENUE, 18621963, at 38 (Lillian Doris ed., 1994).
10.
The term "arrangement" as used in this Article refers to any multiperson
relationship that is not a tax corporation or tax trust, incorporating the definition of
person in section 7701. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
11.
See, e.g., TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, No. 05-0064-cv, 2006 WL 2171519, at
*15-16 (2d Cir. Aug. 3, 2006) (finding that no tax partnership existed due to a lack of an
equity investment); Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 331 F.3d 972, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(denying tax partnership status where no parties intended to join together in a business
and the "partnership" did not have a legitimate nontax purpose); Boca Investerings P'ship,
314 F.3d at 632 (finding that without a legitimate nontax business purpose, a tax
partnership does not exist "where taxpayers use an 'elaborate partnership' with entities
created solely for the purpose of the questioned transaction"); Saba P'ship v. Comm'r, 273
F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (agreeing that "'the absence of a non-tax business
purpose is fatal'" when attempting to establish tax partnership status); ASA Investerings
P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding no tax partnership when
"none of the supposed partners had the intent to form a real partnership").
12.
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended
("Code"), unless stated otherwise.
13.
I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2000) ("No gain or loss shall be recognized on the exchange
of property held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment if such
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have adopted series limited liability company statutes, which
allow members to establish distinct series that isolate liabilities
within that series and vest only the series's members with
control and interests in its profits and losses. 4 The definition of

property is exchanged solely for property of like kind which is to be held either for
productive use in a trade or business or for investment."). Generally all real estate,
including undivided interests in a single piece of real estate, is like kind to other real
estate. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b) to -1(c) (as amended in 1992). Interests in tax
partnerships are specifically excluded from section 1031 nonrecognition. I.R.C.
§ 1031(a)(2)(D). Undivided interests in real estate may, however, qualify for section 1031
nonrecognition. Bradley T. Borden & W. Richey Wyatt, Syndicated Tenancy-in-Common
Arrangements: How Tax-Motivated Real Estate TransactionsRaise Serious Nontax Issues,
PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 18, 19-20. Certain real estate interests may not,
however, satisfy the like-kind-property requirement. See Kelly E. Alton & Louis S. Weller,
Does State Law Really Determine Whether Property Is Real Estate for Section 1031
Purposes?, 32 REAL EST. TAX'N 30, 30-31 (2004) (discussing three IRS releases limiting
the applicability of the like-kind requirement under Section 1031); Bradley T. Borden,
The Whole Truth About Using PartialReal Estate Interests in Section 1031 Exchanges, 31
REAL EST. TAX'N 19, 19-20 (2003) (reporting that property interests such as water rights,
leases, remainder and reversionary interests, life interests, mineral interests, timber
rights, and easements may need to be re-examined to "ensure they are like kind to a fee in
real estate"). A cottage industry now sells undivided interests in real estate to parties
attempting section 1031 exchanges. The arrangements in which such parties invest are
known as syndicated tenancy-in-common (TIC) arrangements. See Borden & Wyatt,
supra, at 18-19 (presenting the requirements for TIC interests and section 1031
applicability); Terence Floyd Cuff, Rev. Proc. 2002-22 and Section 1031 Exchanges
Involving Tenancies-in-Common, 29 REAL EST. TAX'N 148, 148 (2002) (discussing the IRS
requirements for TIC recognition); Terence Floyd Cuff, Section 1031 Exchanges Involving
Tenancies-in-Common, 29 REAL EST. TAX'N 53, 53-54 (2002) (analyzing the issues
surrounding the purchase of TIC arrangements); Richard M. Lipton, New Rules Likely to
Increase Use of Tenancy-in-Common Ownership in Like-Kind Exchanges, 96 J. TAX'N. 303,
303 (2002) (discussing the current laws surrounding TICs). Some industry participants
estimate that between the years 2002 and 2004, the amount of exchange money invested
annually in syndicated TIC arrangements grew 1,333% from $150 million to $2 billion.
Kevin Thomason, Louis S. Weller, Darryl Steinhouse, and Richard M. Lipton, The
Evolution of TICs and Section 1031, Mid-Year Meeting of the Real Estate Committee of
the Tax Section of the American Bar Association, San Diego, California (Jan. 21, 2005)
(citing Real Estate Alert, Dec. 15, 2004) (estimating that over $4.3 billion of real estate
was purchased in the syndicated TIC format). Others estimate even greater growth, with
2004 volume reaching $3.7 billion, up from $150 million after the end of 2001. William
Winn, The TIC Industry Enters the Mainstream, SHOPPING CENTER BUS., May 2005, at
422, 422; see also Joe Gose, An Up-TIC in Realty Swaps, BARRON'S, July 18, 2005 ("Before
[Rev. Proc. 2002-22], fewer than 10 TIC sponsors had raised $157 million in equity to fund
some $700 million in property acquisitions. [In 2004], 46 sponsors raised $1.8 billion in
equity to finance $4.5 billion in real estate ....And the total value of such holdings could
run as high as $9 billion, since deals by dozens of small sponsors fly under industry
trackers' radar."). Investors may also form such arrangements to avoid the liability of
being a member of a partnership. See infra text accompanying note 259.
14.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-215(a) to (b), (d) (2005) ("A limited liability
company agreement may establish or provide for the establishment of 1 or more
designated series of members, managers or limited liability company interests having
separate rights, powers or duties with respect to specified property or obligations of the
limited liability company or profits and losses associated with specified property or
obligations, and any such series may have a separate business purpose or investment
objective.... [I]f notice of the limitation on liabilities of a series as referenced in this
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tax partnership must consider whether a limited liability
company with multiple series is one tax partnership or multiple
tax partnerships.15

Lacking a certain statutory foundation and being subject to
numerous uncoordinated interpretations, the current definition
of tax partnership may not be able to address these recent
developments. By deconstructing the development of partnership
tax law, this Article identifies the types of arrangements
Congress intended tax partnership law to govern and explains
that Congress intended to disregard partnerships and enacted
partnership tax rules only when necessary to simplify
partnership tax accounting and reporting and to facilitate
partner tax administration. The Article's evaluation of the tests
reveals that many are uncertain and do not incorporate these
purposes of partnership tax law and therefore haphazardly grant
subsection is set forth in the certificate of formation .... then the debts, liabilities,
obligations and expenses incurred, contracted for or otherwise existing with respect to a
particular series shall be enforceable against the assets of such series only, and not
against the assets of the limited liability company generally or any other series
thereof.... A limited liability company agreement may provide for classes or groups of
members or managers associated with a series having such relative rights, powers and
duties as the limited liability company agreement may provide, and may make provision
for the future creation in the manner provided in the limited liability company agreement
of additional classes or groups of members or managers associated with the series ....);
see also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/37-40(a) to (e) (2005) ("An operating agreement may
establish or provide for the establishment of designated series of members, managers or
limited liability company interests having separate rights, powers or duties with respect
to specified property or obligations of the limited liability company or profits and losses
associated with specified property or obligations ....[I]f the limited liability company has
filed a certificate of designation for each series which is to have limited liability under this
Section, then the debts, liabilities and obligations incurred, contracted for or otherwise
existing with respect to a particular series shall be enforceable against the assets of such
series only... ."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.305(1)-(2), (4) (West 1999) ("An operating
agreement may establish or provide for the establishment of designated series of
members, managers, or membership interests having separate rights, powers, or duties
with respect to specified property or obligations of the limited liability company or profits
and losses associated with specified property or obligations ....
[T]he debts, liabilities,
and obligations incurred, contracted for, or otherwise existing with respect to a particular
series shall be enforceable against the assets of that series only... ."); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 2054.4(A)-(D) (West Supp. 2006) ("An operating agreement may establish or
provide for the establishment of one or more designated series of members, managers or
membership interests having separate rights, powers or duties with respect to specified
property or obligations of the limited liability company or profits and losses associated
with specified property or obligations ....[I]f notice of the limitation on liabilities of a
series as referenced in this subsection is set forth in the articles of organization of the
limited liability company, then the debts, liabilities, obligations and expenses incurred,
contracted for or otherwise existing with respect to a particular series shall be enforceable
against the assets of such series only ....
").
15.
See Charles T. Terry & Derek D. Samz, An Initial Inquiry into the Federal Tax
Classification of Series Limited Liability Companies, 110 TAX NOTES 1093, 1097 (2006)
(suggesting that each series should be classified as a separate entity under the Illinois
statute).
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or deny access to the partnership tax rules. To remedy this, the
Article proposes a definition of tax partnership that incorporates
the purposes of partnership tax law and limits its applicability to
arrangements that merit such treatment under tax policy. The
proposed definition also provides certainty by adopting tax
terminology. Being so constructed, the proposed definition is
suited to address traditional, current, and future questions
regarding the definition of tax partnership.
Part II of the Article begins the analysis by distinguishing
the definitions of tax corporation and tax trust, both of which are
fairly well established, from the definition of tax partnership.
That section also establishes that arrangements that are neither
tax corporations nor tax trusts shall be either tax partnerships or
arrangements disregarded for tax purposes (tax nothings), 6
depending on the definition of tax partnership.
Part III begins the examination of the definition of tax
partnership by reviewing the history of partnership taxation.
That review identifies simplification and administrability as
primary purposes for the partnership tax rules and anti-abuse
concerns as a secondary purpose. Such rules should, however,
apply only if tax policy otherwise prohibits disregarding an
arrangement. The definition of tax partnership should
incorporate the purposes of partnership tax law by including only
arrangements that the partnership tax rules were enacted to
address. To demonstrate the significance of the definition of tax
partnership, Part IV illustrates how partnership tax rules affect
tax liability.
Part V distills ten tests from the vast body of law that
addresses the definition of tax partnership. Part VI establishes
the policy platform for examining each test. Part VII uses the
policy platform to evaluate each of the tests, exposing the
strengths and weaknesses of each test. This exercise is a natural
selection process, the result of which reveals the strongest teststhose that should remain viable-and the weakest tests-those
that should be eliminated. Based on the evaluations, Part VIII
proposes a definition of tax partnership rooted in the purposes of
partnership tax law and recommends that courts, the
Department of Treasury (Treasury), and the IRS adopt the
proposed definition immediately.

16.
Such arrangements include sole proprietorships and divisions and branches of
companies.

TAX PARTNERSHIP
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THE DEFINITIONS OF MULTIMEMBER TAX ENTITIES

The tax system has three multimember tax entities: (1) tax
corporations, (2) tax trusts, and (3) tax partnerships.1 7 The
definition of each of these determines the tax classification of
multimember arrangements and the tax treatment of the resulting
tax entities and their members." For example, a tax corporation is
subject to an entity-level tax, 9 and distributions to its members are
subject to tax.20 A tax trust must pay tax on undistributed income,
possibly subjecting it to an entity-level tax. 2' A tax partnership is
not subject to an entity-level tax,22 but it must follow the
partnership tax accounting and reporting rules. 3 An arrangement
that is not within one of these three definitions is a tax nothing."
The law clearly defines tax corporation and provides a workable
definition of tax trust, but leaves the definition of tax partnership in
disarray.2 '
A.

The EstablishedDefinitions

The "check-the-box regulations" clearly define tax
corporation." Prior to those regulations, courts and Treasury

17.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) to (2) (as amended in 1996) ("The term
'association' refers to an organization whose characteristics require it to be classified for
purposes of taxation as a corporation rather than as another type of organization such as
a partnership or a trust.").
See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
18.
19.
See I.R.C. § 11 (2000) ("A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the
taxable income of every corporation."). But see I.R.C. § 1363(a) (2000) (excepting S
corporations from corporate tax).
20.
I.R.C. § 301(c)(1) (2000).
21.
I.R.C. §§ 1(e), 641(a) (2000).
22.
See I.R.C. § 701 (2000) ("A partnership as such shall not be subject to the
income tax imposed by this chapter.").
23.
See id. ("Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for income tax
only in their separate or individual capacities."); I.R.C. § 702 (2000) (directing the proper
treatment of a partner's income and credits).
24.
See Arthur Venneri Co. v. United States, 340 F.2d 337, 343 (Ct. Cl. 1965)
(holding that the arrangement was not a tax partnership so the taxpayer was not liable
for employment taxes as an employer); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(4) (as amended in
2005) ("[Clertain organizations that have a single owner can choose to be recognized or
disregarded as entities separate from their owners."); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(3) (as
amended in 2004) ("An entity formed under local law is not always recognized as a
separate entity for federal tax purposes. For example, an organization wholly owned by a
State is not recognized as a separate entity for federal tax purposes if it is an integral part
of the State.").
25.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (as amended in 2006) (defining a tax
corporation); Treas. Reg § 301.7701-4(a) (as amended in 1996) (defining a tax trust). But
see Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (as amended in 2006) (providing a definition of a tax
partnership by contrasting it to a corporation).
26.
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -4 (as amended in 2006). These regulations are
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used a fact-intensive test to define tax corporation.27 The
check-the-box regulations eliminated the uncertainty of that
definition and provided a bright-line definition of tax
corporation that focuses on the form of legal entity." For
example, under the check-the-box regulations, an arrangement
that is a corporation under state law is a tax corporation.29
Commentators have criticized corporate tax law for violating
equity 0 and have criticized the current regulatory definition of
referred to as the "check-the-box" regulations because arrangements are given the choice
to elect to be treated as a tax corporation if they are not otherwise so treated under the
regulations. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2005); see also Thomas M. Hayes,
Checkmate, the Treasury Finally Surrenders: The Check-the-Box Treasury Regulations
and Their Effect on Entity Classification,54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1147 (1997) (discussing
the history and application of the check-the-box regulations).
27.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1996) ("There are a number of
major characteristics ordinarily found in a pure corporation which, taken together,
distinguish it from other organizations. These are: (i) Associates, (ii) an objective to carry
on business and divided [sic] the gains therefrom, (iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization
of management, (v) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property, and (vi) free
transferability of interests."); see also United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 421-24 (9th
Cir. 1954) (applying a six-characteristic test: (1) associates, (2) an objective to carry on a
business and divide the profits therefrom, (3) continuity of life, (4) centralized
management, (5) limited liability, and (6) free transferability of interests); Henry J.
Lischer, Jr., Elective Tax Classification for Qualifying Foreign and Domestic Business
Entities Under the Final Check-the-Box Regulations, 51 SMU L. REV. 99, 103-04 (1997)
(recounting the development of the six factors deemed to indicate that an organization
was a corporation rather than a partnership or trust); Peter B. Oh, A Jurisdictional
Approach to Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, 55 RuTGERS L. REV. 389, 405-15 (2003)
(discussing the development and use of multicharacteristic tests for determining if an
organization was a corporation or a partnership).
28.
See Littriello v. United States, No. Civ.A.3:04CV-143-H, 2005 WL 1173277, at
*3 (W.D. Ky. May 18, 2005) ("The newer regulations allow similar flexibility to the
Kintner regulations, with more certainty of results and consequences."). But see Gregg D.
Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185, 187-88 (2004)
(questioning the validity of the check-the-box regulations based on their inconsistency
with Supreme Court precedent). The court ultimately found that the check-the-box
regulations are consistent with prior case law. See Littriello v. United States, No.
Civ.A.3:04CV-143-H, 2005 WL 1862156, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 3, 2005) (denying the
taxpayer's motion to reconsider based on Professor Polsky's article).
29.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (as amended in 2006) (providing that the definition
of tax corporation also includes federal law corporations, associations, state joint-stock
companies and joint-stock associations, state-chartered business entities conducting
banking activities, business entities wholly owned by a state or foreign government, and
certain enumerated foreign entities). Other arrangements may elect to be tax
corporations. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2005).
30.
See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of
Corporate Income, 68 N.C. L. REV. 613, 633-34 (1990) (noting that double taxation
violates principles of horizontal equity); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Integration of the
Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform
Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 532, 538-40 (1975) (arguing that corporate double taxation
violates horizontal equity because it results in similarly situated individuals bearing
different tax burdens); Fred W. Peel, A Proposal for Eliminating Double Taxation of
Corporate Dividends, 39 TAx LAw. 1, 2 (1985) ("Put simply, the double tax on corporate
dividends is unfair. It violates the principle of horizontal equity. A shareholder who is
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tax corporation for violating both neutrality and equity.81 One
commentator has even questioned its legality." Corporate
taxation's unclear tax policy33 may be the catalyst for the 100year debate over the definition of tax corporation.3 4 While the
debate may continue, currently the definition of tax
corporation is clear.35
A tax trust is "an arrangement created either by a will or
by an inter vivos declaration whereby trustees take title to
property for the purpose of protecting or conserving it for the
beneficiaries under the ordinary rules applied in chancery or
probate courts."3 6 Generally the beneficiaries do nothing more
than accept the benefits of the trust property. 37 This does not,
however, prohibit the beneficiaries from creating the trust or
making contributions to the trust.3 8 The question is generally
whether the arrangement vests "trustees [with] responsibility
for the protection and conservation of property for

taxed on a dividend out of earnings that already have been taxed at the corporate level is
bearing a heavier tax burden than an individual in the same tax bracket receiving
equivalent income ...as a sole proprietor."). For a discussion of standard equity, see infra
Part VI.B. 1.
31.
See, e.g., Anthony P. Polito, Advancing to Corporate Tax Integration: A LaissezFaire Approach, 55 S.C. L. REV. 1, 46-48 (2003) (arguing that the current tax rate
structure results in tax shelters, the selective availability of which violates horizontal
equity); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1646-48 (1999) (discussing theories of equity and efficiency).
32.
Polsky, supra note 28, at 187-88.
33.
See Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-in Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94
GEO.L.J. 889, 890-91, 895 (2006) (noting that "commentators have tried in vain to explain
the corporate/partnership divide in taxation"); Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification:
The One Hundred-Year Debate, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 437, 441 (1995) ("As it turns out,
Congress based its decision more on an effort to soothe the psyche of the American public
than on any theoretical underpinnings."); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, CorporateRegulation
and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 53 (1990) (arguing that the
tax laws developed out of an intersection of competing policies). But see Reuven S. AviYonah, The Story of the Separate Corporate Income Tax: A Vehicle for Regulating
Corporate Managers, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 11, 18-19 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J.
Stark eds., 2005) (arguing that other reasons include the benefits theory of viewing the
corporate tax as an indirect tax on shareholders); Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A
Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 338-42 (1995) (positing that
corporate tax policy is a mix of two clear tax policies, one from the side of the shareholders
and one from the side of corporate managers).
34.
Congress first distinguished corporations from other entities in the Revenue Act
of 1894, beginning the debate regarding the type of entity that came within the
classification of tax corporation. See Hobbs, supra note 33, at 437-38.
35.
If certain commentators ever get their wish and the corporate tax is repealed,
the definition of tax partnership would increase in importance because classifying
arrangements as tax partnerships would be the significant classification task.
36.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (as amended in 1996).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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beneficiaries who cannot share in the discharge of this
responsibility and, therefore, are not associates in a joint
enterprise for the conduct of business for profit."3 9
Arrangements referred to as trusts or registered as trusts (i.e.,
commercial or business trusts) are not tax trusts, however, if
they are "created by the beneficiaries simply as a device to
carry on a profit-making business." 40 Thus, the definition of tax
trust is also fairly well established, leaving only the definition
of tax partnership unclear.
B. The Open Definition: Tax Partnership
This Article focuses on the definition of tax partnership,
which distinguishes tax partnerships from tax nothings.
Section 7701(a)(2) defines partnership to include "a syndicate,
group,
pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated
organization, through or by means of which any business,
financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not,
within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or a
corporation."4 That definition establishes tax partnership as
the default tax entity. 42 Thus, an arrangement can be a tax
partnership only if it is not a tax corporation or a tax trust or
estate. 3 Otherwise, the statutory definition is vague. Only a
few courts have carefully considered its language. Instead,
the definition of tax partnership has developed through tax
common law, Treasury regulation, and IRS rulings.4 '
39.
Id.
40.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(b) (as amended in 1996). But see Rev. Rul. 2004-86,
2004-33 I.R.B. 191 (ruling that a Delaware statutory trust formed to hold real estate was
a tax trust, in part because the trust document significantly restricted the trustee's
authority to conduct business).
41.
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (2000); see also I.R.C. § 761(a) (Supp. III 2005) (defining
"partnership" the same way).
42. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (as amended in 2005).
43. This Article does not address the classification of single-member entities
because they only have one member and fail to raise the tax partnership question. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2005) ("[An eligible entity with a single owner can
elect to be classified as an association or to be disregarded as an entity separate from its
owner."); see also infra Part III (stating that the purposes for the partnership tax rules
were to address multimember entities).
44. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 883, 889 n.15 (1978) (suggesting
that the statute illustrates the concept of arrangements treated as tax partnerships).
"[Tihe key determination using this approach would not be whether a joint venture or any
other of the enumerated entities had been formed, but rather whether an entity is of the
same generic class as those entities and is, therefore, taxable as a partnership." Id. Other
than this type of reference, courts rarely attempt to read much into the statutory
definition of tax partnership.
45. See Article Sources & Author's Research Findings, supra note 4 (referencing a
catalogue of legal authority that addresses the definition of tax partnership).
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The check-the-box regulations provide a labyrinthine
multi-step process for classifying tax entities, but they
ultimately adopt the statutory default for tax partnerships.4 6
That process could be avoided by simply asking whether an
arrangement is a tax corporation or tax trust. 47 An
arrangement that is not a tax trust or tax corporation is a tax
partnership, if within the definition of tax partnership.48
Otherwise, such arrangement is a tax nothing. 4 This Article
asks whether an arrangement that is neither a tax trust nor a
tax corporation is a tax partnership."
Over the past ninety-three years, the courts, Treasury,
and the IRS have approached the definition of tax
partnership haphazardly. Courts and the IRS have
considered whether an arrangement is a tax partnership or,
alternatively, (1) a co-ownership of property; 1 (2) a principal-

46.
To determine if an entity is a partnership, one must first determine whether an
arrangement is a "separate entity." T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215, 216 (1997); Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-1(a) (as amended in 2006). Second, if an arrangement is a separate entity, one
must determine whether it is a "business entity." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended
in 2006). A business entity is any separate entity that is not a tax trust. Id. Third, one
must determine if a business entity is a tax corporation; if it is not, it is a tax partnership.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) to (b) (as amended in 2005).
47.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2006); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a)
(as amended in 2005).
48.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2006); Treas. Reg. § 301.77013(a) (as amended in 2005).
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2005) ("[A]n eligible entity with a
49.
single owner can elect to be classified as an association or to be disregarded as an entity
separate from its owner.").
For those wedded to the analysis in the check-the-box regulations, the analysis
50.
is equivalent to asking whether an arrangement that is neither a tax corporation nor a
tax trust is a separate entity.
51.
See, e.g., Bergford v. Comm'r, 12 F.3d 166, 166-68 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that a
computer-leasing arrangement is a tax partnership); Luckey v. Comm'r, 334 F.2d 719,
720-22 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that the acquisition, development, and disposition of
realty by tenants in common is a tax partnership); Gilford v. Comm'r, 201 F.2d 735, 73536 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that tenants in common are not tax partners because the facts
do not show a desire by either party to form a partnership); Coffin v. United States, 120 F.
Supp. 9, 10-11 (S.D. Ala. 1954) (holding that tenants in common did not establish a tax
partnership); Alhouse v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1678, 1679, 1682 (1991) (finding that a
computer-leasing arrangement is a tax partnership because the two parties took "joint
action towards a common goal"), affd sub nom. Bergford, 12 F.3d 166; Bussing v. Comm'r,
88 T.C. 449, 450-51, 460-62 (1987) (holding that computer-leasing arrangement is a tax
partnership); Underwriters Ins. Agency v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 5, 5-9 (1980)
(holding that co-owners of fishing boats established a tax partnership because the
participants treated their arrangement as such for federal tax purposes); Estate of Levine
v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 780, 785-86 (1979) (determining that tenants in common created a tax
partnership because they "engaged in an active business, performed various services, and
shared the gains and losses"); McShain v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 154, 160 (1977) (holding that a
co-ownership of triple-net leased property was not a tax partnership); Podell v. Comm'r,
55 T.C. 429, 430-32 (1970) (holding that individuals who acquired, renovated, and
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agent relationship; 2 (3) a financing relationship;5 3 (4) nothing; 4
or (5) an oil and gas, electrical, mining, or similar co-owned jointproduction arrangement.5 5 In some situations, the courts and the

disposed of properties had formed a tax partnership); Estate of Appleby v. Comm'r, 41
B.T.A 18, 20-21 (1940) (finding a tenancy in common arrangement not a tax partnership),
affd, 123 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1941); Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261 (holding that
ownership as tenants in common does not mandate finding the existence of a tax
partnership where co-owners do not share in revenue from additional services provided to
tenants); I.T. 2082, 111-2 C.B. 176, 177 (1924) (ruling that co-owners of property and retail
merchandise business did not form a tax partnership); I.T. 1604, 1I-1 C.B. 1, 1-3 (1923)
(ruling that co-ownership of farm was not a tax partnership).
52.
See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Comm'r, 186 F.2d 315, 315-16, 319 (8th Cir. 1951)
(holding that an out-of-state engineer is not a tax partner); Luna v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 1067,
1078-79 (1964) (deciding that an agreement between an insurance company and agent is
not a tax partnership).
53.
See, e.g., Joe Balestrieri & Co. v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1949)
(concluding that making an investment in a partnership venture does not make the
investor a partner when the individual does not have any control over the partnership);
Allison v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1069, 1071, 1078 (1976) (finding no tax partnership
where lender received a fixed fee for financing a subdivision); S. & M. Plumbing Co. v.
Comm'r, 55 T.C. 702, 703, 709 (1971) (holding that an individual who contributed capital
for a construction bond was a partner).
54.
See, e.g., Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 735-36, 748 (1949) (holding that a
father and son cattle operation could be a tax partnership); Lusthaus v. Comm'r, 327 U.S.
293, 295-97 (1946) (holding that a husband and wife were not a tax partnership); TIFD
III-E, Inc. v. United States, No. 05-0064-cv, 2006 WL 2171519, at *9 (2d Cir. Aug. 3, 2006)
(holding that the banks did not have a bona fide equity participation, so the arrangement
was not a tax partnership); Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 331 F.3d 972, 978 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (finding an absence of a nontax business purpose, so the arrangement was not a tax
partnership); Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, 314 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (holding that in the case of an "elaborate partnership" taxpayers must show a
nontax business purpose); Saba P'ship v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 1135, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(instructing the Tax Court to consider whether the arrangement had a nontax business
purpose); ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding
that lack of nontax business purpose indicates that the arrangement is not a tax
partnership); Estate of Winkler v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1657, 1658, 1663-64 (1997)
(concluding that family members joined together as tax partners to buy lottery tickets);
see also Ballou v. United States, 370 F.2d 659, 664 (6th Cir. 1966) (deferring to the lower
court's finding that no partnership was created when parents transferred a company
interest to children's trusts); Earp v. Jones, 131 F.2d 292, 293-94 (10th Cir. 1942) (finding
an arrangement between husband and wife "more fanciful than real" and, therefore, not a
tax partnership); Comm'r v. Olds, 60 F.2d 252, 254-55 (6th Cir. 1932) (holding that
parties' intent to form a tax partnership is sufficient to overcome IRS's challenge that
family arrangement was a sham).
55.
See, e.g., Bentex Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 565, 571 (1953) (holding that coownership and operation of oil and gas property was a tax partnership); Rev. Rul. 83-129,
1983-2 C.B. 105, 105 (classifying a mineral lease as a tax partnership); Rev. Rul. 68-344,
1968-1 C.B. 569, 569-71 (ruling that the co-ownership and operation of power generating
units constituted a tax partnership); Rev. Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30, 30-31 (ruling that
the co-ownership and operation of oil and gas property was a tax partnership); Rev. Rul.
56-500, 1956-2 C.B. 464, 466-67 (ruling that joint extraction operations were part of a tax
partnership); Rev. Rul. 54-42, 1954-1 C.B. 64, 64 (ruling that co-ownership and operation
of oil and gas property was a tax partnership); I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 126, 129 (same); I.T.
3713, 1945 C.B. 178, 178-80 (ruling that a timber-cutting operation was a tax
partnership); I.T. 2749, XIII-1 C.B. 99, 99-100 (1934) (ruling that co-ownership of oil and
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IRS concluded that no tax partnership existed; 56 in others, with
seemingly similar facts, they concluded that a tax partnership
existed.5 7 The IRS and courts have not been particular in
identifying prior case law or rulings with similar facts when
relying on precedent. 8 Some courts cited no authority for the
gas property was a tax partnership); I.T. 2785, XIII-1 C.B. 96, 96 (1934) (ruling that coowners of oil and gas could file an information return); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-15-003
(June 17, 1982) (ruling that co-ownership and joint operation of a mine was a tax
partnership); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-19-065 (Feb. 12, 1979) (ruling that co-ownership and
operation of nuclear generating plant was a tax partnership).
56.
See, e.g., Joe Balestrieri & Co., 177 F.2d at 869, 871 (holding that a guarantee
did not make guarantor of a mining venture a tax partner); Coffin, 120 F. Supp. at 10-11
(holding that tenancy in common arrangement was not a tax partnership); McShain, 68
T.C. at 155-56, 160 (holding that co-ownership involving passive obligations of triple-net
leased property was not a tax partnership); Allison, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1078 (finding no
tax partnership where lender received fixed-fee for financing subdivision); Luna, 42 T.C.
at 1068, 1078-79 (holding that an employment agreement between an insurance company
and its agent was not a tax partnership due to a lack of evidence of a joint venture); Hahn
v. Comm'r, 22 T.C. 212, 214 (1954) (determining that a TIC arrangement was not a tax
partnership); Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261, 261 (concluding that ownership as
tenants in common is not a tax partnership where co-owners do not share in revenue from
additional services provided to tenants); Rev. Rul. 56-500, 1956-2 C.B. 464, 466-67 (ruling
that joint extraction operations may elect to be a tax partnership or a tax corporation).
57.
See, e.g., Bergford v. Comm'r, 12 F.3d 166, 166-68 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding a
computer-leasing arrangement a tax partnership); Luckey v. Comm'r, 334 F.2d 719, 720,
722-23 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that acquisition, development, and disposition of realty by
tenants in common was a tax partnership); Alhouse v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1678,
1679, 1682 (1991) (concluding that a computer-leasing arrangement is a tax partnership),
affd sub nom. Bergford, 12 F.3d 166; Underwriters Ins. Agency v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M.
(CCH) 5, 6-7, 9 (1980) (holding that co-owners of a fishing boats established a tax
partnership because the participants treated it as such for federal tax purposes); Estate of
Levine v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 780, 785-86 (1979) (determining that tenants in common
created a tax partnership because they "engaged in an active business, performed various
services, and shared the gains and losses"); S. & M. Plumbing Co., 55 T.C. at 709 (holding
that capital contributor for a construction bond was a tax partner); Podell v. Comm'r, 55
T.C. 429, 430-32 (1970) (holding that individuals who acquired, renovated, and disposed
of properties had formed a tax partnership); Rev. Rul. 68-344, 1968-1 C.B. 569, 569-71
(ruling that co-ownership and operation of power generating units constituted a tax
partnership); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-15-003 (June 17, 1982) (ruling privately that coownership and joint operation of a mine was a tax partnership); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7919-065 (Feb. 12, 1979) (ruling privately that co-ownership and operation of nuclear
generating plant was a tax partnership).
58.
See, e.g., Bergford, 12 F.3d at 167-69 (citing Luna, an employment case,
Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980), an electrical
cooperative case, and Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946), a family assignment of
income case, in a computer-leasing case); Bartholomew v. Comm'r, 186 F.2d 315, 315, 318
(8th Cir. 1951) (citing Tower in an employment versus tax partnership case); Alhouse, 62
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1679-81 (listing the factors from Luna and citing Tower in a computerleasing case); Bussing v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 449, 450-51, 460 (1987) (citing Tower and
Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), another assignment of income in the family
context case, in a computer leasing case); UnderwritersIns. Agency, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) at
(citing Tower, Culbertson, Luna in a co-ownership versus tax partnership case); Estate of
Levine, 72 T.C. at 781-82, 785 (citing Tower and Culbertson in a co-ownership versus tax
partnership case); Allison, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1071, 1076-77 (citing Culbertson and S. &
M. Plumbing, a financing versus tax partnership case, in a co-ownership versus tax
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definition of tax partnership or appear to have ruled based on the
plain language of the statute. 9 In some cases, the courts looked
at whether the parties intended to form a partnership," but in
others, the courts said that intent was not relevant."' Indeed,
courts and the IRS have confirmed the definition's uncertainty by63
62
alternatively relying on state law, flatly rejecting state law,
and providing no indication of the source of authority. 4 This
partnership case); S. & M. Plumbing Co., 55 T.C. at 706-07 (citing Podell, a co-ownership
case, in a financing versus tax partnership case).
59.
See, e.g., Gilford v. Comm'r, 201 F.2d 735, 736 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that there
was no partnership based on the statutory definitions of "capital assets," "real property,"
and "trade or business" without reference to case law).
60.
See, e.g., Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 748 (remanding case to the Tax Court to
consider the intent question); Alhouse, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1680 (stating that the
existence of a tax partnership question "is a question of fact, that turns on the parties'
intent"); Estate of Levine, 72 T.C. at 785 (stating that the crucial question is whether
parties "intended to create, as evidenced by their actions, a partnership."); Allison, 35
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1076 (stating that the tax partnership question is generally factual with
emphasis on intent).
61.
Evans v. Comm'r, 447 F.2d 547, 550-51 (7th Cir. 1971) (concluding that "[ilf the
corporation's ownership is real then the subjective intent of the parties is not a
determinative test," and Commissioner v. Culbertson is no longer the test since it was
decided before the enactment of section 704(e)(1)).
62.
See, e.g., Joe Balestrieri & Co. v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 867, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1949)
(relying on California state laws and California common law); Fishback v. United States,
215 F. Supp. 621, 626 (D.S.D. 1963) (discussing several state interpretations of a joint
venture, including the lack of a South Dakota Supreme Court ruling on the point of law);
Frazell v. United States, 213 F. Supp. 457, 461-62 (W.D. La. 1963), rev'd on other
grounds, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964) (applying Louisiana Civil Code to determine the
definition of a joint venture); Flanders v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 935, 942-43 (N.D.
Cal. 1959) ("Both [plaintiffs] were residents of Carmel, California .... California law
accordingly applies in determining whether there was a joint venture."); Copeland v.
Ratterree, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9895, at 58,195-96 (N.D.N.Y. 1957) (utilizing
Vermont law to determine if a joint venture existed); Tate v. Knox, 131 F. Supp. 514, 516
(D. Minn. 1955) (using Minnesota substantive law to determine if a joint venture was
created).
63.
See, e.g., Estate of Kahn v. Comm'r, 499 F.2d 1186, 1189 (2d Cir. 1974) ("First, it
is clear that whether [the plaintiffs were] a partnership for tax purposes is a matter of
federal, not local, law."); Haley v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 815, 818 (5th Cir. 1953) ("[Nleither
local law nor the expressed intent of the parties as to the legal nature and effect of their
written agreements are conclusive... for federal tax purposes."); First Mechs. Bank v.
Comm'r, 91 F.2d 275, 278-79 (3d Cir. 1937) (applying federal case law); Arthur Venneri
Co. v. United States, 340 F.2d 337, 340-41, 343 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (applying federal law);
Herzberg v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 440, 444 (S.D. Ind. 1959) (applying the Internal
Revenue Code to the definition of partnership); Wheeler v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 883,
887-88 (1978) (applying federal law to determine if a partnership is formed); Luna v.
Comm'r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077 (1964) ("[T]he Internal Revenue Code prescribes its own
standards for qualification of an unincorporated association as a partnership and
supersedes local law."); Beck Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Comm'r, 27 T.C. 840, 849 (1957)
(applying the Internal Revenue Code because "it supercedes local law for Federal income
tax purposes").
64.
See, e.g., S. & M. Plumbing Co. v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 702, 707, 709 (1971)
(referencing case law as authority for indicia of the existence of a joint venture without
reference to state or federal definitions); Au v. Comm'r, 40 T.C. 264, 267-68 (1963)
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kaleidoscope of cases, regulations, and rulings evinces the need
for a certain definition of tax partnership. Such a definition
should be governed by tax policy, including the purposes of
partnership tax law.
III. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION
Tax law originally disregarded partnerships.65 Later,
Congress enacted partnership tax rules and the definition of tax
partnership to address tax accounting and reporting concerns
and purportedly to subject similarly situated arrangements to
the same accounting and reporting rules.66 Congress also enacted
laws governing the allocation of partnership tax items, and
Treasury promulgated extensive regulations interpreting
allocation rules in the statute. Even later, Congress enacted
anti-abuse rules.68 A review of the history of partnership taxation
reveals those purposes.
A. The Effort to Disregard
Partnerships were disregarded under the Tariff Act of 1913,
which imposed income tax on individuals and corporations.69
Congress acknowledged partnerships merely to require the
partners to report partnership income individually. ° That act
also required partnerships to report profits and identify
individual partners, when requested by the IRS.71 Thus, although
(addressing the issue of partnership without reference to any definition and ultimately
deciding the case on other grounds); Smith v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 1319, 1323-25 (1947)
(applying principles of both Texas and federal law without clearly deciding on either
basis).
65.
See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
66.
See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
67.
See infra notes 125-48 and accompanying text.
68.
See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
69.
Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.A, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (imposing the first income
tax); see also Bradley T. Borden, Sandra Favelukes & Todd E. Molz, A History and
Analysis of the Co-Ownership-PartnershipQuestion, 106 TAX NOTES 1175, 1175-80 (2005)
(discussing the history of partnership taxation).
70.
See Tariff Act of 1913, § II.G(a) (imposing a "normal tax" on individuals for
income derived from corporations, joint-stock companies or associations, and insurance
companies, but excluding partnerships).
71.
Id. § II.D ("[Aind any such firm, when requested by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, or any district collector, shall forward to him a correct statement of
such profits and the names of the individuals who would be entitled to the same, if
distributed.... ."). The 1916 Act was more specific, providing that
such partnership, when requested by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, or
any district collector, shall render a correct return of the earnings, profits, and
income of the partnership, except income exempt under section four of this Act,
setting forth the item of the gross income and the deductions and credits allowed
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Congress generally disregarded partnerships, it recognized
them enough to allow the IRS to obtain information about
partnerships and to administer partner taxation. 2 These early
rules establish that partnership taxation should first attempt
to disregard partnerships and then recognize them only to
facilitate tax administration, but not to impose a tax on
partnerships. 3

This

initial

disregard

of partnerships

reflects

two

perspectives. First, at the time the income tax was enacted,
the view was that a partnership was an aggregate of its
members, not a separate entity. 4 Congress adopted this view
by not subjecting partnerships to an entity-level tax. 5 Second,
by disregarding partnerships, Congress attempted to treat
partner taxpayers similarly to the standard taxpayer who
would conduct similar business or own property individually. 6
To preserve partnership disregard, Congress enacted
minimally intrusive rules necessitated by tax administration.7
Tax administration also justified treating partner taxpayers
differently from the standard taxpayer.

by this title, and the names and addresses of the individuals who would be
entitled to the net earnings, profits, and income, if distributed.
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 8(e), 39 Stat. 756, 762-63. In 1932, Congress required all
tax partnerships to make a return. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 189, 47 Stat. 169, 223
("Every partnership shall make a return for each taxable year, stating specifically the
items of its gross income and the deductions allowed by this title, and shall include in the
return the names and addresses of the individuals who would be entitled to share in the
net income if distributed and the amount of the distributive share of each individual. The
return shall be sworn to by any one of the partners.").
72.
Without requiring such information, Congress would impede the IRS's ability to
assess and collect income tax from partners.
73.
By and large, the current tax rules adhere to this same principle. The
complexity of the current rules stems from the intricate nature of administering an
income tax that derives from flow-through entities, such as partnerships.
74.
See First Mechs. Bank v. Comm'r, 91 F.2d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 1937) (noting that
under common law, a partnership was not considered a legal entity).
75.
See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. Since the enactment of the first
partnership tax rules, that view has changed. See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 201(a)
(amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 91 (2001) ("A partnership is an entity distinct from its
partners."). This change of view has not affected the partnership tax rules significantly
enough to result in repeal of all partnership tax rules based on the aggregate theory.
Thus, the original justification of partnership tax rules-the aggregate substantive-law
theory-no longer exists, but the rules remain.
76.
See infra Part VI.B.1 (discussing standard equity).
77.
Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.A, 38 Stat. 114, 166-67.
78.
See id. § II.G(a) (excluding partnerships from taxation at the entity level).
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B. The Imposition of Tax Reporting Requirements
If partnerships were completely disregarded for tax
purposes, they should not have been required or allowed to
compute income at the partnership level. Instead, each item of
income or loss should have been allocated to a partner as
though the partnership did not exist. Each partner should
have separately reported the income and loss from partnership
operations, as the partnership would not have been
recognized. 9 The War Revenue Act of 1917 moved away from
disregarding partnerships by allowing partnerships to compute
taxable income at the partnership level."0 A partnership that
computes taxable income needs a taxable year to avoid
computing income multiple times during the year." Thus,
Congress enacted rules that allowed partnerships to compute
income once a year based upon their own fiscal years. 2 This
79.
Thus, as a partnership incurred expenses, those expenses would be allocated to
the partners. As the partnership recognized income, that income would be allocated to the
partners. For example, if a partnership with two equal partners were to receive $100,000
for services provided to a customer, the partners would each include $50,000 in their
respective gross incomes as compensation. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2000) (directing taxpayers
to include in gross income amounts received in compensation for services). If the
partnership were to pay $2,000 in rent for the office space used for the partnership's
business, each partner would deduct $1,000 of the rental expense. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(3)
(2000) (allowing a deduction for rental costs incurred by a business). Each partner would
recognize the items separate from the other, according to the partner's method of tax
accounting and taxable year. A cash method calendar year partner would recognize
partnership income and deductions for the calendar year as the partnership recognizes
them. Thus, if during the calendar year the partnership received $1,200,000 in fees from
services and paid $24,000 for rent, the partner would recognize half of those amounts for
the calendar year. An accrual method partner on a fiscal year from May 1 through April
30 would recognize income and deductions accrued by the partnership during that period
of time. Therefore, if the partnership accrued $1,000,000 of fees and $22,000 of rent
during that period, the accrual method partner would recognize those amounts. The
potentially different tax treatment of these items led to the enactment of the partnership
tax rules. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
80.
War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1204(1)(e), 40 Stat. 300, 331-32.
81.
For example, if a partnership had three partners who respectively had taxable
years ending on July 31, October 31, and December 31, partnership income would have to
be computed on each of those dates to allocate the partners' respective shares of
partnership income. Although this is an administratively inconvenient task for the
partners, it would produce a more accurate computation of income for each partner and
subject partners to rules more similar to the rules to which the standard taxpayer is
subject.
82.
War Revenue Act of 1917, § 1204(1)(e) ("A partnership shall have the same
privilege of fixing and making returns upon the basis of its own fiscal year as is accorded
to corporations under this title."). In the War Revenue Act of 1917, Congress also provided
greater specificity regarding the exclusion of interest from U.S. obligations:
That from the net distributive interests on which the individual members shall
be liable for tax, normal and additional, there shall be excluded their
proportionate shares received from interest on the obligations of a State or any
political or taxing subdivision thereof, and upon the obligations of the United
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appears to have been an attempt to simplify partnership tax
accounting. 3
Congress next enacted a rule to address the situation in
which a partnership's taxable year straddled calendar years with
different rates.8 4 That rule (1) alleviated the administrative
burden of partnerships having to compute income and loss
multiple times during the year, (2) identified the rates to which
income of a partnership straddling two tax years would be
subjected, and (3) created a reporting entity (the tax
partnership).,5 The straddle rule also appears to have been an
attempt to subject partner taxpayers to the same rates to which
the standard taxpayer would have been subject. s6
After permitting partnerships to compute taxable income,
Congress enacted rules governing the computation of partnership
taxable income to assure that all partnerships computed income
similarly. 7 In 1918, Congress required partnerships to compute
net income in the same manner and on the same basis as

States (if and to the extent that it is provided in the Act authorizing the issue of
such obligations of the United States that they are exempt from taxation), and
its possessions, and that for the purpose of computing the normal tax there shall
be allowed a credit, as provided by section five, subdivision (b), for their
proportionate share of the profits derived from dividends.
Id. Prior acts did not require the language in the authorizing act. See Revenue Act of
1916, ch. 463, § (8)(e), 39 Stat. 756, 762-63 (excluding language pertaining to the
authorization of a tax exemption). The War Revenue Act of 1917 also provided that
income of a partnership reported as requested by the Commissioner should not include
exempt income. War Revenue Act of 1917, § 1204(1)(e).
83.
See Borden et al., supra note 69, at 1176 (noting that Congress implemented a
fiscal year system for partnership tax accounting in order to establish consistency among
taxpayers).
84.
War Revenue Act of 1917, § 1204(1)(e). For example, the statutory rate of
income for individuals was 1% in 1915 and 2% in 1916. Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § ILA,
38 Stat. 114, 166; Revenue Act of 1916, § 1(a). If a partnership's taxable year straddled
those two years, the income could be subject to different tax rates. Congress required the
income to be split between the two years:
If a fiscal year ends during nineteen hundred and sixteen or a subsequent
calendar year for which there is a rate of tax different from the rate for the
preceding calendar year, then (1) the rate for such preceding calendar year shall
apply to an amount of each partner's share of such partnership profits equal to
the proportion which the part of such fiscal year falling within such calendar
year bears to the full fiscal year, and (2) the rate for the calendar year during
which such fiscal year ends shall apply to the remainder.
War Revenue Act of 1917, § 1204(1)(e).
85.
See supra Part III.B (pertaining to the War Revenue Act of 1917).
86.
See Borden et. al., supra note 69, at 1176 (discussing Congress's intent to
.consistently tax individuals who invested in partnerships").
87.
See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 218(d), 40 Stat. 1057, 1070 (1919) (stating the
requirements for computation of net income of a partnership). For example, without such
a rule, one partnership may have used corporate tax rules while another may have used
individual tax rules to compute taxable income.
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individuals.88 The 1918 Act also required partners to include their
"distributive share[s] . .. of the net income of the partnership" in
their respective individual incomes for the individual tax years
during which the partnership's tax year ended.89 These rules
imposed the same accounting and reporting rules on all
partnerships and partners.9 ° Thus, they created the first uniform
method for computing partnership taxable income and reflected a
change in congressional focus from standard equity to deviation
equity (i.e., the focus turned to whether arrangements similar to
partnerships were subject to partnership tax law).91
Although Congress did not state its purpose for enacting
these rules in 1918, it later referred to uniform reporting and its
desire to "make it easier for the members to determine the
distributive shares in the [partnership] gains and losses which
are to be included in their own returns."92 This explanation refers
to equity (uniform reporting), simplicity, and administrability
(ease of determination).93 The reference to ease indicates that
88.
Id. ("The net income of the partnership shall be computed in the same manner
and on the same basis as provided in section 212 [(rules for computing the net income of
an individual)], except that the deduction provided in paragraph (11) of subdivision (a) of
section 214 [(the deduction for charitable contributions)] shall not be allowed.").
89.
Id. § 218(a) ("There shall be included in computing the net income of each
partner his distributive share, whether distributed or not, of the net income of the
partnership for the taxable year, or, if his net income for such taxable year is computed
upon the basis of a period different from that upon the basis of which the net income of
the partnership is computed, then his distributive share of the net income of the
partnership for any accounting period of the partnership ending within the fiscal or
calendar year upon the basis of which the partner's net income is computed."). The Act
also addressed the partners' shares of partnership credit: "The partner shall, for the
purpose of the normal tax, be allowed as credits, in addition to the credits allowed to him
under section 216, his proportionate share of such amounts specified in subdivisions
(a) [(addressing credits for corporate dividends received)] and (b) [(addressing credits for
interest on United States and War Finance Corporation bonds)] of section 216 as are
received by the partnership." Id. This did not alter the flow-through status of
partnerships. See H.R. REP. No. 65-767, at 11 (1918) ("Under the proposed bill the
partners will be liable to income tax the same as under existing law. The partnership as
such is not liable to income tax, but each partner will pay his income tax upon his share of
the partnership profits whether the same are distributed or not.").
90.
Subsequent legislation addressed which taxable year a partnership could adopt.
I.R.C. § 706(b) (1958); I.R.C. § 706(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1987). These rules are intended to
limit partners' ability to defer the inclusion of income through partnership taxable year
manipulation. See infra note 164-66 and accompanying text. For an in-depth discussion of
the history and purpose of the partnership taxable year rules, see Christopher H. Hanna,
A Partnership'sBusiness Purpose Taxable Year: A Deferral Provision Whose Time Has
Passed, 45 TAX LAW. 685, 688-94, 701-02 (1992).
91.
Indeed, in subsequent years, Congress confirmed this intent. See infra note 100
and accompanying text (noting that Congress avoids "uncertainty" by requiring
syndicates to file information returns comparable to partnership returns).
92.
H.R. REP. No. 72-708, at 53 (1932) (referring to the statutory definition of tax
partnership).
93.
Id.
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Congress recognized a difference between the standard
taxpayer's computation of net income and a partner taxpayer's
computation. This difference justified treating the partner
taxpayer differently from the standard taxpayer.
C. The Statutory Definition of Tax Partnership
The legislative history accompanying the 1932 Act reveals
that Congress focused on deviation equity in enacting the
definition of tax partnership.94 The 1932 Act defined
"partnership" for federal tax purposes as "a syndicate, group,
pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization, through
or by means of which any business, financial operation, or
venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of
this Act, a trust or estate or a corporation."9 This language has
largely survived until this day.9" The Committee Report indicates
that Congress believed that taxpayers were not making
partnership returns for "income from the operations of joint
ventures, syndicates, pools, and similar organizations."97 Some
taxpayers would not account for the income of such ventures on
an annual basis but would wait and report the income from the
entire operation when it was wound up.9" Congress was also
concerned that members of such arrangements would have to
account for operations on the basis of their own accounting
periods and according to their own accounting methods,
irrespective of the arrangement's accounting period or methodan issue addressed with respect to partnerships in prior tax
acts.99 Congress believed that by defining tax partnership

94.
See infra Part VI.B.2 (discussing deviation equity).
95.
Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 111(a)(3), 47 Stat. 289, 289.
96.
See supra Part II.B.
97.
H.R. REP. No. 72-708, at 53 (1932) ("Some confusion has existed over the
requirements of the prior acts as to the time and manner of returning income from the
operations of joint ventures, syndicates, pools, and similar organizations. If the syndicate
was not an association, partnership, or trust within the meaning of the act, there was no
express requirement in the act or regulations for the filing of a syndicate return, and the
sole responsibility of making returns of the annual gains and losses of the syndicate was
placed upon the several members.").
98.
Id. ("Quite frequently, however, the members of such a syndicate overlooked the
necessity of their making returns each year of their shares in the annual gains and losses
from syndicate operations and assumed that they were required only to make returns of
their shares in the ultimate gain or loss from the entire syndicate operations in the year
when the syndicate was wound up or liquidated."). This treatment differed from the
reporting required of partnerships, which were required to compute and report income on
an annual basis. See supra note 82.
99.
H.R. REP. No. 72-708, at 53 (1932) ("Moreover, a strict observance of the letter
of the prior acts would have required each member to determine his annual share in the
syndicate gains or losses upon the basis of his own accounting period and according to his
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broadly, it could eliminate that uncertainty and subject all
similar arrangements to the partnership tax accounting and
of arrangements
reporting rules.' °° The focus on the similarity
0'
equity.
deviation
to
commitment
a
reflects
By identifying specific arrangements in the definition,
Congress also focused on the legal form of arrangements. The
focus on deviation equity and the legal forms of entities is partly
to blame for the current status of the definition of tax
partnership. 2 Instead of considering whether treating the
members of the various arrangements differently from the
standard taxpayer was justified by the difference between such
arrangements and the standard taxpayer, Congress clumped the
several arrangements into a single category.'03 This may not
reflect, in all situations, the purposes for which Congress enacted
the partnership tax rules and has the potential of violating
standard equity.
Conspicuously omitted from the statutory definition of tax
partnership is the type of partnership with which syndicates,
groups, pools, joint ventures, and other unincorporated
organizations should be compared. The tax laws had referred to
partnerships for almost twenty years before Congress enacted a
definition of tax partnership.' 4 The omission of a definition of tax
partnership in the early acts indicates that Congress enacted the
rules to govern substantive-law partnerships in these early laws.
Early rulings and cases that adopted the substantive-law
definition of partnership support this conclusion.' 5
own method of accounting, irrespective of the accounting period or method of accounting
upon which the books or records of the syndicate were kept.").
100.
Id. ("The bill does away with this uncertainty by placing all joint ventures,
syndicates, pools, and similar organizations, which do not constitute associations or
trusts, in the category of partnerships, and the members of such syndicates, pools, etc., in
the category of partners. This provision will have the effect of requiring the syndicate to
file an information return similar to the return of a partnership and will thus make it
easier for the members to determine the distributive shares in the syndicate gains and
losses which are to be included in their own returns.").
101.
Estate of Appleby v. Comm'r, 41 B.T.A. 18, 21 (1940) (stating that the new
statute "was intended primarily to provide a more definite category for syndicates, and for
organizations similar to them, to pools, and to joint ventures, the taxation of the income of
which had been troublesome"), affd, 123 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1941).
102.
See infra text accompanying notes 431-35 (noting that Congress and courts
have relied heavily on deviation equity to define tax partnership, and explaining the
confusion stemming from this reliance).
103.
See I.R.C. § 761(a) (1958) (defining the term "partnership").
104.
See supra Parts III.A-B.
105.
See, e.g., Newell v. Comm'r, 17 B.T.A. 93, 96 (1929) ("No rigid rules can be laid
down as to the requirements to establish the relationship. Ordinarily where two or more
persons associate themselves together for a common undertaking for profit, and share in
the profits or losses, a partnership results."); Kier v. Comm'r, 15 B.T.A. 1114, 1117 (1929)
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D. The 1954 Code: An Amalgam of the Entity and Aggregate
Theories
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ("1954 Code") adopted
comprehensive partnership tax rules, which were codified in
subchapter K of that code." 6 These rules are an amalgam of the
aggregate and entity theories." 7 Their enactment followed
significant debate among practitioners, academics, and
Treasury.0 8 The survival of the aggregate theory in the 1954
Code and subsequent acts signals a departure from substantive
law, which now treats partnerships as separate entities.'0 9 The
rules that adopt the aggregate theory demonstrate Congress's
desire to treat partner taxpayers similarly to the standard
taxpayer when possible. The rules that adopt the entity theory
largely reflect Congress's commitment to simplicity and
administrative convenience in partnership taxation."0
("'Partnership is the association of two or more persons, for the purpose of carrying on
business together, and dividing its profits between them."' (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 2395)); see also infra Part V.A-B.1 (defining substantive-law partnership and listing tax
cases that adopt the substantive-law definition).
106.
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591-736, 68 Stat. 3, 239; see also J.
Paul Jackson et al., The InternalRevenue Code of 1954: Partnerships,54 COLUM. L. REV.
1183 (1954) (providing an in-depth description of the tax rules in the 1954 Code). The
partnership tax rules remain codified in subchapter K of the Code, See I.R.C. § 761 (2000).
107.
Several provisions of the 1954 Code adopt the aggregate theory that attempts to
disregard the partnership for tax purposes. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 701 (1958) (subjecting
partners, not partnerships, to tax on partnership income); I.R.C. §§ 734, 743 (1958)
(allowing basis adjustments to partnership property on certain distributions and sales of
partnership interests); I.R.C. § 751 (1958) (considering partnership assets to determine
the character of any gain or loss realized on the disposition of a partnership interest).
Other provisions adopt the entity theory, recognizing partnerships for tax purposes. See,
e.g., I.R.C. § 702(b) (1958) (characterizing tax items at the partnership level); I.R.C.
§ 703(a) (1958) (requiring partnerships to compute taxable income); I.R.C. § 706(b) (1958)
(providing rules for determining the partnership taxable year); I.R.C. § 707 (1958)
(providing rules for transactions between partners and the partnership); I.R.C. § 708
(1958) (providing rules for determining when a tax partnership terminates); I.R.C. § 741
(1958) (treating the interest in a partnership as property for tax purposes). Some
provisions adopt aspects of both. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 721 (1958) (providing that neither the
partners nor the partnership recognize gain or loss on the contribution of property to the
partnership); I.R.C. §§ 722-723 (1958) (providing rules for determining the basis of
contributed property); I.R.C. § 731 (1958) (providing rules for recognizing gain or loss on
distributions from a partnership to a partner). The application of the entity and aggregate
theories calls for careful policy scrutiny, leaving work for a future article.
108.
See Mark P. Gergen, The Story of Subchapter K: Mark H. Johnson's Quest, in
BUSINESS TAX STORIES, supra note 33, at 207.
109.
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 201(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 91 (2001).
110.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 703(a) (1958) (requiring, with only a few exceptions, that
partnership taxable income be computed in the same manner as individual income);
I.R.C. § 706(b)(1) (1958) (determining the partnership's taxable year the same as if the
partnership were a taxpayer); I.R.C. § 741 (1958) (requiring that gain or loss be
recognized to the "transferor partner" in the partnership); see also supra text
accompanying notes 82-83 (noting that the requirement to compute taxable income at the
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The 1954 Code also replicated the statutory definition of tax
partnership and adopted rules that allow certain types of
arrangements to elect out of subchapter K ("section 761
elections"). 1 ' Although such elections may only affect the
application of subchapter K, they create de facto nontax
partnerships, at least with respect to subchapter K.112 Thus, the
section 761 elections effectively exclude certain arrangements
from the definition of tax partnership, at least in part. 113 One of
these elections appears to be a codification of the joint-profit
test." 4 The origin of the others is less clear."'
Although the section 761 elections create a partial exception
from the definition of tax partnership, the interaction with

tax partnership level and the taxable year rules were adopted for simplicity and
administrative convenience). Treating interests in tax partnerships as property simplifies
accounting on a disposition or acquisition of an interest, because parties are not required
to account for each asset of the partnership. But see I.R.C. § 751 (2000) (requiring
partners to identify and account for gain attributable to partnership accounts receivable
and inventory).
111.
See I.R.C. § 761(a) (1958) (defining the term "partnership").
112.
See id. (offering three arrangements which may be elected by an unincorporated
organization to exclude the organization from tax partnerhip status). The IRS has created
an interdependence test to determine what provisions outside of subchapter K apply to
tax partnerships, including those eligible for the section 761 elections. I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,043 (Oct. 5, 1983) ("[I]f a particular section of the Code is 'interdependent' with
section 761(a), the [qualified] partnership should not be treated as a partnership for
purposes of such section."); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,982 (Jan. 13, 1977). If, however,
the other section is not interdependent with section 761(a), the qualified partnership will
be treated as a partnership for purposes of such other section. Id. A section is
interdependent with section 7 61(a) if the other section can be applied without requiring
the partnership to compute income at the partnership level. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,043 (Oct. 5, 1983). Several sections of the Code are not interdependent with section
761(a) and, therefore, will treat qualified tax partnerships as tax partnerships for
purposes of the other sections. See, e.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512,
516-17 (7th Cir. 1980) (determining that section 195 is not interdependent with section
761(a)(1)); Rev. Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30, 30-31 (applying former section 48(c)(2)(A)'s
dollar limitation at the qualified tax partnership level even though the taxpayers had
elected out of partnership treatment for purposes of subchapter K). But see I.R.C.
§ 1031(a)(2)(D) (2000) (disregarding a qualified tax partnership for section 1031
purposes).
113.
See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 633 F.2d at 515 (noting that section 761(a) allows
certain qualifying organizations to be excluded from subchapter K partnership
provisions).
114.
Id. at 515-16; see supra Part V.B.3 (explaining the joint-profit test).
115.
See, e.g., Bradley T. Borden, Revisiting the Federal Tax Definition of Partnership
and the § 761(a)(1) Election in the TIC Environment, 47 TAx MGMT. MEMORANDUM 51,
59-62 (2006) (discussing the possible origin and application of section 7 6 1(a)(1)). This
issue deserves further attention and consideration in addition to Professor McMahon's
seminal work on the section 761 elections. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr. The Availability
and Effect of Election out of PartnershipStatus Under Section 761(a), 9 VA. TAX REV. 1, 3
(1989) (discussing tax consequences pertaining to oil and gas joint operating agreements
classified as partnerships).
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section 7701 is considered a two-part analysis." 6 First, the
analysis asks whether an arrangement is a tax partnership
under section 7701(a)(2)."7 Second, if the arrangement is a tax
partnership, the analysis asks whether the arrangement may
elect out of subchapter K under section 761.118 This analysis does
not explicitly treat section 761(a) as a partial carve-out from the
definition of tax partnership, but by excluding certain
arrangements from subchapter K, the effect is the same as an
explicit exception.
Following the enactment of the 1954 Code, Treasury
promulgated a regulatory definition of tax partnership."9 That
regulation repeated the statutory definition of tax partnership,
providing, "The term 'partnership' is broader in scope than the
common law meaning of partnership, and may include groups not
commonly called partnerships."2 ° The definition incorporated
concepts from the substantive-law definition of tax partnership
and common law.'2 ' When check-the-box regulations were
116.
See, e.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 633 F.2d at 517 (concluding that the
arrangement was a tax partnership under sections 7701(a)(2) and 761(a) of the Code);
Baughn v. Comm'r, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1447, 1455-57 (1969) (allowing a section 7701
partnership to make the section 761(a)(2) election).
117.
See, e.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 633 F.2d at 517 (concluding that the
arrangement was a tax partnership under sections 7701(a)(2) and 761(a) of the Code);
Baughn v. Comm'r, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1447, 1455-57 (1969) (allowing a section 7701
partnership to make the section 761 (a)(2) election).
118.
Determining the availability of the election is also a difficult task. See, e.g.,
Borden, supra note 115, at 59-61 (speculating as to the type of arrangements to which
section 761(a)(1) election applies).
119.
T.D. 6175, 1956-1 C.B. 211, 213.
120.
Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1956). Treasury's reference to
common law is unclear. At the time the regulation was promulgated, courts had rejected
the state-law definition of partnership. See, e.g., Haley v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 815, 818-20
(5th Cir. 1953) (looking to the definition of partnership under section 3797 of the Code to
determine whether a partnership existed between the parties); Earp v. Jones, 131 F.2d
292, 293 (10th Cir. 1942) (analyzing whether the parties' arrangement satisfied the
definition of a partnership under federal, not state law). However, some courts still looked
to state law. See, e.g., Winmill v. Comm'r, 93 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1937) (determining
that under state law, a partnership existed between the parties for tax purposes), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 84 (1938); First Mechs. Bank v.
Comm'r, 91 F.2d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 1937) (acknowledging that under the Revenue Act of
1932, joint ventures are included as partnerships). Perhaps most significantly, courts
relied on substantive law to define tax partnership. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S.
280, 282-83 (1946) (relying on sections 181 and 182 of the Code in determining the
parties' tax consequences in their "individual capacity"). Thus, the reference to common
law is not certain.
121.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (as amended in 1956) (codifying the rule from tax
cases, stating that "[miere coownership of property which is maintained, kept in repair,
and rented or leased does not constitute a partnership," and adopting a substantive-law
rule: "[I]f an individual owner, or tenants in common, of farm property lease it to a farmer
for a cash rental or a share of the crops, they do not necessarily create a partnership
thereby"); see also Brown v. Coates, 420 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi

2006]

TAX PARTNERSHIP

951

promulgated, Treasury amended section 761 regulations, which
included the definition in the check-the-box regulations by
reference. 122 The check-the-box regulations adopted a significant
portion of the definition in the old section 761 regulations. 123 The
check-the-box regulations, however, dropped the reference to
common law and instead state that the definition of tax
partnership "does not depend on whether the organization
is... an entity under local law."'24 They also use the term
"separate entity" instead of "partnership."'25 This regulatory
definition indicates that Treasury considered an arrangement's
substance more important than its form. It does not, however,
describe the standard for assessing the arrangement's substance.
E. The Section 704(b) Allocation Rules and Assignment of
Income
Perhaps the most significant provision in the 1954 Code is
section 704, which allowed partners to allocate partnership items
to the partners by agreement, so long as such allocations were
not for the principal purpose of avoiding or evading tax. 126 That
provision was later amended to prevent agreed allocations that
do not have "substantial economic effect." 1 7 Following that
change, Treasury promulgated very complicated regulations for
2
testing whether allocations have substantial economic effect. 1
Those allocation rules treat partner taxpayers differently from

1967) (holding that payment of a fixed portion of crops did not create a substantive-law
partnership).
122.
Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1 (as amended in 1997); T.D. 8717, 1997-1 C.B. 125, 128.
123.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (as amended in 2006) (adopting the examples
from section 761 regulations but changing the terminology from "partnership" to
"separate entity").
124.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2006).
125.
Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1956) (excluding the term
"separate entity" from the definition of "partnership"), with Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(1)
to (2) (as amended in 2006) (acknowledging that some arrangements may give rise to a
"separate entity" for taxation purposes).
126.
See I.R.C. § 704(a)-(b) (1958) (providing for the allocation of a partner's
distributive share as determined by a partnership agreement); see also WILLIAM S.
MCKEE ET AL., 1 FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS ch. 10 (1977)
(describing the partnership allocation rules); ARTHUR B. WILLIS ET AL., PARTNERSHIP
TAXATION 10.01[3], at 10-8 to -12 (6th ed. Supp. No. 3 2006) (discussing the partnership
allocation rules and their development).
127.
I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (2000); see also Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§ 213(d), 90 Stat. 1520, 1548 (requiring that a partner's distributive share be determined
by a partner's interest in the partnership if the allocation "does not have substantial
economic effect").
128.
T.D. 8065, 1986-1 C.B. 254-55; Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (as amended in 2005).
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the standard taxpayer, who is required to adhere to the
assignment-of-income doctrine.'2 9
The assignment-of-income doctrine provides that the person
who owns property or performs services should recognize the
income from such property or services. 3 ° The Supreme Court has
referred to the doctrine as the "first principle of income taxation,"
the tenet that "income must be taxed to him who earns it."'131 The
doctrine considers the source of income.'3 2 Under the assignmentof-income doctrine, courts and the IRS have disallowed attempts
to sever and reassign income from the owner of property or
service provider."3 Taxpayers have attempted to use the tax
partnership allocation rules to shift income to family members,"'

129.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b).
130.
See, e.g., Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 583 (1941) (holding that the
assignment amount was includible as taxable income); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136,
141-42 (1932) (requiring that a husband include his distributive share of net income
despite assignment of a one-half interest to his wife); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15
(1930) ("[Hle was the only party to the contracts by which the salary and fees were
earned, and it is somewhat hard to say that the last step in the performance of those
contracts could be taken by anyone but himself alone."); see also Comm'r v. Banks, 543
U.S. 426, 430-31 (2005) (holding that a litigant must include as taxable income the
amount payable to the attorney as a contingent fee). But see Brant J. Hellwig, The
Supreme Court's Casual Use of the Assignment of Income Doctrine, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV.
751 (2006) (arguing that the assignment-of-income doctrine should be used only for
gratuitous assignments of income and other tax principles should apply to compensatory
assignments).
131.
Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1949).
132.
Earl, 281 U.S. at 114-15 ("There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries
to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory
arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid
from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it .... [Flruits [cannot be]
attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.").
133.
See, e.g., Banks, 543 U.S. at 430 (holding that a contingent fee paid to attorney
out of a money judgment is included in plaintiffs income); Earl, 281 U.S. at 114-15
(holding that income earned by husband must be allocated to the husband).
134.
See, e.g., Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 748 (holding that recognition of a partnership
between a father and his sons depends on whether a bona fide intent that the sons take
part in the business exists); Lusthaus v. Comm'r, 327 U.S. 293, 295 (1946) (rejecting an
attempt to shift income between husband and wife by means of a family partnership);
Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 291-92 (1946) (holding that no meaningful partnership
existed between husband and wife when the husband actually earned all the income of
the partnership and the wife had no role in the business); Ballou v. United States, 370
F.2d 659, 664 (6th Cir. 1966) (deferring to lower court's finding that parents transferred
tax partnership interest to children's trusts and finding no tax partnership); Maletis v.
United States, 200 F.2d 97, 97 (9th Cir. 1952) (attempting to shift income from father to
sons by means of a partnership); Earp v. Jones, 131 F.2d 292, 292-93 (10th Cir. 1942)
(attempting to shift income between husband and wife by means of a family partnership);
Comm'r v. Olds, 60 F.2d 252, 253, 255 (6th Cir. 1932) (holding that a bona fide family
partnership between father and daughters existed); Sherman v. United States, 141 F.
Supp. 369, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (attempting to shift income from father to wife and sons by
means of a partnership); Estate of Winkler v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1657, 1658 (1997)
(attempting to shift income from lottery winnings to family partnership); Linsenmeyer v.
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and have more recently made attempts to shift income to foreign
entities exempt from U.S. tax.'3 5 Courts have held that such
arrangements are not tax partnerships, reassigning income to
the owner of property or provider of service.'36 In each of these
instances, the court looked to the source of the income and traced
it to the party who owned or controlled the services or property
generating the income."' The partnership tax rules should not
disrupt the application of this doctrine, unless some overriding
3 8 That overriding
policy consideration justifies the departure.'
139
consideration is tax administration.
The tax partnership allocation rules respond to a
fundamental difficulty of conduit taxation-determining whose
tax base gets credited with income and expenses from a tax
partnership. 4 ° The tax partnership allocation rules provide that
Comm'r, 25 T.C. 1126, 1130-31 (1956) (attempting to shift income to children in the
partnership although the father never intended that the children, though listed as
partners, operate the business or contribute capital); Stern v. Comm'r, 15 T.C. 521, 52627 (1950) (attempting to shift income from father to sons by means of a partnership).
See, e.g., TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, No. 05-0064-cv, 2006 WL 2171519,
135.
at *3-4, (2d Cir. Aug. 3, 2006) (attempting to shift income to a foreign entity); Andantech
L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 331 F.3d 972, 973 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same); Boca Investerings P'ship v.
United States, 314 F.3d 625, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same); Saba P'ship v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d
1135, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (same); ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505, 506
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (same).
136.
See, e.g., Lusthaus, 327 U.S. at 297 (holding that allocation rules are not
applicable because no genuine partnership exists); Tower, 327 U.S. at 291-92 (holding
that no meaningful partnership existed between husband and wife where the husband
actually earned all the income of the partnership and the wife had no role in the
business); Andantech L.L.C., 331 F.3d at 973 (finding that a nontax business purpose did
not exist, so the arrangement was not a tax partnership); ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at
516 (holding that lack of a nontax business purpose indicates the arrangement does not
qualify as a tax partnership); Ballou, 370 F.2d at 663-64 (holding that no bona fide
partnership existed between a husband and wife and their minor children because the
children contributed no capital to the partnership); Earp, 131 F.2d at 294 (holding that an
arrangement between husband and wife was more fanciful than real and was therefore
not a tax partnership); Linsenmeyer, 25 T.C. at 1134 (holding that no bona fide family
partnership existed because it was never intended that the children, although listed as
partners, operate the business or contribute capital).
See supra note 136.
137.
See infra Part VI.B (discussing equity, one of the fundamental principles of a
138.
sound tax system); see also Darryll K. Jones, Towards Equity and Efficiency in
PartnershipAllocations, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1047, 1069-70 (stating that tax law should also
assign nontransferable burdens and benefits to taxpayers based on their economic
benefits and burdens).
Because of the extreme complexity of the partnership tax allocation rules,
139.
partnership tax pundits may doubt whether this is a sincere statement. Although
complex, the partnership tax allocation rules provide a workable model. Tracing would be
very difficult (if not impossible), making the complex allocation rules more desirable than
the impossibility of tracing.
140.
See George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX
REV. 141, 154 (1999) ("The source of the difficulty is the fact that income and other items
realized by many business entities are treated under state law as belonging to the entity
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partners may establish their own allocation methods by
agreement, subject to the substantial economic effect test.'41
Congress could attempt to draft complicated rules to trace
income from partnership property or services to the member who
owns the property or provides the service, but such an attempt
could not accomplish its intended purpose in many situations.'

and not to the owners. The receipt by the owners of the entity's income, for example, may
arise only upon a distribution from the entity. Yet consistent with basic income tax
principles, tax reporting of the income cannot await distribution. Someone must include it
in that person's tax base when the income arises. Thus, if there is no distribution of the
income by the entity, there must nevertheless be a current allocation of the income among
the owners to permit them to report currently their share of it.").
141.
See I.R.C. § 704(a)-(b) (2000) (permitting partners to set forth in the
partnership agreement the manner in which the partnership items will be allocated to the
partners); see also Yin, supra note 140, at 154 ("Hence, by private agreement, the
partners might decide to allocate the income of the partnership equally among
themselves, or to allocate all of the income to only one partner, or to provide for any other
sharing arrangement."). Although the partnership tax rules leniently allow partnerships
to allocate items of income, gain, expense, and loss, there are parameters intended to
prevent the abusive use of allocation. See I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (2000) (disregarding
partnership allocations if they do not have substantial economic effect); see also Treas.
Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1) (as amended in 2005) (noting three ways an allocation will be
respected: (1) "the allocation [has] substantial economic effect," (2) "the allocation [is] in
accordance with the partner's interest in the partnership," or (3) "the allocation [is]
deemed to be in accordance with the partner's interest in the partnership"); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 2005) (deeming an allocation to have substantial
economic effect if it has economic effect and if it is substantial); Treas. Reg. § 1.7041(b)(2)(ii) (as amended in 2005) ("In order for an allocation to have economic effect, it
must be consistent with the underlying economic arrangement of the partners."); Treas.
Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 2005) (noting that an allocation "is substantial if
there is a reasonable possibility that the allocation ... will affect substantially the dollar
amounts to be received by the partners from the partnership, independent of tax
consequences. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the economic effect of an
allocation ...is not substantial if, at the time the allocation becomes part of the
partnership agreement, (1) the after-tax economic consequences of at least one partner
may, in present value terms, be enhanced compared to such consequences if the
allocation... were not contained in the partnership agreement, and (2) there is a strong
likelihood that the after-tax economic consequences of no partner will, in present value
terms, be substantially diminished compared to such consequences if the
allocation ... were not contained in the partnership agreement."). The partnership tax
allocation rules are the source of much concern for many people. This area of tax law is
perhaps the most complex. See, e.g., Twenty Mile Joint Venture, PND, Ltd. v. Comm'r,
200 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) ("We are mindful that '[p]artnership taxation
is ... generally recognized as the most difficult area of the Internal Revenue Code.'"
(quoting HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP 411 (2d ed. 1990))).
142.
But see Yin, supra note 140, at 164 ("The central flaw of the conduit model is its
inability to provide assurance that the proper amount of business income and loss for any
given year is allocated and taxed to the proper owner."). Commentators have criticized the
partnership tax rules as being overly complicated. See Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither
PartnershipTaxation?, 47 TAx L. REV. 105, 108 (1991) ("[Subchapter K] has become one of
the most inaccessible and burdensome features of the entire tax system."). Nonetheless,
any attempt to trace income and expenses from the property owned or services provided
by the parties back to the arrangement would create even more difficult administrative
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In fact, any such attempts would likely create extremely complex
rules and accomplish little more than the current rules
accomplish.' The current allocation rules reflect a compromise
between
the
assignment-of-income
doctrine
and
the
administrative inconvenience of attempting to trace income from
partnership property or services to the member who owns the
property or performs the services.
Unlike the assignment-of-income doctrine, the allocation
rules do not focus on the source of income."' Instead, they
generally allow allocations of tax items, look to the economic
treatment of an allocation, and require that the tax treatment
follow the economic allocation of such items.1 4' In essence, the
allocation rules allow partners to agree on the economic
allocation of items but require that the partner to whom an item
146
is allocated recognize the tax consequence of that allocation.
Thus, unlike the assignment-of-income doctrine, substantial
economic effect generally ignores the source of the item. The
closest the substantial economic effect test comes to retaining
some semblance of the assignment-of-income doctrine is by
requiring that allocations not decrease the partners' overall tax
liability. "7 In this manner, the allocation rules consider the
problems for taxpayers, tax advisors, and the IRS.
143.
Treasury could establish some general principles to partially address some of
these concerns. For example, it could require that income be allocated among different
types of investor groups (e.g., capital investors and service investors), and within those
groups tracing may be possible. For example, within the investor group, tracing may be
possible based on the proportionate investment of each member of the group. While these
are important issues to consider, they are beyond the scope of this Article and warrant a
separate article that thoroughly examines the allocation rules. Commentators have
further suggested that partnership items be allocated according to the members' interest
in the arrangement. See generally Yin, supra note 140, at 154 (discussing the possibilities
for allocating partnership income).
144.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a) (as amended in 2005).
145.
Id. ("In order for an allocation to have economic effect, it must be consistent
with the underlying economic arrangement of the partners. This means that in the event
there is an economic benefit or economic burden that corresponds to an allocation, the
partner to whom the allocation [of the tax item] is made must receive such economic
benefit or bear such economic burden.").
146.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 2005) ("To the extent an allocation
under the partnership agreement of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item
thereof) to a partner ... is not in accordance with the partner's interest in the
partnership ....
such income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item thereof) will be
reallocated in accordance with the partner's interest in the partnership.
").
147.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 2005) ("[T]he economic effect of an
allocation (or allocations) is not substantial if, at the time the allocation becomes part of
the partnership agreement, (1) the after-tax economic consequences of at least one
partner may, in present value terms, be enhanced compared to such consequences if the
allocation (or allocations) were not contained in the partnership agreement, and (2) there
is a strong likelihood that the after-tax economic consequences of no partner will, in
present value terms, be substantially diminished compared to such consequences if the
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source of income only to determine an allocation's effect on the
overall taxability of the taxpayers, but they focus on the back-end
of the allocation. 4 s The purpose of the allocation rules appears to
be to overcome the administratively impossible task of tracing
income and expenses from property and services of members of
certain arrangements."' Because the rules disregard the
assignment-of-income doctrine, the definition of tax partnership
should make them available only when tracing is not possible.
F.

The Anti-Abuse Rules

Congress has amended the 1954 Code several times, often
for anti-abuse purposes.15 ° For example, anti-abuse rules prevent
taxpayers from using tax partnerships to alter the character of
unrealized gain or loss, 5 ' and from transferring property among
partners tax free. 5 ' Thus, the final purpose of the partnership tax
rules is to prevent the abusive use of the rules.
This brief review of the history of partnership taxation
reveals that Congress attempts to disregard partnerships and
enacts partnership rules to (1) simplify partnership tax
accounting and reporting, (2) facilitate the administration of the
tax, and (3) prevent taxpayers from using the partnership tax

allocation (or allocations) were not contained in the partnership agreement.").
148.
For example, the substantial economic effect test considers whether a special
allocation of capital gain reduces the overall tax liabilities of the partners. The source of
the income is important only to determine substantiality, not to consider assignment of
income.
149.
When an entity is formed to own property, the arrangement becomes different
from the direct ownership of the property. See Yin, supra note 140, at 163-64 ("[Tjhe
conduit model requires the existence of an economic baseline against which a tax
allocation can be tested. Yet so long as there is state law separation between the entity
and the owners that is, the owners do not, in fact, own the assets directly but instead
only own interests in the firm which owns the assets-the economic baseline against
which the tax allocation needs to be compared is necessarily missing."). In situations
where there is no activity other than owning the property, however, income can be traced
from the property to the owners in proportion to their ownership in the entity.
150. See Jennifer C. Root, The Commissioner's Clear Reflection of Income Power
Under § 446(B) and the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review: Where Has the Rule of
Law Gone, and Can We Get It Back?, 15 AKRON TAX J. 69, 83 (2000) ("[L]egislators have
instituted anti-abuse laws that try to prevent.., circumvention of the purposes behind
taxation.").
151.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 724(a)-(c) (2000) (providing that unrealized receivables,
inventory, and loss property retain their character after being contributed to a tax
partnership); I.R.C. § 735(a) (2000) (providing that gain from distributed inventory
remains ordinary to distributee partners for at least five years).
152.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(B) (2000) (requiring the contributing partner of
property to recognize gain or loss from property contributed to the partnership); I.R.C.
§ 737 (2000) (restricting partners from selling and exchanging property through a
partnership).
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rules for abusive purposes."' When possible, Congress attempts
to treat partner taxpayers the same as the standard taxpayer by
The definition of tax
adopting the aggregate theory.'
partnership should take these purposes into account to ensure
only those arrangements that would otherwise have complicated
accounting and reporting concerns and tax administration
difficulties come within the definition. The consequences of
negligently granting or denying access to the rules are
significant."'
IV. EFFECT OF THE DEFINITION OF TAx PARTNERSHIP
Although tax partnerships are not subject to an entity-level
tax, as tax corporations and tax trusts are, tax partnership
classification may affect timing of income and loss recognition, the
character of gain or loss, the time the statute of limitations tolls,
and the applicability of other tax concepts, each of which may
significantly affect a taxpayer's tax liability. The myriad cases and
rulings addressing the definition of tax partnership stand as a
testimony of the significance of the definition."' The definition of tax
partnership can affect three general types of tax rules: (1) timing
and accounting rules, (2) transactional rules, and (3) procedural
rules.
A.

Timing and Accounting Rules

The definition of tax partnership determines whether the rules
of subchapter K apply to an arrangement. 7 If an arrangement is a
tax partnership, subchapter K generally applies to the
arrangement."' Alternatively, if an arrangement is not a tax

153.
See supra Part III.B (discussing the purpose behind the adoption of tax
reporting rules).
154.
See supra Part III.D ("The rules that adopt the aggregate theory demonstrate
Congress's desire to treat partner taxpayers similarly to the standard taxpayer when
possible.").
155.
See supra Part II.E ("Because the rules disregard the assignment-of-incomedoctrine, the definition of tax partnership should make them available only when tracing
is not possible.").
156.
See, e.g., Luckey v. Comm'r, 334 F.2d 719, 722 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that
section 735 applied because the arrangement was a partnership); Bryant v. Comm'r, 46
T.C. 848, 862-64 (1966) (excluding subchapter K from applying to the partnership).
157.
See Bryant, 46 T.C. at 862-64 (ruling that subchapter K does not apply to the
partnership); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-15-003 (June 17, 1982) (determining whether an
entity is a tax partnership prior to allowing the entity to elect out of subchapter K).
158.
See Demirjian v. Comm'r, 457 F.2d 1, 5-6 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that if a
partnership exists, section 703(b) requires that the election be made at the partnership
level); Luckey, 334 F.2d at 722 (applying section 735 because the arrangement was a
partnership); Estate of Levine v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 780, 788 (1979) (holding that a partner
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partnership, subchapter K does not apply to the arrangement.'59
Subchapter K can affect whether gross income and deductions are
reported by members or whether they individually report shares of
taxable income from an arrangement.16 In at least one case, this
distinction affected the application of a limit based upon gross
income."'
The definition of tax partnership can be important in
determining the proper tax year for recognizing gain or loss.' The
current partnership tax rules provide that partnerships compute;
taxable income on an annual basis.' Partners then report income
from the partnership based on the year during which the
partnership's taxable year ends.'64 Without these rules, partners

must include partnership income in the partner's taxable income for the partner taxable
year during which the partnership's taxable year ends). But see I.R.C. § 761(a) (2000)
(providing that certain unincorporated organizations may elect out of the partnership tax
rules); supra text accompanying notes 111-15 (regarding section 761 election).
159.
See, e.g., Hahn v. Comm'r, 22 T.C. 212, 214 (1954) (holding that because no
partnership existed, the co-owners were not allowed to use the partnership tax rules and
a co-owner's gross income included gross income from the property); see also Comm'r v.
Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 288-89 (1946) (holding that allocation rules are not applicable
because there was no partnership); Lusthaus v. Comm'r, 327 U.S. 293, 297 (1946) (same).
But see Borden et al., supra note 69, at 1187 (speculating about whether the Tax Court
created elective partnership treatment in Cusick v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 241
(1998), because the arrangement otherwise did not appear to be a partnership).
160.
Hahn, 22 T.C. at 214 (holding that income from rental property owned as
tenants in common must be individually reported because the arrangement is not a
partnership).
161.
See Estate of Langer v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 41, 47-48 (1951) (holding that the
arrangement was a partnership and the taxpayer was only required to include his
allocable share of partnership net income in gross income for purposes of applying section
107(d), limiting the amount of tax attributable to back pay determined by whether the
back pay exceeded fifteen percent of the taxpayer's gross income, but noting if the
arrangement had not been a tax partnership, the taxpayer would have been required to
include gross receipts from the arrangement in gross income).
162.
See, e.g., Joe Balestrieri & Co. v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 867, 872-73 (9th Cir. 1949)
(holding that no partnership existed between the taxpayer and the partnership where the
taxpayer made a payment pursuant to a loan guarantee to the partnership and could only
take a deduction if it could demonstrate that the taxpayer was unable to be reimbursed
for the payment from the partnership); Estate of Levine, 72 T.C. at 788 (holding that
because a partnership existed, the partner was required to include partnership income in
his individual income during the year the partnership tax year ended); Bentex Oil Corp.
v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 565, 571-72 (1953) (holding that because a partnership existed, an
election at the partnership level to deduct expenses currently requires the partner to
deduct currently instead of capitalizing the costs).
163.
I.R.C. § 703(a) (2000) ("The taxable income of a partnership shall be computed
in the same manner as in the case of an individual. . . ."); I.R.C. § 441(a) (2000) ("Taxable
income shall be computed on the basis of the taxpayer's taxable year.").
164.
I.R.C. § 706(a) (2000) ("In computing the taxable income of a partner for a
taxable year, the inclusions required by section 702 and section 707(c) with respect to a
partnership shall be based on the income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit of the
partnership for any taxable year of the partnership ending within or with the taxable
year of the partner.") Thus, whether a partnership's taxable year ends on January 31,
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would have leeway in choosing when to report partnership
income. 65' Time-value-of-money principles give timing rules
significance.'6 6 If a partnership does not exist, the members of an
arrangement must report income from the arrangement based on
their respective taxable years.'6 7 Disregarding the arrangement may
move the date of inclusion forward 16' but never back.6 9 Timing
rules also
could affect whether the tax year is closed with respect to
170
item.
an
The definition of tax partnership helps establish the person to
whom income or loss should be allocated. 17' If an arrangement is a
tax partnership, partners can agree to allocate items of income and
loss among the partners in any manner, so long as such allocations
have substantial economic effect. 72 Alternatively, if an arrangement
is not a tax partnership, items of income and loss must be traced

2005, or December 31, 2005, a partner whose taxable year ends on December 31, 2005,
reports partnership taxable income on its 2005 tax return. Current rules require the
partnership taxable year to be determined by reference to the partners' taxable years.
I.R.C. § 706(b)(1)(B) (2000) ("Taxable year determined by reference to partners."). Thus, in
many situations, the partnership's and the partners' taxable years will be the same.
165.
See supra note 162. For example, partners could disregard the partnership's
taxable year and compute income of the partnership on a monthly basis. This would
match the partnership's taxable year with the taxable year of each of the partners.
166.
If a partnership taxable year ends on January 31 and a partner's taxable year
ends on December 31, the partner has an eleven-month delay in reporting income of the
partnership. See MCKEE ET AL., supra note 126, 9.04 ("[Tlhe partnership's accounting
method can be different from the partners' accounting methods.").
167.
See I.R.C. § 441(a) (2000).
168.
If an arrangement was classified as a tax partnership with a taxable year
ending on January 31, a partner whose taxable year ends on December 31 would not be
required to include partnership taxable income from February 1 to December 31 in the
partner's gross income for the year. If the same arrangement was not a tax partnership,
the same member would be required to include the arrangement's income for the entire
year in the member's gross income.
169.
See I.R.C. § 441(a) ("Taxable income shall be computed on the basis of the
taxpayer's taxable year."). If an arrangement is disregarded for tax purposes, income of
the arrangement for an individual member's tax year will be included in the individual's
income for the year. The arrangement's income for a portion of the year may not be
included in a member's income until a subsequent year if the arrangement is respected for
tax purposes. See supra notes 164-66.
170.
See, e.g., First Mechs. Bank v. Comm'r, 91 F.2d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 1937) (holding
that the arrangement was a tax partnerships and the statute of limitations began the
year during which the amount should have been included in partner's income).
171.
See, e.g., Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949) (holding that the
existence of a partnership determines whether income can be divided); Lusthaus v.
Comm'r, 327 U.S. 293, 297 (1946) (allocating all business income to a husband who
attempted to shift income to his wife by placing his business in a tax partnership with
her); Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 289 (1946) (holding that no tax partnership existed
where husband placed an entire business in partnership form to shift income to his wife
through partnership allocations and allocating all the business income to the husband).
172.
See supra Part III.E (discussing agreements by partnerships regarding the
proper allocation of partnership income).
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from the property and services to the members who own such
property or provide such services.'73 The ability to allocate items of
income and loss, subject only to the substantial economic effect test,
is one of the significant benefits of the partnership tax rules.
The tax definition of partnership also affects the method of
accounting a taxpayer may use. 4 If an arrangement is a tax
partnership, the partnership items must be accounted for using the
tax partnership's method of accounting, even though the partners
may use a different method. 5 Thus, if the tax partnership uses the
accrual method of accounting, but an individual member uses the
cash method, the accrual method will apply to partnership items.' 76
If the arrangement is not a tax partnership, the individual's cash
method will apply. 7 This can affect the year during which the
partners report income from the arrangement,' affecting the tax
value of the item under time value of money principles.
B. TransactionalRules
The definition of tax partnership also determines whether
subchapter K applies. 9 Generally, the formation of a partnership is
a tax-free event.8 Thus, if one person contributes real estate and
173.
See id. (describing the assignment-of-income doctrine).
174.
See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Comm'r, 186 F.2d 315, 317-18 (8th Cir. 1951) (holding
that if an arrangement to perform planning and engineering services was a partnership,
income with respect to those services would be accounted for using the accrual method;
otherwise, the member's cash method of accounting would be used).
175.
See id. (recounting the taxpayers' arguments that if a partnership had existed,
the members would have reported income currently under the accrual method).
176.
See id. at 317 (noting that since the partnership used the accrual method, the
accrual method applied to a partner).
177.
See id. at 318 (holding that income from a nonpartnership project should be
reported on the cash receipts and disbursement basis of accounting).
178.
See id. (holding that because no partnership existed, the cash method members
should report income when payments were received in a subsequent year). This can be
important if a prior taxable year is closed for audit purposes.
179.
Subchapter K includes rules relating to the purchasing and selling of a
partnership interest. See I.R.C. § 741 (Supp. III 2005) (determining when a gain or loss is
capital or noncapital); I.R.C. § 751 (2000) (same). Subchapter K also includes rules
regarding the allocation of partnership income and expenses. See I.R.C. § 704(b) (2000)
(explaining how to determine a partner's distributive share of income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit and the regulations promulgated thereunder).
180.
See I.R.C. § 721(a) (2000) (providing that "[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized to
a partnership" upon a contribution of property). But see Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (as
amended in 1996) ("The value of an interest in [a partnership] transferred to a partner as
compensation for services constitutes income to the partner under section 61."). The IRS
has proposed regulations and issued a notice that will change the manner in which
partners and partnerships account for profits interests exchanged for services. See Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(b), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,683, 29,683 (May 24, 2005) ("If a partnership
interest is transferred in connection with the performance of services,... then the holder
of the partnership interest is not treated as a partner solely by reason of holding the
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another contributes cash to a tax partnership, neither person shall
recognize gain or loss on the contribution.' On the other hand, if
one person pays another for an interest in property to become a
tenant-in-common of the property, the transfer
will likely be a
18 2
taxable event to the person selling the interest.
The definition of tax partnership affects the nature of property
transferred.'
Simply put, if an arrangement is treated as a tax
partnership, a member's transfer will be treated as a transfer of an
interest in the tax partnership, not a transfer of the underlying
property.' This can affect the application of other Internal Revenue
Code provisions.' 8' For example, if an arrangement is treated as a
tax partnership, an interest in that arrangement does not qualify
for section 1031 nonrecognition."' If, on the other hand, an
interest. .... "); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,681, 29,681 (May 24,
2005) (explaining how to account for substantially nonvested interests); Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.83-3(1), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,680, 29,680-81 (May 24, 2005) (providing special rules for the
transfer of a partnership interest); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(4)(ii), 70 Fed. Reg.
29,683, 29,683 (May 24, 2005) (providing that a partnership interest "[tiransferred in
connection with the performance of services rendered to a partner.., is not deductible by
the partnership, but is deductible only by such partner to the extent allowable under
Chapter 1 of the Code"); I.R.S. Notice No. 2005-43, 2005-24 I.R.B. 1221 (proposing
procedures for partnership interests transferred in connection with the performance of
services).
181.
I.R.C. § 721(a). For example, if A contributes real estate worth $100,000 for a
2/3 partnership interest and B contributes cash worth $50,000 for a 1/3 partnership
interest to form a partnership, neither party recognizes gain on the formation of that
partnership. Economically, however, A would have a 2/3 interest in the $50,000 cash, and
B would have a 1/3 interest in the real estate.
182.
See I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2000) ("[T]he entire amount of the gain or loss.., on the
sale or exchange of property shall be recognized."). For example, if B were to pay A
$33,000 for a 1/3 interest in A's real estate, A would recognize gain or loss on the
transaction if A's basis in that 1/3 interest were anything other than $33,000. See I.R.C.
§ 1001(a) (2000) (providing that gain equals the amount realized over the adjusted basis
of transferred property and loss is the adjusted basis over the amount realized on the
transfer of property); I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2000) (providing that all gain shall be recognized
unless otherwise provided in the Code).
183.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261 (ruling that the co-ownership
arrangement was not a partnership, so the interest acquired was an interest in the
underlying property, not an interest in a partnership).
184.
See I.R.C. § 741 ("In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a
partnership, gain or loss shall be recognized to the transferor partner. Such gain or loss
shall be considered as gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset, except as
otherwise provided in section 751 . . . ."). But see I.R.C. § 751(a) ("The amount of any
money, or the fair market value of any property, received by a transferor partner in
exchange for all or a part of his interest in the partnership attributable to (1) unrealized
receivables of the partnership, or (2) inventory items of the partnership, shall be
considered as an amount realized from the sale or exchange of property other than a
capital asset.").
185.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(D) (2000) (excepting nonrecognition of gain or loss
from exchanges solely in kind when a partnership exists).
186.
See id. ("This subsection shall not apply to any exchange of... interests in a
partnership .. ").But see I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2) (2000) ("For purposes of this section, an
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arrangement is disregarded, a member's interest in the underlying
property may qualify for section 1031 nonrecognition." 7 Thus, the
definition of tax partnership affects the applicability of section 1031
and other nonrecognition provisions.' 9
The definition of tax partnership also determines the effect
liabilities have on the basis of property owned by the members of an
arrangement.'89 If an arrangement is a tax partnership, complicated
rules determine the partners' shares of partnership liabilities,
which in turn determine the bases partners take in their respective
partnership interests.9 If an arrangement is not a tax partnership,
the traditional rules used to compute basis determine the members'
bases in the underlying property. 9 '

interest in a partnership which has in effect a valid election under section 761(a) to be
excluded from the application of all of subchapter K shall be treated as an interest in each
of the assets of such partnership and not as an interest in a partnership."). See also Karen
C. Burke, An Aggregate Approach to Indirect Exchanges of Partnership Interests:
Reconciling Section 1031 and Subchapter K, 6 VA. TAX REV. 459, 461 (1987) (suggesting
that a strict aggregate approach to indirect exchanges of partnership interests would not
violate the policy for excluding partnership interests from section 1031 nonrecognition).
187.
See supra note 13 (noting that nonpartnership real estate interests may qualify
for section 1031 nonrecognition).
188.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031(a) (2000) (prohibiting section 1031 nonrecognition of gain
or loss for interests in a partnership).
189.
See I.R.C. § 752 (2000) (providing rules for the increase or decrease of a
partner's liabilities); see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, 108TH CONG., OPTIONS TO
IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 165-66 (2005)
(recommending that nonrecourse debt not be included in a partner's outside basis).
190.
See I.R.C. § 752(a) (2000) ("Any increase in a partner's share of the liabilities of
a partnership, or any increase in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of the
assumption by such partner of partnership liabilities, shall be considered as a
contribution of money by such partner to the partnership."); I.R.C. § 722 (2000) ("The
basis of an interest in a partnership acquired by a contribution of property, including
money, to the partnership shall be the amount of such money and the adjusted basis of
such property to the contributing partner at the time of the contribution.. . ."); I.R.C.
§ 752(b) (2000) ("Any decrease in a partner's share of the liabilities of a partnership, or
any decrease in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of the assumption by the
partnership of such individual liabilities, shall be considered as a distribution of money to
the partner by the partnership."); I.R.C. § 733 (2005) ("In the case of a distribution by a
partnership to a partner other than in liquidation of a partner's interest, the adjusted
basis to such partner of his interest in the partnership shall be reduced (but not below
zero) by (1) the amount of any money distributed to such partner. ..."); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.752-2 (as amended in 1991) (providing extensive rules for determining a partner's
share of recourse partnership liabilities); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3 (as amended in 2000)
(providing rules for determining a partner's share of nonrecourse partnership liabilities).
191.
See I.R.C. § 1012 (2000) (providing that the basis in property is the cost of the
property). The basis of property acquired with borrowed funds includes the amount of
borrowed funds used to acquire the property. Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983)
("[Tihe taxpayer is entitled to include the amount of the loan in computing his basis in the
property."); Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1, 11 (1947) ("We conclude that the proper
basis ... is the value of the property, undiminished by mortgages.... ."). Money borrowed
against existing property does not increase the basis of the property because it is not part
of the cost of the property.
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The definition of tax partnership can affect the character of
gain or loss a person recognizes.'92 For example, gains and losses
recognized on the sale of a partnership interest are generally
treated as capital gains and losses.' Gains and losses recognized on
the sale of certain real property used in a trade or business for more
than one year are not capital.' Thus, if an arrangement that owns

192.
See, e.g., Winmill v. Comm'r, 93 F.2d 494, 495-96 (2d Cir. 1937) (holding that
partnership gains can be offset by losses because they are expenses incurred in business,
but individual gains cannot be offset by losses because they are personal losses); Estate of
Appleby v. Comm'r, 41 B.T.A. 18, 21 (1940) (showing that under the law in effect at the
time, because an individual was not a member of the partnership, the character of gain at
the partnership level did not flow through to the partner (citing Johnston v. Comm'r, 86
F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1936)), affd, 123 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1941). Under current law, character
of gain or loss at the partnership level would carry to the partners. See I.R.C. § 702(b)
(2000) ("The character ...shall be determined as if such item were realized directly from
the source from which realized by the partnership.. . ."); Luckey v. Comm'r, 334 F.2d
719, 722 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that property held by an arrangement classified as a
partnership was inventory and retained its character as inventory for five years after
being distributed to the partner, and finding that gain or loss on a disposition of the
property within that period of time would be ordinary pursuant to section 735(a)); Gilford
v. Comm'r, 201 F.2d 735, 736 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that the loss from the sale of real
property held by tenants in common for use in a trade or business was ordinary, but if a
partnership had existed, the sale would have been of a partnership interest and the loss
may have been a capital loss); Coffin v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 9, 11 (S.D. Ala. 1954)
(holding that the sale of an interest in the underlying property would not produce a
capital gain, but if the arrangement had been a partnership, the gain on the sale of the
partnership interest would have produced a capital gain); Allison v. Comm'r, 35 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1069, 1078 (1976) (holding that no partnership existed and the transfer of real
property to the taxpayer was for services rendered, and thus ordinary income); S. & M.
Plumbing Co. v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 702, 706-09 (1971) (holding that payments made from
an arrangement classified as a partnership were treated as payments for the use of
capital and were ordinary income to the partner); Podell v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 429, 431, 433
(1970) (holding that the co-ownership arrangement was a partnership engaged in the
activity of buying and selling real property, and gain realized from the sale of the property
was ordinary income); Luna v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1076-77 (1964) (holding that
because an arrangement was an employment contract rather than a partnership, the
amount paid by the employer to the employee to terminate the contract was ordinary
income to the employee rather than capital gain); see also I.R.C. § 731(a)(1) (2000)
(providing for nonrecognition of gain in distribution by a partnership to a partner under
certain circumstances); Underwriters Ins. Agency v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 5, 9 (1980)
(holding that an arrangement involving fishing boats was a partnership and the loss from
the sale of the partnership interest was a capital loss).
193.
I.R.C. § 741 (2000 & Supp. III 2005) ("In the case of a sale or exchange of an
interest in a partnership, gain or loss shall be recognized to the transferor partner. Such
gain or loss shall be considered as gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset,
except as otherwise provided in section 751 (relating to unrealized receivables and
inventory items)."). Taxpayers generally prefer capital gains because they may be taxed at
a lower rate. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2000) (determining a taxpayer's capital gain tax rate). On
the other hand, taxpayers generally prefer ordinary loss because it is not subject to the
limitation imposed on capital losses. See I.R.C. § 1211 (2000) (restricting capital losses to
the amount of capital gains).
194.
I.R.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2000) ("If (A) the section 1231 gains for any taxable year, do
not exceed (B) the section 1231 losses for such taxable year, such gains and losses shall
not be treated as gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets."). Section
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real property used in a trade or business is a tax partnership, gain
or loss on the sale of the interest in the arrangement will generally
be treated as the gain or loss from the sale of a capital asset. 95 If the
arrangement is not treated as a partnership, loss from the sale of
the interest could be treated as an ordinary loss.9
The definition of tax partnership affects whether certain costs
may be deducted or must be capitalized.19 7 For example, if an
arrangement is a tax partnership, costs to form the partnership
must be capitalized as organization costs and costs incurred before
business operations begin must be capitalized as start-up
expenditures.' 9' If an arrangement is not a tax partnership, costs
incurred to create the arrangement may be deductible currently as
expansion costs.'99
C. ProceduralRules
Partnership classification also may affect the application of
certain tax elections.'0 0 If a partnership exists, the partnership
1231 gain and loss mean any recognized gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property
used in a trade or business. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(3)(A)(i), (B) (2000) (defining section 1231 gain
and section 1231 loss). Property used in a trade or business includes real property used in
a trade or business held for more than one year, subject to certain exclusions. I.R.C.
§ 1231(b)(1) (2000) (defining property used in a trade or business).
195.
But see I.R.C. § 751(a) (2000) (providing that gain from the sale of a partnership
interest attributable to unrealized receivables and inventory of the partnership will be
ordinary income to the selling partner).
196.
See Gilford, 201 F.2d at 736 (holding that an arrangement was not a tax
partnership, triggering ordinary loss treatment); see also Tate v. Knox, 131 F. Supp. 514,
516-17 (D. Minn. 1955) (holding that an arrangement was not a tax partnership, so the
payment was for the termination of an employment contract and thus ordinary income).
But see Coffin, 120 F. Supp. at 11 (holding that an arrangement was not a tax
partnership, so the taxpayer is a dealer and the gain is ordinary).
197.
See, e.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 1980)
(ruling that a partnership existed and the costs to form the partnership had to be
capitalized as start-up expenditures).
198.
See I.R.C. § 709 (2000) (defining the tax treatment of partnership organization
costs); I.R.C. § 195(a) (2000) (prohibiting deduction for start-up expenditures unless an
exception applies).
199.
See Colo. Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1193 (10th Cir.
1974) (holding that costs to create new credit card services were deductible currently);
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm'r, 475 F.2d 775, 787 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that costs to
open a new retail outlet were deductible currently); Rev. Rul. 2000-4, 2000-1 C.B. 331, 332
(distinguishing expansion costs from other future benefits required to be capitalized). The
taxpayer in Madison Gas & Electric Co. argued that the costs for training and other
related expenses incurred by a public utility in the expansion of its generating capacity
through the joint construction and operation of a nuclear plant with two other utilities
were deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses. Madison Gas & Electric Co., 633
F.2d at 514. The court ruled, however, that the arrangement was a tax partnership,
requiring the taxpayer to capitalize the expenditures. Id. at 517.
200.
See, e.g., McShain v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 154, 159-60 (1977) (holding that the
absence of a partnership meant that the individual taxpayer's election under section 1033
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generally must make tax elections, which apply to all partners.
For example, section 1033 allows a property owner to elect to defer
gain realized on the disposition of condemned property if the
proceeds are reinvested within a certain period of time."2 An
election made by the owner of an undivided interest in condemned
property will not be effective if the arrangement in which the owner
holds the interest is a tax partnership and the individual is treated
203
as a partner.
If a tax partnership is deemed to own the property, the tax
partnership must make the election. If the arrangement is not a
to exclude the gain on the involuntary disposition of his share of a piece of real property
was valid, but if the ownership arrangement had been a partnership, the partnership
would have had to make the election); I.T. 3713, 1945 C.B. 178, 179-80 (ruling that the
partnership, not the partners, makes the election to have timber cut during a particular
year, so the election does not "constitute an election by any of the partners as to his own
individual assets or as to the assets of any other partnership of which one or more of such
individuals may be members"); Rev. Rul. 83-129, 1983-2 C.B. 105, 105 (ruling that
partners of a partnership with an effective section 761 election may separately make the
election under section 616(b) to deduct certain expenditures incurred during the year "on
a ratable basis as the units of produced ores or minerals benefited by the expenditures are
sold"); Rev. Rul. 68-344, 1968-1 C.B. 569, 571 (ruling that members of an arrangement
that is a partnership may, under certain circumstances, elect to be excluded from the
application of all or a part of subchapter K); Rev. Rul. 54-42, 1954-1 C.B. 64, 64 ("The
election to charge to expense intangible drilling and development costs incurred in
connection with the oil operations of a partnership that files its return and computes its
income on Form 1065 is exercisable by the partnership. The partnership election is
controlling irrespective of the elections of the individual partners as to their own
operations.").
201.
See I.R.C. § 703(b) (2000) ("Any election affecting the computation of taxable
income derived from a partnership shall be made by the partnership, except that any
election under (1) subsection (b)(5) or (c)(3) of section 108 (relating to income from
discharge of indebtedness), (2) section 617 (relating to deduction and recapture of certain
mining exploration expenditures), or (3) section 901 (relating to taxes of foreign countries
and possessions of the United States), shall be made by each partner separately.").
202.
I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A)-(B) (2000) (allowing nonrecognition of gain when
condemned property is converted into similar property or money used for an investment).
But see Demirjian v. Comm'r, 457 F.2d 1, 5-6 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that a partnership
that failed to make election did not qualify for section 1033 nonrecognition).
203.
Demirjian, 457 F.2d at 4-6 (finding that two individuals who acquired
undivided interests in real property upon liquidation of a corporation were a partnership,
and upon subsequent disposition of the property, the partnership had elected to not
recognize gain under section 1033).
204.
Id. at 5-6 ("[Section] 703(b) requires that the election... under [section] 1033
be made by the partnership .... Section 703(b) provides, with exceptions not relevant
here, that any election which affects the computation of taxable income derived from a
partnership must be made by the partnership. The election for nonrecognition of gain on
the involuntary conversion of property would affect such computation and is the type of
election contemplated by [section] 703(b)."); see also H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 66 (1954)
("The bill provides that all elections with respect to income derived from a partnership
(other than the election to claim a credit for foreign taxes) are to be made at the
partnership level and not by the individual partners. This rule recognizes the partnership
as an entity for purposes of income reporting. It avoids the confusion which would occur if
each partner were to determine partnership income separately for his own purposes.").
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tax partnership, the members of the arrangement make the
elections individually.0 5
The definition of tax partnership also determines whether the
2 °s
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA)
partnership audit rules apply. 27 The TEFRA audit rules provide
that "the tax treatment of any partnership item (and the
applicability of any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount
which relates to an adjustment to a partnership item) shall be
determined at the partnership level."0 8 The period of assessing a
tax deficiency of any member of a partnership is based upon when
the partnership tax return is required to be filed or actually filed.2 9
Thus, even though a partner's statute of limitations has otherwise
lapsed with respect to a certain year, the IRS may assess a tax on a
partner with respect to partnership items of that year.2 1 0
Failure to realize that an arrangement is a tax partnership can
subject parties to penalties.2 1' Partnerships are required to file
information returns each year and furnish each partner with
information regarding partnership operations.2 12 The penalty for

205.
This does not affect the interdependence test that applies if an arrangement is a
partnership under the section 7701 regulations but has made a valid section 761 election.
If the provision in the Code granting the election is interdependent with subchapter K,
then the election will be made at the partner level. Otherwise, the election is made at the
partnership level. See supra note 112 (discussing in greater detail the interdependence
test and its use to determine which regulations apply to partnerships).
206.
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 402(a),
96 Stat. 648, 648-67 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 6221-6232); see Jay Rosen, TEFRA's New
PartnershipAuditing Procedures:Was the Small Partner Left Out?, 38 TAX L. REV. 479
(1983) (reviewing the TEFRA audit rules in greater detail and criticizing the Act for
negatively affecting small partners).
207.
See, e.g., Alhouse v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1678, 1682 (1991) (finding an
arrangement a partnership and dismissing for lack of jurisdiction a deficiency
reapportionment request because the IRS had not conducted an audit at the partnership
level as required by section 6221), affd sub nom. Bergford v. Comm'r, 12 F.3d 166 (9th
Cir. 1993).
208.
I.R.C. § 6221 (2000).
209.
I.R.C. § 6229(a) (2000).
210.
Press v. Comm'r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 285, 286-87 (1986) (holding that the
arrangement is a partnership, the TEFRA audit rules apply, and the taxpayer's signing of
Form 872-A extended the statute of limitations for the partnership items). See WILLIAM S.
McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 9.07[1] (3d ed. E-book
2006) (1977) ("The statute of limitations runs separately for partnership items. With
respect to each partner, therefore, the statute may be open with respect to partnership
items even though the nonpartnership aspects of his return may be closed under the rules
generally applicable to individual and corporate taxpayers.").
211.
See infra note 213 and accompanying text (describing penalties imposed on
partnerships for failure to file tax returns).
212.
See I.R.C. § 6031(a) (2000) ("Every partnership (as defined in section 761(a))
shall make a return for each taxable year, stating specifically the items of its gross income
and the deductions allowable by subtitle A, and such other information, for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of subtitle A as the Secretary may by forms and regulations
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failing to file such returns and furnish information to the partners
can be significant."'
The definition of tax partnership also affects whether certain
limits apply at the arrangement level or apply separately to the
arrangement's members.214 For example, if an arrangement is a tax
partnership, a limit on the amount of credit allowed with respect to
property owned by the partnership may apply at the partnership
level, and the partners would be limited to their pro rata shares of
the credit. 16 If an arrangement were not a tax partnership,

prescribe, and shall include in the return the names and addresses of the individuals who
would be entitled to share in the taxable income if distributed and the amount of the
distributive share of each individual."); I.R.C. § 6031(b) (2000) ("Each partnership
required to file a return under subsection (a) for any partnership taxable year shall (on or
before the day on which the return for such taxable year was required to be filed) furnish
to each person who is a partner or who holds an interest in such partnership as a nominee
for another person at any time during such taxable year a copy of such information
required to be shown on such return as may be required by regulations.").
213.
See I.R.C. § 6698(a) (2000) ("In addition to the penalty imposed by section 7203
(relating to willful failure to file return, supply information, or pay tax), if any
partnership required to file a return under section 6031 for any taxable year (1) fails to
file such return at the time prescribed therefor (determined with regard to any extension
of time for filing), or (2) files a return which fails to show the information required under
section 6031, such partnership shall be liable for a penalty determined under subsection
(b) for each month (or fraction thereof) during which such failure continues (but not to
exceed 5 months), unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause."); I.R.C.
§ 6698(b) (2000) ("For purposes of subsection (a), the amount determined under this
subsection for any month is the product of (1) $50, multiplied by (2) the number of persons
who were partners in the partnership during any part of the taxable year[.]"); I.R.C.
§ 6722(a) (2000) ("In the case of each failure described in subsection (b) by any person
with respect to a payee statement, such person shall pay a penalty of $50 for each
statement with respect to which such a failure occurs, but the total amount imposed on
such person for all such failures during any calendar year shall not exceed $100,000.");
I.R.C. § 6722(b) (2000) ("For purposes of subsection (a), the failures described in this
subsection are (1) any failure to furnish a payee statement on or before the date
prescribed therefor to the person to whom such statement is required to be furnished, and
(2) any failure to include all of the information required to be shown on a payee statement
or the inclusion of incorrect information."); I.R.C. § 6724(d)(2) (2000) ("The term 'payee
statement' means any statement required to be furnished under (A) section 6031(b) ....").
If the failure to file is due to intentional disregard of the rules, the $100,000 limit is
removed and instead capped at 10% of the aggregate amount of the items required to be
reported. See I.R.C. § 6722(c) (2000) (describing penalties issued for "intentional disregard
of the requirement to furnish a payee statement").
214.
See, e.g., Bussing v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 449, 461-63 (1987) (holding that because a
partnership existed, partners were able to deduct only losses to the extent to which their
bases were at risk within the meaning of section 465); Rev. Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30,
31 (ruling that a dollar limitation on the section 38 property investment credit applied at
the partnership level and was unavailable to the individual partners).
215.
See Bryant v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 848, 862-64 (1966) (concluding that despite an
arrangement's valid election under section 761(a)(2) to be excluded from subchapter K
treatment, a tax partnership existed and the investment credit provisions of sections 38
and 48 should be applied at the partnership level, leaving each partner entitled to a pro
rata share of the credit), affd, 399 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1968). The Internal Revenue Service
has opined that provisions of the Code that are interdependent with section 761 (i.e.,
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however, the limit may apply to each member individually,
multiplying the amount of the limit available.216
The definition of tax partnership may affect whether
certain parties are liable for unpaid employment taxes.2 17 In
particular, if a partnership exists, each partner may be liable
for any unpaid employment taxes owed by the partnership."'s If

income does not have to be computed at the partnership level to apply the other section)
can be applied at the individual partner level if a valid section 761 election is in effect.
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,982 (Jan. 13, 1977). Thus, if a valid section 761 election is in
effect, partners should individually make the election to expense or capitalize intangible
drilling or development costs. Id. If a provision of the Code is not interdependent with
section 761, that section must be applied at the partnership level even if a valid section
761 election is in effect. Id.; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,043 (Oct. 5, 1983)
("[Because the section 48 credit limit can be applied without computing partnership
income,] it is not inconsistent with the purpose and effect of section 761(a) to continue to
recognize the partnership as such for purposes of the investment credit limitation. Merely
because a partnership elects not to be subject to the provisions of subchapter K, does not
mean that the partnership can escape limitations generally applicable to partnerships if
those limitations can be applied despite the fact that income and deductions are computed
at the partner rather than the partnership level. The question in each instance is whether
the limitation or rule outside of subchapter K can be applied without doing violence to the
concept of electing out of subchapter K and computing income and deductions at the
partner level.").
216.
Cf Rev. Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30, 31.
217.
See Baily v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1205, 1206-07, 1210 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(rejecting the taxpayer's argument that he had merely lent money and was not partners
with a playhouse owner who failed to pay the federal withholding taxes allegedly owed by
the Lakewood Summer Playhouse in Tamaqua, Pennsylvania).
218.
I.R.C. § 3401(d) (2000) ("[Tlhe term 'employer' means the person for whom an
individual performs or performed any service, of whatever nature, as the employee of such
person... ."); I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1) (2000) ("[Elvery employer making payment of wages
shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax .. ");I.R.C. § 3403 (2000) ("The
employer shall be liable for the payment of the tax required to be deducted and withheld
under this chapter...."); Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(d)-1(c) (as amended in 1970) ("An
employer may be an individual, a corporation, a partnership, a trust, an estate, a jointstock company, an association, or a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other
unincorporated organization, group, or entity."). If the partnership is a general
partnership, it would be an employer and the partners would be jointly and severally
liable for unpaid employment taxes. See Baily, 350 F. Supp. at 1207; see also I.R.C.
§ 6672(a) (2000) ("Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any
tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for
and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such
tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable
to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted
for and paid over."). This is known as the "100% penalty" because "the responsible person
is held liable for the entire amount of withheld trust fund taxes that are not paid by the
employer. Liability for this penalty attaches to 'responsible persons' who 'willfully' fail to
pay over withheld taxes." FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 16.02[2], at 16-13 to
-14 (Leandra Lederman & Ann Murphy eds., 2003) (footnote omitted). Partners may or
may not be responsible persons. Id. § 16.02[2], at 16-14. Thus, the evidence of a
partnership in this case may not have subjected the taxpayer to the 100% penalty. Baily,
350 F. Supp. at 1207-09. Since the partnership was a general partnership and the
taxpayer was jointly and severally liable under substantive law for the tax liability of the
partnership, the -IRS did not have to resort to the 100% penalty to collect the tax from the
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a tax partnership does not exist, only the employer would be
liable for unpaid employment taxes.21 If a tax partnership
exists, a general partner will owe self-employment tax on
allocated partnership income,"' whereas the same person may
not owe self-employment tax if an arrangement is not a tax
partnership.22'
D. Call for Certainty
These several examples illustrate that the definition of tax
partnership has serious repercussions. These examples do not,
however, reveal whether the definition of tax partnership
generally
favors
taxpayers
or generally
favors
the
2
22
government.
In fact, classifying an arrangement as a tax

taxpayer. Id. at 1207, 1209-10. Instead, the court was able to proceed under common law
joint and several liability of the partners. Id. This is an example of a situation in which
the state-law classification of a partnership affects the tax liability of a partner. Id. at
1209-10.
219.
I.R.C. § 3403 (2000) ("The employer shall be liable for the payment of the tax
required to be deducted and withheld under this chapter, and shall not be liable to any
person for the amount of any such payment.").
220.
See I.R.C. § 1401 (2000) (imposing a tax on self-employment income); see also
I.R.C. § 402(a)-(b) (2000) (defining self-employment income to include "income derived by
an individual from any trade or business carried on by such individual, less the
deductions allowed by this subtitle which are attributable to such trade or business, plus
his distributive share (whether or not distributed) of income or loss described in section
702(a)(8) from any trade or business carried on by a partnership of which he is a
member").
221.
To be subject to self-employment tax, the partnership would have to carry on a
trade or business. See supra note 220 (examining provisions which apply the selfemployment tax to income derived from a trade or business). While trade or business
activity generally indicates the existence of a tax partnership, an arrangement with some
business activity may not be a tax partnership. See Gilford v. Comm'r, 201 F.2d 735, 736
(2d Cir. 1953) (concluding that although maintenance of rental property was a
"necessarily regular and continuous activity... [that fell] within the concept of trade or
business[,] .... the mere holding of business property by tenants in common does not
make such tenants partners in the tax sense"). But see I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13) (2000)
(excluding from the definition of self-employment income a limited partner's distributive
share of a partnership's income or loss). Whether members of limited liability companies
must include their distributive shares of income and loss from the limited liability
arrangement in self-employment income is an unanswered question. See, e.g., David C.
Culpepper et al., Self-Employment Taxes and Passthrough Entities: Where Are We Now?,
109 TAx NOTES 211 (2005) (discussing section 1402 self-employment tax provisions and
the confusion surrounding their application to limited liability entities).
222.
Creating a score card that determines what favors the government may be
difficult. If increased revenue for the government and decreased taxes for taxpayers is the
only measure for determining whether tax laws favor one party over the other, the score
would be difficult to determine because partnerships are pass-through entities for tax
purposes, and the issues that will be affected by tax partnership classification may be
difficult to predict. Furthermore, the effect of the issue may be equally unpredictable. The
relevant advantage a law provides merits greater attention. Tax laws should be certain,
equitable, neutral, and administrable. See infra Part VI (discerning a sound tax system
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partnership may benefit the taxpayer in certain situations but
the government in other situations.228 The inability to predict
the issues that will involve the tax partnership question does
not justify an uncertain definition. To the contrary, that
inability demands that the definition be certain. Otherwise,
taxpayers and the IRS can raise the tax partnership definition
as needed to argue for a desired tax result. This makes the tax
partnership classification elective. Elective classification
violates principles of equity by creating opportunities for the
well-advised taxpayers and traps for others.224 It also creates
complexity by requiring taxpayers to evaluate the tax results
of being classified as a tax partnership and of being
disregarded. 5 Thus, the definition of tax partnership should
be both certain and nonelective.
V. THE DEFINITIONS OF PARTNERSHIP
As stated above, Congress appeared to enact the
partnership tax law to govern substantive-law partnerships. 2 6
Also, some of the tests derive from the substantive-law
definition.2 27 To eliminate confusion, this Article discusses the
substantive-law definition of partnership to distinguish it from
the definition of tax partnership.
based on four fundamental principles of certainty, equity, neutrality, and
simplicity/administrability). Evaluating tax laws based on these criteria makes looking to
the effect on revenue not sufficient in determining who the law favors. Congress can
moderate the tax laws as needed to adjust federal revenue. Tax laws should satisfy other
criteria, even if used to increase or decrease federal revenues.
223.
For example, in Gilford, the taxpayer argued that a partnership existed to
obtain capital loss treatment that could be carried forward to subsequent years. Gilford,
201 F.2d at 736; see also infra notes 369-74 and accompanying text (discussing the court's
finding that an arrangement was not a partnership despite the existence of business
activity). If the taxpayer's situation had been different, however, the taxpayer would have
preferred that the arrangement not be classified as a partnership to obtain ordinary loss
that could offset ordinary income without limit. See I.R.C. § 1211 (2000) (limiting the
amount of loss recognized from the sale of capital assets).
224.
See George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private Business Enterprises: Some Policy
Questions Stimulated by the "Check-the-Box" Regulations, 51 SMU L. REV. 125, 130-31
(1997) (describing the relative disadvantages of transaction costs, risk of error, and
complexity that unwary taxpayers face in an elective tax system, as opposed to
advantages of tax liability minimization by well-advised taxpayers in a similar system).
225.
See Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation,the Check-the-Box
Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 451-55 (2005)
(arguing that the check-the-box regulations do not simplify corporate classification
because taxpayers in the elective regime must pay counsel to advise them concerning the
tax consequences of the alternative classifications).
226.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text (chronicling Congress's path to
establishing partnership tax law).
227.
For example, the substantive-law test, the joint-profit test, and the degree-ofactivity test all derive from the substantive-law definition of partnership.

20061
A.

TAX PARTNERSHIP

971

The Substantive-Law Definition of Partnership

The substantive-law definition of partnership originated in
British common law.228 Under substantive law, a partnership is
"an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit. '229 Courts considering the definition of tax
partnership frequently refer to three elements of the definition:
(1) profit-sharing, (2) intent, and (3) control. 30 Profit-sharing is
generally thought to be "a necessary condition for the existence of
[a] partnership. '231' A substantive-law partnership may, however,
exist without a profit-sharing relationship "if there is strong
evidence of other indicia of co-ownership or subjective
partnership intent, as when a mere wage earner is a party to an
agreement that explicitly labels the business as a partnership. 3 2
Thus, substantive law appears to adopt a test similar to the
estoppel test discussed below. 33 If the parties choose to treat an
arrangement like a partnership, they will be a partnership, even

228.
See, e.g., Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1946) (citing Cox v. Hickman,
(1860) 11 Eng. Rep. 431, 449 (H.L.) (establishing British precedent)).
229.
UNIF. P'SHIP. ACT § 101(6) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 61 (2001). That definition
is very similar to the definition that existed at the time Congress enacted the first income
tax statute. For example, the English Partnership Act of 1890 provided, "'Partnership is
the relation which subsists between persons carrying on business in common with a view
to profit.'" 1 J.M. BARRETT & ERWIN SEAGO, PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS LAW AND
TAXATION ch. 2, § 1, at 19 (1956) (quoting English Partnership Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict.,
c. 39, § 1(1)). Contemporary commentators similarly stated, "Partnership. . . is a legal
relation, based upon the express or implied agreement of two or more competent persons
whereby they unite their property, labor or skill in carrying on some lawful business as
principals for their joint profit." Id. ch. 2, § 1, at 19 & n.3 (citing FLOYD R. MECHEM, LAW
OF PARTNERSHIP 1 (2d ed. 1920)). At the time the first U.S. income tax was enacted,
courts also used this definition as they considered the partnership question in the
substantive law context. See, e.g., id. ch. 2, § 1, at 20 & n.4 (citing Eilers Music House v.
Reine, 133 P. 788, 790 (Or. 1913) ("A partnership is an agreement ... between two or
more persons to unite their labor, skill, money, and property, or either or all of them, in a
lawful business for mutual account.")).
230.
See infra notes 240-46, 249-50 and accompanying text (identifying the
importance of profit sharing, intent, and control in the finding of a partnership).
231.
ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP, § 2.07(b)(2) (2005).
232.
Id.
233.
See infra Part V.B.9 (examining in greater detail the estoppel test as an
equitable tool). See also UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 308(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 128 (2001)
("If a person, by words or conduct, purports to be a partner, or consents to being
represented by another as a partner, in a partnership or with one or more persons not
partners, the purported partner is liable to a person to whom the representation is made,
if that person, relying on the representation, enters into a transaction with the actual or
purported partnership."). This is a continuation of "the basic principles of partnership by
estoppel from UPA Section 16." UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 308(a) cmt. (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A.
129 (2001).
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in the absence of profit sharing."4 Otherwise, it appears profitsharing is required.
Profit-sharing may depend upon one of three possible
definitions of profit: (1) the accounting definition, (2) the balance
sheet definition, or (3) the dictionary definition. The accounting
definition of profits is "net income, or [the] difference between
revenues and expenses, for a given accounting period., 23" The
balance sheet definition refers to profits as money that remains
after a partnership pays all liabilities and returns partner
contributions.2 ' This definition would take into account the
appreciated value of partnership assets. 237 The dictionary
definition identifies profit as the "'benefit or advantage accruing
from the management, use, or sale of property from the carrying
on of any process of production, or from the conduct of
2 3 As discussed below, courts and
business."'
the IRS have applied
different definitions of profit to define tax partnerships
under the
239
joint-profit test, leading to different results.
At one time, substantive law considered profit sharing
sufficient to establish a partnership. 2 ° That doctrine has become
obsolete.2 "1 Now, intent to form a partnership also plays an
important role in defining substantive-law partnerships.2 2
Courts have looked to both subjective and objective intent to
determine whether a substantive-law partnership exists.2 3
Subjective intent is evidenced by "the parties' own expressions of
intent in their written agreement (if any), their utterances, or in
234.
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 231, § 2.07(b)(2).
235.
Id. § 2.07(b)(4).
236. Id. § 2.07(b)(4) & n.19.
237.
Id.
238.
Id. § 2.07(b)(4) n.21 (quoting City of Englewood v. Commercial Union Assurance
Cos., 940 P.2d 948, 956-57 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that cost sharing supported
partnership classification because the resulting savings were a benefit to the parties),
affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Compass Ins. Co. v. City of Littleton, 984 P.2d 606
(Colo. 1999)).
239.
See infra text accompanying notes 348, 355 (identifying the initial use of the
accounting definition of profit and the later use of the dictionary definition).
240.
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 231, § 2.07(b)(3) ("Every man who has a
share of the profits of a trade ought also to bear his share of the loss. And if any one takes
part of the profit, he takes a part of that fund on which the creditor of the trader relies for
his payment.'" (quoting Grace v. Smith, (1775) 96 Eng. Rep. 587, 588 (KB.)).
241.
Id. (citing Cox v. Hickman, (1860) 11 Eng. Rep. 431, 449 (H.L.); UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 7(4) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 418 (2001); UNIF. P'SHIP. ACT § 202(c)(3) (amended 1997), 6
U.L.A. 93 (2001)).
242.
Id. § 2.05(a) (citing Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 741-42 (1949) (noting
that the existence of partnership depends on the intent of the parties)). "[Ijntention is
inherent in the word 'association' in the statutory definition of partnership." Id. (citing
UNIF. P'SHIP. ACT § 6 cmt. (amended 1914), 6 U.L.A. 394 (2001)).
243.
Id. § 2.05(b)-(c).
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documents relating to the business."24 4 Parties demonstrate an
objective intent to form a partnership when they "do the acts that
in law constitute [a] partnership."24' 5 "[Profit and loss sharing,
control [sharing], and capital contributions" are acts that
constitute a partnership in law and demonstrate subjective
intent.24 6
Examining the parties' intent presents some difficulties. As
one commentator observed:
It is one thing... to say that partnership is voluntary,
and another to define precisely under what circumstances
partnership is intended. The problem of defining
partnership intent is complicated by a number of
considerations. First, partnership is often an informal
relationship among lay people who do not speak or act with
regard to technical, legal rules. Second, it is not possible in
many cases to draw definite conclusions as to intent from
the form of the relationship the parties have entered into,
since many of the elements of the standard form of
partnership set forth in the partnership statute are subject
to the contrary agreement of the parties. The parties may
have intended partnership even if several of these elements
are not present. Third, the determination of partnership
may depend on the context of the determination. Of
particular relevance to the role of intent is the distinction
between third-party and inter sese cases.247
Difficulties also arise in the tax context when courts use intent to
determine the existence of a tax partnership.2 4
249
"Joint control is... a significant indicator of partnership.,
In particular, joint control indicates co-ownership.
In cases
where joint control is absent but parties share in the profits, the
arrangement often is not a partnership.25 ' For example, debtorcreditor relationships, principal-agent
relationships, and
244.
Id. § 2.05(b) (providing the following examples of conduct or verbal expressions
that indicate subjective intent: "verbal statements of the purported partners, whether the
parties used a trade name, holding or applying for business licenses, keeping of accounts
reflecting partnership [operations], whether business bank accounts were maintained,
whether the parties filed partnership tax returns, [and] deliberately operating the
business in the [partnership] form" (footnotes omitted)).
245.
Id. § 2.05(c).
246. Id.
247.
Id. § 2.05(a) (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted).
248.
See, e.g., Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, 314 F.3d 625, 630-32 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (requiring the district court to apply the business-purpose test to meet the
Culbertson intent test).
249.
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 231, § 2.07(c)(1).
250.
Id. (citing UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 6 cmt. (1914), 6 U.L.A. 393 (2001)).
251.
Id. § 2.07(c)(2).
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landlord-tenant relationships are not partnerships, but any of
these could be a profit-sharing arrangement.252 In each of these
relationships, the lack of control indicates that the parties do not
co-own the business.25 3 Nonetheless, joint-control is not prima
facie evidence of partnership.2" 4 More, such as sharing profits, is
needed to satisfy the definition of partnership.2 5 Control is also
important in determining whether an arrangement is a tax
partnership.2 56

These elements of substantive-law partnerships reflect the
reasons partnership classification is important in the substantive
law context, which differ from tax policy. "The existence of
partnership is never the immediate issue in a case, but only part
2 7 Nonetheless, the issue
of the answer to the question at hand.""
at hand should govern the definition of partnership.5 In the
substantive law context, the existence of a partnership may be
important to determine whether certain parties are liable for
debts,5 whether a person is entitled to benefits as an
employee,'
whether a party is receiving payments as a
creditor,2 6 ' and
whether
a noncompete
agreement is
enforceable. 62 Each of these various reasons giving the
substantive-law definition of partnership significance may have
its own policy considerations, which should govern the
substantive-law definition of partnership.6
Such policy

252.
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 202(c)(3) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 93 (2001) ("A person who
receives a share of the profits ... is presumed to be a partner in the business, unless the
profits were received in payment: (i) of a debt by installments or otherwise; (ii) for services
as an independent contractor or of wages of other compensation to an employee; (iii) of
rent. ...").
253.
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 231, § 2.07(c)(2).
254.
Id. § 2.07(c)(3).
255. Id.
256.
See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text (necessitating the existence of
joint control for a finding of a partnership).
257.
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 231, § 2.02(a).
258.
Wheeler v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 883, 887, 889-96 (1978) (determining
whether the parties' relationship was a partnership in the context of the fair market
value of stock, debentures, and notes).
259.
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 231, § 2.02(a).
260.
Id. § 2.02(b)(2).
261. Id. § 2.02(b)(3) (providing that if a person receives payments as a creditor, they
may be void under state usury laws).
262. Id. § 2.02(b)(4).
263.
For example, whether parties are jointly and severally liable may affect whether
a creditor will extend financing to a partnership. If the parties' actions demonstrate a
subjective intent to form a partnership, and the creditor relies upon those actions to make
a loan to one of the parties, substantive-law policy would dictate that the arrangement
should be treated as a partnership to allow the creditor to proceed against the partners
jointly and severally to obtain repayment of the loan.
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considerations may, however, differ significantly from tax policy
considerations.264 If the respective policy considerations differ, the
definitions they govern should also differ. Many of the tests used
to define tax partnership fail to consider this and work from the
substantive-law definition or are derived from that definition.26 5
B. The Ten Tests Used to Define Tax Partnership
An in-depth study of the authority addressing the definition
of tax partnership reveals that the following ten tests are used
haphazardly to define tax partnerships: (1) the substantive-law
test, (2) the state-law test, (3) the joint-profit test, (4) the
expense-sharing test, (5) the degree-of-activity test, (6) the typeof-activity test, (7) the source-of-activity test, (8) the businesspurpose test, (9) the estoppel test, and (10) the fact-question test.
At times, the authority addressing the tax partnership question
identifies the test it used.266 Most often, however, the authority is
silent as to the test used, and at times the test used is
indeterminable. In no place other than this Article are the ten
tests identified separately and presented to be evaluated using
tax policy. Although some would argue that some of the tests are
mere subsets of other tests (e.g., the degree-of-activity test and
type-of-activity test are subsets of the substantive-law test, and
the expense-sharing test is a subset of the joint-profit test), this
Article lists them separately to reflect the manner in which
Congress, the courts, Treasury, and the IRS apply the tests.
1. The Substantive-Law Test. Under the substantive-law
test, an arrangement is a tax partnership if several factors

264.
For example, the partnership tax rules were justified on simplicity and
administrability grounds. This differs from the policy for holding parties jointly and
severally liable. If parties hold themselves out as partners to a creditor but do not have
accounting and reporting complexity, they should not be treated as partners for tax
purposes.
265.
See infra Part V.B (recounting in greater detail the disorganized application of
ten tests used to define tax partnerships).
266.
See, e.g., Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir. 1952) (recognizing
that the court could apply the estoppel doctrine to prevent the taxpayer from arguing that
no tax partnership exists); Earp v. Jones, 131 F.2d 292, 293-94 (10th Cir. 1942)
(recognizing that the partnership had to have a business purpose); Tate v. Knox, 131 F.
Supp. 514, 516-17 (D. Minn. 1955) (relying on Minnesota law to determine whether a
"joint adventure" was created).
267.
See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Nat'l Bank of Portland, 239 F.2d 475, 476-80
(9th Cir. 1956) (employing an undeterminable test); Bartholomew v. Comm'r, 186 F.2d
315, 318-19 (8th Cir. 1951) (same); I.T. 2082, 3-2 C.B. 176 (1924) (using the substantivelaw test but not identifying it as such); I.T. 1604, 2-1 C.B. 1 (1923) (concluding that no
partnership existed, despite co-ownership and sharing of profits, without announcing
which test was utilized).
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indicate the parties' intent to form a partnership.268 Prior to the
enactment of the statutory definition of tax partnership, the IRS
applied the substantive-law test to determine that an
arrangement was not a tax partnership.2 69 The IRS ruled in
several cases that no tax partnership existed even though two or
more individuals co-owned property and used it in a trade or
business. 7 °
The IRS cited no prior tax decisions in accord with its
ruling,2 7' but it did cite substantive law272 and listed elements of
the substantive-law definition to rule that the arrangement was
not a tax partnership.2 73 Specifically, the IRS ruled that the
arrangements were tenancies-in-common and not partnerships.27 4
268.
See infra text accompanying notes 280-82 (listing authorities that led to the
establishment of intent as an indicator of a tax partnership).
269.
See infra notes 270-73 and accompanying text (noting the IRS's decision to
apply substantive-law elements to issues concerning the existence of a partnership).
270.
I.T. 2082, 3-2 C.B. 176 (1924) (concerning family members who co-owned a
merchandise store that they managed); I.T. 1604, 2-1 C.B. 1 (1923) (involving parties who
co-owned, and operated, and shared the profits from a farm).
271.
The IRS may not have cited prior tax decisions on this issue because this was
the first time it had encountered this issue. Apparently, however, the IRS had considered
the issue in the oil and gas context. It stated:
It seems that the courts are unanimous in upholding this proposition of law and
the Bureau has unqualifiedly followed it in several instances. The cases in which
the rule has been applied by the Bureau have been mostly those involving the
coownership of oil leaseholds and vessels operated by an agent in the business of
importing and exporting. In the former class it has been consistently held that
participation in the profits is not conclusive evidence of a partnership and that
mere coownership and operation of oil leaseholds, each coowner contributing a
pro rata share of the investment or cost of operation and each sharing the
product, do not, without more, create a partnership. And in the case of vessels it
has been held that, in the absence of special facts affirmatively showing a
partnership, where a vessel is owned by several parties and operated by a
managing owner or agent for the account of all, the relation does not constitute a
partnership for income tax purposes.
I.T. 1604, 2-1 C.B. at 2.
272.
Id. ("A few of the cases bearing upon this proposition might be referred to in
brief. It is essential to a partnership that there be a community of interest in the subject
of it, other than that of mere joint tenants or tenants in common. The common ownership
of property used as a place of business does not of itself make the owners partners. The
common ownership of real property upon and with which a business is conducted for the
benefit of the tenants in common does not in itself constitute them partners. Neither do
the common ownership of a productive property and an agreement by the owners to divide
what it produces, of themselves, prove a partnership. The common ownership of woodland
and an agreement to cut and sell the timber therefrom, dividing equally the expenses and
proceeds, do not make a partnership." (citations omitted)).
273.
Id. at 1. The IRS stated that the "absence of mutual dependence or agency
between the coowners and [the ability of] any one of the coowners [to) sell his interest
without securing the consent of other part owners, which is contrary to one of the
fundamental attributes of a partnership" demonstrates a partnership did not exist. Id.
274.
The court identified mutual dependence, agency, and the right to alienate
property as the bases for its decision. Id. at 3. Those factors may or may not affect the
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Because tenancy-in-common (TIC) arrangements are excluded
from the substantive-law definition of partnership, taxpayers
establish that an arrangement is not a tax partnership by
showing that it is a tenancy-in-common.27 5
Prior to the enactment of the statutory definition of tax
partnership, Treasury adopted the tenancy-in-common safe
harbor, stating that "joint investment in and ownership of real
and personal property not used in the operation of any trade or
business and not covered by any partnership agreement does not

timing and computation of the income and loss of an arrangement. Mutual dependence
and agency describe important legal relationships that exist among partners. Agency is
different from partnership because the agent is subject to the control of the principal. See
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 231, § 2.01(b); 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 32.07
(David A. Thomas ed., 2d Thomas ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2004) ("[Elach tenant in
common has a share that is alienable, devisable, and inheritable."). See also MECHEM,
supra note 229, § 11, at 15-16 (showing how co-ownership differs from partnership by
providing a contemporary list which includes, "1. Co-ownership is not necessarily the
result of an agreement to create it, while partnership is. 2. Co-ownership does not
necessarily involve community of profit or loss, while partnership does. 3. One co-owner
may, without the consent of the others, assign his interest in such a way that his assignee
will assume his relations to the other co-owners, but one partner cannot do this. 4. One coowner is not as such the agent of the others, while a partner is. 5. One co-owner has no
lien on the common property for expenses or outlays, or for what may be due from the
others as their share of a common debt, while a partner has such a lien" (footnotes
omitted)).
These considerations only become important in the partnership tax context
when they affect the source of income. See infra text accompanying notes 393-97
(explaining that the distinction between tax partnerships and principal-agent
relationships turns on the lack of a party's control over income and lack of a party's
contributed services). Restrictions on alienation may affect the value of an interest, but
should not affect the computation and timing of income and loss of the property.
275.
I.T. 2082, 3-2 C.B. at 177 (1924) (ruling with little analysis that the
arrangement was a TIC); I.T. 1604, 2-1 C.B. at 2 (1923) ("Citations are unnecessary in
support of the proposition that a mere tenancy in common does not create a
partnership."); see also UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 202(c)(1) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A 92, 92-93
(2001) ("Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties, joint property,
common property, or part ownership does not by itself establish a partnership, even if the
co-owners share profits made by the use of the property."). In Estate of Appleby v.
Commissioner, the Board of Tax Appeals considered whether two brothers who co-owned,
improved, and leased certain property were partners for federal income tax purposes.
Estate of Appleby v. Comm'r, 41 B.T.A. 18, 20-21 (1940) (citing I.T. 1604, 2-1 C.B. 1; I.T.
2082, 3-2 C.B. 176), aftd, 123 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1941). The Board ruled that they were not
partners, recognizing that a TIC arrangement had never before been classified as a
partnership, although the IRS had formerly recognized the existence of TIC
arrangements. Id. Although the co-owners had developed the property, the Board stated
that they did so at the insistence of the lessee, and the lessee operated the improvements
once constructed. Id. The Board was concerned that if it ruled that the tenancy in
common were a partnership, it would be difficult to exclude other arrangements such as
marital communities or tenancies by the entirety from the statutory definition of
partnership. Id. Therefore, it ruled that no partnership existed. Id. It also predicted with
accurate foresight that "it will probably continue to be difficult to classify many of the
imaginable varieties of businesses and interests in which more than one person share."
Id. at 21.
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constitute a partnership."2 76 Treasury removed this provision
from the regulations after the enactment of the federal statutory
definition of tax partnership.2 77 That indicates that the statutory
definition of tax partnership, which included syndicates, groups,
pools, and joint ventures, was broader than the substantive-law
definition of partnership and might even include substantive-law
tenancies-in-common.2 78
Courts focused on the parties' intent, and eventually
multifactor tests became important under the substantive-law
test. 7 9 Decisions that have become bellwethers in defining tax
partnership-Commissioner v.
Tower, s°
Lusthaus
v.
2s
Commissioner, ' and Commissioner v. Culbertson
22-introduced
28
3
intent to the definition of tax partnership. In those cases, the

276.
Regulations 74, Art. 1317 (Dec. 1, 1931).
277.
Regulations 77 did not include Art. 1317; see also I.T. 2749, 8-1 C.B. 99, 99-100
(1934) ("The omission of the provisions of article 1317 of Regulations 74 from Regulations
77 ... was occasioned by the definition of a partnership contained in section 1111(a)(3) of
the Revenue Act of 1932, which definition did not appear in the Revenue Act of 1928."
(citation omitted)).
278.
See MECHEM, supra note 229, § 16, at 19-21 (stating that joint ventures and
syndicates "frequently have some of the characteristics of partnership, but they are
usually not partnerships, at least of the commercial or trading class, and the rights and
liabilities of the parties, where there are no elements of estoppel, are to be worked out by
a consideration of the terms of the contract and of the powers and authorities in fact
conferred. The implied authority of the associates to bind each other by contracts is
usually very limited. Persons so situated who have acquired property which they are to
hold until they unite in disposing of it do not usually contemplate or require any acts of
agency by one; there are ordinarily no incidental contracts to be made; the parties intend
to act unitedly when they act at all; and consequently there is no ground for implying any
general authority in one to act for all. Only the consent of all, or the rare case of
overpowering necessity, would create an authority." (footnotes omitted)).
279.
Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 738-39 (1949); Lusthaus v. Comm'r, 327
U.S. 293, 297 (1946); Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 287 (1946).
280.
Tower, 327 U.S. at 286-87.
281.
Lusthaus, 327 U.S. at 297.
282.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 738-39.
283.
Although these cases have become bellwethers, reliance on them may not be
justified in situations in which capital is a significant income-producing factor because the
question in these cases was later addressed by legislation. See I.R.C. § 704(e)(1) (1958) ("A
person shall be recognized as a partner for purposes of this subtitle if he owns a capital
interest in a partnership in which capital is a material income-producing factor, whether
or not such interest was derived by purchase or gift from any other person."). Section
704(e) may be a codification of the dissenting opinion in Lusthaus v. Commissioner, which
provided that if the husband made a gift of property to his wife, and the wife contributed
that property to a partnership with the husband, the arrangement should be a tax
partnership. Lusthaus, 327 U.S. at 301-03 (Reed, J., dissenting). Also, the facts and
issues raised in other cases rarely resemble the facts in these cases. See supra note 58
(identifying cases with different facts relying on the Culbertson, Lusthaus, and Tower
cases). Commissioner v. Culbertson is often cited in nontax cases for its holding regarding
intent. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra,note 231, § 2.05(a) n. 1 ("An often-quoted case is
Commissioner v. Culbertson .... ").
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parties attempted to form state-law partnerships.2 8 In Tower, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the arrangement might have
been a partnership under Michigan law. 285 The Court held,
however, that it was not bound by state law in determining
whether the arrangement was a tax partnership."6 The Court
considered whether the partnership was formed for the sole
purpose of shifting income earned by a husband to his wife who
was not formerly involved in the operation or management of the
husband's business enterprise.2 87 Citing two substantive-law
cases, the Court stated, "A partnership is generally said to be
created when persons join together their money, goods, labor, or
skill for the purpose of carrying on a trade, profession, or
business and when there is community of interest in the profits
and losses."2"'
The Court focused on the substantive-law factor of intent to
decide the case, 289 stating that the participants' "intention in this
284.
Culbertson, 327 U.S. at 736-37 ("The partnership agreement between taxpayer
and his sons was oral. The local paper announced the dissolution of the Coon and
Culbertson partnership and the continuation of the business by respondent and his boys
under the name of Culbertson & Sons. A bank account was opened in this name, upon
which taxpayer, his four sons and a bookkeeper could check. At the time of formation of
the new partnership, Culbertson's oldest son was 24 years old, married, and living on the
ranch, of which he had for two years been foreman under the Coon and Culbertson
partnership."); Lusthaus, 327 U.S. at 296 ("Pennsylvania issued petitioner and his wife a
certificate authorizing them to carry on the business as a partnership."); Tower, 327 U.S.
at 287 ("Respondent contends that the partnership arrangement here in question would
have been valid under Michigan law and argues that the Tax Court should consequently
have held it valid for tax purposes also.").
285.
Tower, 327 U.S. at 287-88 ("Thus, Michigan could and might decide that the
stock-transfer here was sufficient under state law to pass title to the wife, so that in the
event of her death it would pass to whatever members of her family would be entitled to
receive it under Michigan's law of descent and distribution.").
286.
Id. at 288 ("But Michigan cannot by its decisions and laws governing questions
over which it has final say, also decide issues of federal tax law and thus hamper the
effective enforcement of a valid federal tax levied against earned income.").
287.
Id. at 291-92 ("And the wife drew on income which the partnership books
attributed to her only for purposes of buying and paying for the type of things she had
bought for herself, home and family before the partnership was formed. Consequently the
result of the partnership was a mere paper reallocation of income among the family
members. The actualities of their relation to the income did not change."). The Court
relied on the Tower analysis to rule similarly in Lusthaus v. Commissioner. See Lusthaus,
327 U.S. at 297 ("For the reasons set out in our opinion in Commissioner v. Tower, the
decision of the circuit court of appeals is affirmed." (citation omitted)).
288.
Tower, 327 U.S. at 286 (citing Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U.S. 611 (1892)
(determining whether a lender became liable as a partner for debts of a partnership based
on the terms of the loan); Ward v. Thompson, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 330 (1859) (determining
whether an arrangement between co-owners of a vessel was a partnership or charter
arrangement for purposes of determining jurisdiction of a court of admiralty)).
289.
See Tower, 327 U.S. at 286-87 ("When the existence of an alleged partnership
arrangement is challenged by outsiders, the question arises whether the partners really
and truly intended to join together for the purpose of carrying on business and sharing in
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respect is a question of fact, to be determined from testimony
disclosed by their 'agreement, considered as a whole, and by their
conduct in execution of its provisions.""'2 9 Although couched by
the Court as federal law doctrine, intent is derived from
substantive law.291 The Court concluded its opinion by stating
"that while the partnership was 'clothed in the outer garment of
legal respectability' its existence could not be recognized for
income tax purposes."292 Thus, the Court rejected any form the
arrangement might have had.9 The Court appears to provide
two levels of assurance: first, the Court concluded that the
arrangement was not a tax partnership under the intent element
of the substantive-law definition, and second, it rejected the
arrangement's form.
In Culbertson, the Supreme Court instructed the Tax Court
to reconsider which of the family members had "a bona fide
intent [to] be partners in the conduct of the cattle business,
either because of services to be performed during those years, or
because of contributions of capital of which they were the true
owners." 94 In oft-quoted language,"' the Supreme Court focused
on intent: "The question is ...whether, considering all the
facts.., the parties in good faith and acting with a business
purpose intended to join together in the present conduct of the
29 Later, the D.C. Circuit
enterprise.""
connected intent to the
business-purpose test, requiring that an arrangement have a

the profits or losses or both."). Again the court is looking to substantive law for this part of
the analysis. Under substantive law both subjective intent and objective intent are
important in considering whether parties have formed a partnership. See supra text
accompanying notes 243-46.
290.
Tower, 327 U.S. at 287 (quoting Drennen v. London Assurance Co., 113 U.S 51,
56 (1885), and citing Cox v. Hickman, (1860) 11 Eng. Rep. 431 (H.L.)).
291.
See supratext accompanying notes 243-46.
292.
Lusthaus, 327 U.S. at 297 (quoting 3 T.C. 540, 542 (1944), affd, 149 F.2d 232
(3d Cir. 1945), affd, 327 U.S. 293 (1946)).
293.
Tower, 327 U.S. at 292. The court probably could have reached the same
conclusion relying exclusively on the business-purpose test, as the Tenth Circuit did a few
years earlier in Earp v. Jones, 131 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1942).
294.
Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 748 (1949). In that case, four sons used a
note to buy an undivided one-half interest in a herd of cattle from their father and
contributed the interest to a partnership with their father, who contributed his remaining
one-half interest to the partnership. Id. at 736. Shortly after the partnership was formed
in 1940, two of the sons entered the Army. Id. at 737. The two younger sons went to
school during the winter and worked with the cattle during the summer. Id. The
taxpayers filed a partnership tax return for 1940 and 1941, but the Tax Court, relying on
the decisions in Tower and Lusthaus, disallowed the division of income among the father
and his sons based on a finding that none of the sons had contributed capital or services
to the partnership. Id.
295.
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 231, §2.05(a) n.1.
296.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 742.
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nontax business purpose to satisfy the Culbertson intent
requirement. 9 7
The intent question requires a definition of tax
partnership." The substantive-law test attempts to define tax
partnership using multifactor list. 2 9 Considering joint
ventures to be equivalent to tax partnerships,"' courts derived
several factors from state-law definitions of joint venture and
other sources of substantive law.0 1 The number of factors
adopted varies from three to fifteen.3 2 Before the publication of
Revenue Procedure 2002-22, the lists generally included no
more than eight factors, which derived from the substantivelaw definition of partnership or joint venture.0 3 The IRS's
fifteen factors in Revenue Procedure 2002-22 incorporate
some of these eight factors,0 4 neglect others,"' add new

297.
ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
298.
See SABA P'ship v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 1135, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining
that the tax partnership question, although fact-intensive, is a question of law).
299.
See infra notes 300-07 and accompanying text (identifying several such
multifactor lists and their sources).
300.
See Winmill v. Comm'r, 93 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1937) (construing section 1696(2) of
the Revenue Act of 1932 to include joint ventures as partnerships for federal tax
purposes), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938).
301.
See Ayrton Metal Co. v. Comm'r, 299 F.2d 741, 742 (2d Cir. 1962) (relying upon
Beck Chemical Equipment Corp. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 840, 848-49 (1957) (relying
upon the definition of joint venture in Corpus Juris Secundum and New York law));
Fishback v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 621, 625 (D.S.D. 1963) (relying upon American
Jurisprudence and Blackner v. McDermott, 176 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1949) (dealing with
nontax issues)); Flanders v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 935, 942-43 (N.D. Cal. 1959)
(relying upon California Juris, California cases, and Tate v. Knox, 131 F. Supp. 514, 517
(D. Minn. 1955) (relying upon the Minnesota definition of joint venture)); Alhouse v.
Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1678, 1680 (1991) (relying upon Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.
1067, 1077 (1964) (relying upon Beck Chemical Equipment Corp.)) affd sub nom. Bergford
v. Comm'r, 12 F.3d 166 (9th Cir. 1993); Podell v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 429, 431 (1970) (relying
upon Flandersand Tate); Rev. Proc. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 733, 734 (relying upon Bergford,
Bussing v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1050 (1987), and Alhouse).
302.
See Ayrton Metal Co., 299 F.2d at 743 (adopting three factors); Rev. Proc. 200222, 2002-1 C.B. 733, 735-37 (adopting fifteen factors).
303.
See Luna, 42 T.C. at 1077-78 (including (1) the agreement of the parties and
their conduct; (2) the parties' contributions; (3) the parties' control over income and
capital, including each party's right to make withdrawals; (4) whether the parties were coproprietors, employee/employer, or principal/agent; (5) whether the parties conducted
business under a joint name; (6) whether the parties filed a partnership tax return;
(7) whether the parties exercised mutual, although perhaps unequal, control and assumed
mutual responsibilities; and (8) whether the arrangement maintained separate books); see
also Fishback, 215 F. Supp. at 626 (noting that equal control is not required).
304. For example, the IRS lists treating the arrangement as an entity, incorporating
Luna factors (1), (5) and (6); lists restrictions on alienation, incorporating factors (3) and
(7); and lists management or brokerage agreements, incorporating factor (4). Rev. Proc.
2002-22, 2001-1 C.B. 733, 735-37; see also supra note 303 (listing the eight factors as
described in Luna).
305.
The IRS does not list the keeping of separate books in Revenue Procedure
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factors from other tests, °6 and create new factors from whole
cloth.0 7 Thus, as the substantive-law test now stands, it
considers several factors to determine whether the parties
intended to create a partnership.
2. The State-Law Test. The state-law test adopts the state0
law classification of an arrangement."
Thus, if an arrangement
is a partnership under state law, it will be a tax partnership
under the state-law test. Under the state-law test, any legal
entity with two or more members that is not a corporation or
other entity defined as a tax corporation or tax trust will be a tax
partnership.0 9 Thus, under the state-law test, limited liability
companies,
limited
partnerships,
and
limited liability
3
1
°
partnerships are tax partnerships. The state-law test looks to
intent and the multifactor lists only if the state-law definition of
partnership relies upon intent and the factors. The state-law test
does not necessarily consider tax policy. It simply includes all
noncorporate state-law entities as tax partnerships, so long as
they do not come within the definition of tax trust.3 1

2002-22. Id.
306.
For example, the IRS lists tenancy in common ownership and restrictions on
alienation, drawing from the substantive-law definition of TIC. See supra note 274 (noting
factors that the IRS has considered include mutual dependence, agency, and the right to
alienate property). The IRS lists no business activity, drawing from the degree-of-business
activity test. See infra Part V.B.5 (describing the degree-of-activity test). Additionally, the
IRS lists payments to sponsor, drawing from the source-of-activity test. See infra Part
V.B.7 (defining the source-of-activity test).
307.
For example, the IRS limits the number of members to thirty-five, requires
unanimous consent from the members for certain actions, requires the immediate
distribution of sale proceeds, restricts the members' rights to option their interests, and
prohibits members' borrowing from related parties. Rev. Proc. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 733,
736-37.
308.
See, e.g., Copeland v. Ratterree, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9895, at 58,195
(N.D.N.Y. 1957) (noting that Vermont state law should apply when the agreement was
made in Vermont and contemplated performance in Vermont).
309.
See Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-33 I.R.B. 191, 193 ("Generally, when participants in
a venture form a state law entity and avail themselves of the benefits of that entity for a
valid business purpose, such as investment or profit, and not for tax avoidance, the entity
will be recognized for federal tax purposes.").
310.
These legal entities do not come within the definition of tax corporation. See
supra note 29 (defining a tax corporation). They generally would not be tax trusts. But see
Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-33 I.R.B. 191, 193-94 (ruling that a Delaware Statutory Trust
was a separate entity as defined in Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-1(a)). If a Delaware
Statutory Trust can be a tax trust, id., it is possible that other state-law entities may also
be tax trusts if subject to the same restrictions to which Delaware Statutory Trusts are
subject.
311.
But tax law may disregard some state-law government entities. See supra
note 24.
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Many courts have shunned the state-law test,312 as Treasury
has appeared to do in the check-the-box regulations.3 1
Nonetheless, the state-law test may still have life. Some courts
have relied exclusively upon the state-law characterization of an
arrangement in deciding whether an arrangement was a tax
partnership.3 "4 Taxpayers seeking tax partnership classification
may be able to rely upon the existing case law to invoke the
state-law test.3 15 The IRS, on the other hand, is bound by rules it
promulgates.3 "6 Since it sets forth that state law does not
determine the definition of tax partnership,3 7 the IRS should not
be able to invoke the state-law test. Its only recourse in such
See, e.g., Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 287-88 (1946) (refusing to apply
312.
Michigan law to the federal tax issue); Press v. Comm'r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 285, 286 (1986)
(emphasizing that the court is not bound by state-law definitions); Kelly v. Comm'r, 29
T.C.M. (CCH) 1090, 1101 (1970) (stating that the definition of tax partnership is broader
than state law); Linsenmeyer v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 1126, 1132 (1956) (noting that status
under state law is irrelevant); Stern v. Comm'r, 15 T.C. 521, 526-28 (1950) (disregarding
whether state law allows person to be a partner).
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2005) ("[The definition of tax
313.
partnership] is a matter of federal tax law and does not depend on whether the
organization is recognized as an entity under local law.").
See, e.g., Joe Balestrieri & Co. v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1949)
314.
(finding arrangement not a tax partnership because it did not satisfy the California
definition of joint venture); Winmill v. Comm'r, 93 F.2d 494, 495-96 (2d Cir. 1937)
(holding that since arrangement was a joint venture it was a tax partnership), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938); First Mechs. Bank v.
Comm'r, 91 F.2d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 1937) (holding that since arrangement was a joint
venture it was a tax partnership); Comm'r v. Olds, 60 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir. 1932)
(relying upon Michigan law); Powell v. Comm'r, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 161, 163-64 (1967)
(holding arrangement to be a TIC under state law); Copeland v. Ratterree, 57-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9895, at 58,195 (N.D.N.Y. 1957) (concluding that arrangement having been
made in Vermont, it should be interpreted according to the laws of the state of Vermont);
Estate of Appleby v. Comm'r, 41 B.T.A. 18, 20-21 (1940) (holding arrangement not a tax
partnership because it was a TIC under state law); see also Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r,
115 T.C. 478, 486-87 (2000) (relying upon state-law classification to hold that a tax
partnership existed for purposes of applying the minority discount to determine the value
of a gift), affd in part, rev'd in part, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002).
Although the Supreme Court in Tower held that state-law definitions did not
315.
bind the court, see Tower, 327 U.S. at 288, other subsequent decisions have applied state
law to define tax partnership. See supra note 314 (listing multiple decisions in which
courts have relied upon the state-law characterization of a tax partnership). Perhaps
these later decisions indicate the state-law test is still viable.
See, e.g., Estate of McLendon v. Comm'r, 135 F.3d 1017, 1024-25 (5th Cir. 1998)
316.
(holding that IRS is bound by position stated in revenue ruling); Rauenhorst v. Comm'r,
119 T.C. 157, 183 (2002) ("Certainly, the Commissioner's failure to follow his own rulings
would be unfair to those taxpayers, such as petitioners herein, who have relied on revenue
rulings to structure their transactions. Moreover, it is highly inequitable to impose
penalties, which respondent has done in this case. Accordingly, in this case, we shall not
permit respondent to argue against his revenue ruling, and we shall treat his revenue
ruling as a concession."); I.R.S. Notice, CC-2003-014 (May 8, 2003) ("[IRS] litigating
positions should be derived from, and consistent with, the Internal Revenue Code and our
published guidance."). Published guidance includes regulations.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2005).
317.
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situations may be to invoke the estoppel test, which considers
state-law classification.3 1 This, however, would require more
than a mere showing of the existence of a state-law entity.3 9 The
state-law test, at a minimum, appears to have life in practice.
Competent tax advisors would hesitate to advise a client to join a
state-law entity if the client wished to avoid becoming a member
of a tax partnership.3 2 °
3. The Joint-ProfitTest. The joint-profit test excludes from
the definition of tax partnership arrangements that lack a jointprofit motive. 321 Joint profit is an element of the substantive-law
test, 322 but it has found special application defining qualified tax
partnerships.3 23
Qualified
tax partnerships
are
those
arrangements that meet the definition of tax partnership but are
not required to follow the partnership tax accounting and
reporting rules.3 24 Generally, only co-owned joint-production
arrangements are considered qualified tax partnerships.
Co-owned joint-production arrangements are those whose
members co-own property and pool resources to produce
something from the co-owned property.326 The arrangement
318.
See infra text accompanying note 408 (describing the estoppel test).
319.
Id.
320.
See supra note 13 (describing the TIC industry, which has grown up from this
hesitancy).
321.
I.R.C. § 183 (2000).
322.
See supra text accompanying note 231 (explaining that profit sharing is a
component of a partnership for taxation purposes).
323.
Such arrangements were first referred to as qualified partnerships in I.T. 3930,
1948-2 C.B. 126, 129 ("The Bureau, under [(I.T. 2749 and I.T. 2785)], has consistently
treated all such operating agreements as creating qualified partnerships .... ").
324.
Id. ("That being true, such organizations may be classified for Federal income
tax purposes as joint ventures or partnerships only in a qualified sense. Under I.T. 2749
and I.T. 2785, such joint operators are required to file qualified partnership returns
showing only items of gross income and deduction." (citations omitted)); see also I.R.C.
§ 761(a)(2) (2000) (allowing members of certain co-owned joint-production arrangements
to elect out of subchapter K).
325.
I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. at 128-29.
326.
See, e.g., id. at 126-27. Under a typical oil and gas co-owned joint-production
arrangement, members own an interest in property that produces oil. Id. at 126. Often,
such interest is an oil lease. Id. This interest allows the interest holder (or the agent of an
interest holder) to enter the land under which the oil and gas is located to obtain the oil
and gas. Id. The members may provide the services necessary to obtain the oil and gas or
may hire others to perform such services. Id. Arrangements may allow members to take
production in kind or provide that the arrangement will sell the oil and gas and distribute
the income to the members in proportion to their interest in the arrangement. Id. The
features listed include:
(1) The costs of development and expenses of operation are to be prorated among
the parties in accordance with their respective interests. (2) Division of oil
proceeds is usually accomplished by payment of the purchase price by the pipeline company or other purchaser directly to the several parties in accordance
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distributes the product in kind to the members who dispose of it
individually.3 "7 Members of arrangements of this sort often coown oil and gas property, co-produce oil and gas, and distribute it
to the members who sell the oil and gas individually; 28 co-own
power plants and distribute co-produced electricity in kind to the
members;... or co-own and co-mine mineral or other extractive
property, the product of which the arrangement distributes to its
members in kind.330 Distributing the product in kind raises the
question of whether members of such an arrangement have a
joint-profit motive and should be tax partnerships or lack a jointprofit motive and should be qualified tax partnerships or tax
nothings. The IRS has ruled that members of co-owned jointproduction arrangements lack a joint-profit motive, 331 but the Tax
Court 332 and the Seventh Circuit 333 have held that the members
possess a joint-profit motive. The source of these disparate

with their respective shares as indicated by division orders signed by them.
Generally, any party may take his share of the oil in kind. Where that right
exists, any authority given the operator to market the oil may be revoked upon
proper notice. Sometimes, however, the operator is authorized without
qualification to market the product. (3) The operator is required to carry
adequate insurance and to make an accounting. (4) Operating agreements
remain in force until the mineral is exhausted or, in the case of unit operating
agreements, for the term of the lease or leases or renewals thereof. Sometimes
an express provision is made for withdrawal of one of the parties by assignment
of his rights to the others. (5) The parties having voting power proportionate to
their interests to choose and advise the operator (in cases in which only one
lease is involved, broad powers are commonly vested in the operator named in
the agreement), to change the operator, to determine drilling and operating
plans, to audit and pass on the operator's accounting, and to pass on
transactions for disposal of surplus equipment. (6) Any party may sell or
encumber his entire interest, but may not subdivide or sell without giving the
others preferential option (in the case of agreements covering single leases, the
contract may not contain express provisions to that effect). (7) The liabilities of
the parties are to be separate and not joint.
Id. at 126-27.
327.
Rev. Rul. 83-129, 1983-2 C.B. 105 (describing an arrangement in which
minerals produced as a result of a mineral claim lease are distributed in kind to the
partners).
328.
See, e.g., id.; Rev. Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30, 31. If the members have no
control over the disposition of the property received from the arrangement, the
arrangement would not satisfy this definition of co-owned joint-production arrangement.
329.
See, e.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 1980)
(holding an arrangement to be a tax partnership); Rev. Rul. 68-344, 1968-1 C.B. 569, 572
(finding arrangement a tax partnership, eligible for the section 761(a)(2) election).
330.
See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-15-003 (June 17, 1982) (holding a mining
arrangement to be a tax partnership).
331.
I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 126, 129 ("In such cases there is no joint profit
contemplated... by the associates.").
332.
Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 521, 562 (1979), affd, 633 F.2d 512
(7th Cir. 1980).
333.
Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 633 F.2d at 515-17.
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positions appears to be the respective definitions of profit that
each adopts.
Following the enactment of the statutory definition of tax
partnership, the IRS ruled that a co-owned joint-production
arrangement that was a substantive-law joint venture was a tax
partnership.3 34 The IRS stated that "ordinarily joint or
coownership of property does not of itself constitute a
partnership... [butI when the coowners or joint owners agree to
employ such property in the carrying on of a trade or business
they become partners."33 5 The statutory definition of tax
partnership (which included joint ventures at the time) bound
the IRS to rule that the arrangement was a tax partnership once
it found that the arrangement was a substantive-law joint
venture. In a subsequent ruling, the IRS ruled that the same
type of tax partnership was not required to follow the
33 6
partnership tax accounting and reporting rules."
This created the first qualified tax partnership. 7
Unfortunately, the IRS left no clue at the time of the ruling about

334.
I.T. 2749, 8-1 C.B. 99, 99-100 (1934) (citing Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v. Goodsky, 46
S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1931); 47 C.J. § 98 (1929)) (concluding that "[in the instant case the
coownerships of the oil and gas leases and the operations thereunder may be fairly
considered as falling within the broad scope of the term 'joint venture.' While the term
'joint venture' is usually, but not necessarily, limited to a single transaction, it has been
held that the business of conducting such a venture to a successful termination may
continue for a number of years. It is true that ordinarily joint or coownership of property
does not of itself constitute a partnership but it is also true that when the coowners or
joint owners agree to employ such property in the carrying on of a trade or business they
become partners" (citations omitted)).
This ruling is opposite of a regulation the IRS revoked not long before the
ruling. See Regulations 74, Art. 1317 (1931) ("Coowners of oil lands engaged in developing
the property through a common agent are not necessarily partners.").
335.
I.T. 2749, 8-1 C.B. at 100 (citing 47 C.J. § 98 (1929)). The arrangement between
the members provided that (1) the gross revenue from such properties would be paid to
and accounted for by the co-owners monthly, (2) the co-owners would pay expenditures in
the development and operation of the properties monthly, (3) gross and net income would
be settled monthly, and (4) the accounting method would result in a complete periodical
account for revenue and expense in the same manner as in the case of a separate piece of
property. Id. at 99-100.
336.
See I.T. 2785, 8-1 C.B. 96, 96-97 (1934). The ruling allowed the operating coowner to file Form 1065 and an attached schedule provided by the IRS. Id. The schedule
was required to show the (1) "total working interest," (2) "names and addresses of the
coowners," (3) "the percentage of each coowner's interest in the coownership," (4) "total
costs and expenses billed each coowner with respect to drilling for and producing the oil
and gas, " and (5) "the total revenue credited in those cases where the operating coowner
distributed revenue to the other coowners (by way of credit or cash) from the sale or other
disposition of the coowners' oil and gas." Id.
337.
Qualified partnerships are preserved under today's tax laws. See I.R.C. § 761(a)
(2000) (defining "partnership" and explaining how qualified partnerships can be exempted
from the application of subchapter K); Borden et al., supra note 69, at 1182 ("Later IRS
Rulings and court decisions.., appear to interpret section 761 as a codification of I.T.
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why it exempted qualified tax partnerships from the partnership
tax accounting and reporting requirements. 3 8
Later the IRS articulated the joint-profit test and applied it
to rule that a co-owned joint-production oil and gas arrangement
was a qualified tax partnership.33 9 The primary issue was
whether the arrangement was a tax corporation or a tax
partnership.3 40 Nonetheless, the IRS applied the joint-profit test
3930."). But see Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 633 F.2d at 515-16 ("Section [761(a)] has
generally been interpreted, in the absence of any legislative history, as approving the
Bentex decision while providing relief from certain resulting hardships.... This
interpretation is surely correct. . . ." (citations omitted)); McMahon, supra note 115, at 10
("Most consider.., that Congress enacted [section 761(a)] in reaction to the Bentex Oil
decision." (citing Marvin K. Collie & Joseph P. Driscoll, Partnership Oil and Gas
Operations Under Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 33 TEx. L. REV. 792,
794-95 (1955); Joseph Taubman, Oil and Gas Partnershipsand Section 761(a), 12 TAX L.
REV. 49, 58 (1957))). Section 761(a)(2) "simultaneously confirms and ameliorates the
result in Bentex Oil." Id.
338.
The IRS probably acted illegally in creating qualified partnerships. In 1934,
there was no other legal authority allowing an arrangement that was a tax partnership
under the statutory definition to not follow the partnership accounting and reporting
rules. Since the IRS provided no basis in the law to support its ruling, we are left to
speculate why it created qualified tax partnerships. Commentators have since questioned
the IRS's authority to circumvent the established rule of law enumerated in statute and
by the courts for administrative convenience in entity classification. See Polsky, supra
note 28, at 221-39 (arguing that the Treasury acted beyond the scope of its authority in
promulgating the check-the-box regulations, which conflict with prior case law (Morrissey
v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935)) and the statutory definition of tax corporation in
sections 7701(a)(2) and (a)(3), and that if these rules favor taxpayers, taxpayers are
unlikely to challenge them). But see Littriello v. United States, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 50,385, at 88,059 (W.D. Ky. 2005) (rejecting the taxpayer's claim that the checkthe-box regulations are invalid). The qualified tax partnership ruling did not impose an
apparent burden on taxpayers since they in effect gave taxpayers involved in oil and gas
co-ownership joint-production arrangements the election to follow the partnership tax
accounting and reporting rules or to not follow them. With this opportunity to choose, it is
unlikely that the rules will be challenged. But see Bentex Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 20 T.C.
565, 571 (1953) (involving a taxpayer challenge to the partnership classification in oil and
gas co-ownership joint-production arrangement).
339.
See I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 126, 128-29 (explaining that "if the joint objective is
limited to development and the extraction and processing of mineral.., for division in
kind or for sale for the accounts of the several participants individually, the test of a joint
venture for joint profit is not met").
340.
Indeed, in I.T. 3930, the IRS considered whether an oil and gas co-owned jointproduction arrangement was a tax corporation. Id. at 126-29. First, the IRS distinguished
the subject agreements from general partnerships
principally in that (1) they can arise only between joint operators, (2) they
extend to and are terminated by exhaustion of the mineral deposit, (3) the
majority in interest controls policies, and (4) the death of a participant or the
transfer of his interest does not interrupt the relation-the heir or transferee
becoming a participant.
Id. at 127. Second, the IRS stated that both a joint-profit motive and the carrying on of a
business indicate the existence of either a tax partnership or a tax corporation, but does
distinguish them from each other. Id. Third, the IRS stated that arrangements that have
centralized management and continuity of interest are not tax partnerships. Id. at 128.
Fourth, the IRS nonetheless disregarded centralized management and continuity of life
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to rule that the arrangement was a qualified tax partnership.3 41
As articulated by the IRS, the joint-profit test provides that a coownership arrangement is a qualified tax partnership if it (1) is
not a state-law corporation, (2) has sufficient business-like
activity, and (3) does not have a joint-profit motive.342 Under the
definition of tax corporation, a state-law corporation could not
have been a tax partnership.343 Thus, to be considered a tax
partnership, the arrangement had to be something other than a
state-law corporation. The first factor of the IRS's test addresses
this. The second and third factors are elements of the
substantive-law definition of partnership.3 44 Because co-owned
joint-production
arrangements have
significant business
activity, 45 the third factor's joint profit is the focus with such
arrangements. Whether such an arrangement is a tax
partnership under the joint-profit test depends upon the
definition used to define profit.346
The IRS originally appeared to adopt the accounting
definition of profit.34 7 It ruled that a joint-profit motive exists if a
product is sold through the joint efforts of two or more parties.348
and focused on joint-profit motive to rule that the arrangement was a tax partnership. Id.
Because there was no joint profit, the IRS classified such arrangements as qualified tax
partnerships. Id. at 129. This ruling is fascinating because it classified an arrangement
with continuity of life and centralized management as a qualified tax partnership, after
stating that those were the two defining characteristics of a tax corporation. Arguably, the
arrangement was a tax corporation under the laws in effect at the time. See also
Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 361-62 (applying the corporate-resemblance test later adopted in
the Kintner regulations).
341.
I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. at 129.
342.
Later, the absence of a joint-profit motive became important to co-ownership
joint-production arrangements wishing to elect out of subchapter K under section
761(a)(2). See Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1994) (allowing members of coowned joint-production arrangements to elect out of subchapter K if they own property as
co-owners, reserve the right to take product in kind, and do not jointly sell the product).
But see Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 633 F.2d at 516-17 (indicating that distributions of
property in kind may be a form of profit sharing).
343.
See supra text accompanying note 27 (illustrating the fact-intensive, sixcharacteristic test used to define tax partnership).
344.
See supra text accompanying note 229 (defining what partnership means under
substantive law). The second factor's business activity is the same as the substantive-law
definition's requirement that the parties carry on a business. The factor is analogous to
the profit sought by the parties under the substantive-law definition.
345.
See Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 521, 559-60 (1979), affd, 633
F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980) (declaring that in order to be partners, the parties must "actively
carry on a trade, business, financial operation, or venture").
346.
The substantive-law test may adopt all definitions of profit. In which case, these
arrangements would be tax partnerships under the substantive-law test. Whether they
are excluded, at least in part, from the definition of tax partnership under the joint-profit
test, turns on the definition of profit incorporated by the test.
347.
I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 126, 128-29.
348.
Id. at 126 ("[W]here agreements irrevocably vest the operator in his
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In such cases, the joint sale of the product vests the arrangement
with ownership of the product and of the revenue derived from
the sale of the product.349 The arrangement also has expenses,
which it deducts from its revenue, creating an arrangement-level
profit (under the accounting definition). 5 ' Dividing this profit
among the members creates a joint profit.3"' No joint-profit
motive exists, however, if the arrangement distributes the
product to the members who sell the product individually.3 52 In
such a situation, the arrangement has no revenue, so it can have
no profit under the accounting definition of profit."3 Such an
arrangement may be a qualified tax partnership.35 4
3 55 the
In Madison Gas & Electric Co. v. Commissioner,
Seventh Circuit later used the dictionary definition of profit to
hold that if the definition of tax partnership requires a jointprofit motive, co-owned joint-production arrangements possess

representative capacity with the authority to extract and sell the mineral, there are
created for income tax purposes associations taxable as corporations, which associations
are the owners of the depletable economic interests in the oil and gas in place and of the
income derived from operations.").
349.
Id.
350.
See supra text accompanying note 238 (identifying the dictionary definition of
profit).
351.
I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B.at 128-29.
352.
Id. at 129 ("As such agreements commonly allow the participants to take their
shares of the mineral in kind (or provide for the sale of the shares of the respective
participants for their individual accounts under revocable agency powers), the sale of the
mineral, even though made by the operator, is a sale by or on behalf of the individual
participants. In such cases, there is no joint profit contemplated or realized by the
associates.... [I]t is held that the participants, through the partnership thus created,
individually own depletable economic interests in the oil and gas in place and must report
the proceeds therefrom as their income." (citations omitted)).
353.
See id.
354.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-344, 1968-1 C.B. 569, 569-72 (involving a group of
electrical power corporations that owned several large power-generating units as
tenants-in-common and had the right to take their respective shares of power
generated and sell them to their respective end-users). In Revenue Ruling 68-344, the
IRS, relying on I.T. 3930, ruled that the joint ownership and operation of the
arrangement was "substantially like the conduct of a business," but "there [was] no
division of [profits] ... because all gain [was] derived from sales of power by
each ... participant for its own account." Id. at 570. Because the arrangement was not
a tax trust, a tax estate, or a tax corporation, and something more than a mere
expense-sharing arrangement, the IRS ruled it was a tax partnership eligible for the
section 761(a)(2) election or a qualified tax partnership. Id. at 571.
355.
Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 514-17 (7th Cir. 1980)
(involving a typical co-owned joint-production arrangement in which one co-owner wished
to deduct certain employee training expenses related to a co-owned electricity plant). In
Madison Gas & Elec. Co., the IRS took the position that the expenses were incurred in the
start up of a new tax partnership and therefore were not deductible currently. Id. at 514.
The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that there must be a joint-profit motive for a
tax partnership to exist as defined by sections 7701 and 761. Id. at 515-17.
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the requisite joint-profit motive. The Seventh Circuit adopted the
Tax Court's reasoning:
[T]he test of... profit motive for purposes of finding a
Federal tax partnership is clearly met in the situation at
hand where a group of business organizations decide to
band together to produce with economies of scale a common
product to be distributed to the members of the venture in
kind.356
Addressing the profit motive, the Tax Court stated, "To the
extent a profit motive may be required for an unincorporated
organization to be a partnership for Federal tax purposes, we
hold that it is present in this case with the in kind distribution of
' This mirrors
electricity produced by the nuclear power plant."357
the dictionary definition of profit, which provides that profits are
the "benefit or advantages accruing from ....the carrying on of
any process of production."35 8 Under the dictionary definition of
profit, the economies of scale are the benefits accruing from
carrying on the production process jointly. As this holding
demonstrates, the dictionary definition of profit abolishes the
joint-profit test as all arrangements that carry on business as coowners will realize some benefit from doing so; otherwise they
would not join together.
The accounting-definition-based joint-profit test is preserved
in section 761(a)(2), which allows certain arrangements that coown property and distribute production from the property in kind
to its members to elect out of subchapter K. 9 The arrangement
in Madison Gas & Electric Co. should have satisfied the
requirements in section 761(a)(2) and been able to elect out of
subchapter K.36 ° Section 761(a)(2) requires that the arrangement
356.
Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 521, 562 (1979), afFd, 633 F.2d 512
(7th Cir. 1980).
357.
Id. at 563. But see Harlan E. Moore Charitable Trust v. United States, 9 F.3d
623, 624-25 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that even though the landlord paid some of the
farming costs, rent received pursuant to a sharecropping agreement in the form of onehalf of all grain produced on the farm did not constitute a share of the profits because
"[p]rofits are sales net of [all] cost").
358.
See supra text accompanying note 238 (denoting the dictionary definition of
profit).
359.
See Rev. Rul. 68-344, 1968-1 C.B. at 571 (providing the requirements that the
organization must meet in order to choose to be exempted from subchapter K).
360.
See id. (containing a pre-Madison Gas and Elec. Co. ruling that the Seventh
Circuit did not overturn). The court in Madison Gas and Elec. Co. did not consider the
validity of the partnership's section 761(a)(2) election. It did, however, indicate that its
decision does not affect the partnership's ability to make the election. Madison Gas &
Elec. Co., 72 T.C. at 563. It quoted the Tax Court, stating "[i]f distribution in kind of
jointly produced property is enough to avoid partnership status, we do not see how such
distribution could be used as a test for allowing an election to be excluded from the
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not sell produced property to qualify for the election." 1 Thus, the
rule adopts the IRS's joint-profit motive test. Unfortunately,
section 761(a)(2) appears to be the extent of its applicability
today.362

4. The Expense-SharingTest. The expense-sharing test is
closely related to the joint-profit test. The expense-sharing test
provides that "a joint undertaking merely to share expenses [is
not a tax partnership] .,,363 For example, "if two or more persons
jointly construct a ditch merely to drain surface water from their
properties," they are not partners. 64 This test is similar to the
joint-profit test because both tests apply to arrangements that
engage in significant activity but do not market or sell a product.
The expense-sharing test is, however, different from the jointprofit test because it applies only to arrangements that do not
produce a product or services, whereas the joint-profit test
applies to arrangements that produce a product or services .
5. The Degree-of-Activity Test. The degree-of-activity test
provides that if two or more parties co-own property and carry on
more than a certain degree of activity, they will be a tax
partnership.366 One court has articulated the degree-of-activity
partnership provisions of subehapter K." Id.
361.
I.R.C. § 761 (a)(2) (2000).
362.
See McMahon, supra note 115, at 11-12 (observing that section 761(a)(2) would
be rendered meaningless if the lack of joint-profit motive precludes partnership
classification and the I.T. 3930 standard for joint-profit motive applies).
363.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (as amended in 2006).
364.
Id.
365.
See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 72 T.C. at 561-62 (distinguishing the co-owned
joint-production arrangement at issue from the expense-sharing arrangement in the
regulations). Under the dictionary definition of profit, members of an expense-sharing
arrangement could have a joint profit. See supra text accompanying note 238 (addressing
the dictionary definition of profit). For example, in the ditch-digging hypothetical, the
parties benefit from the ditch draining water from their properties, which they
constructed through joint efforts. Thus, some may argue that the expense-sharing test is
identical to the joint-profit test. However, the regulation still preserves the distinction.
366.
See, e.g., Gilford v. Comm'r, 201 F.2d 735, 736 (2d Cir. 1953) (declaring that
services required to maintain property in rental condition are not sufficient for
establishing a tax partnership); Cusick v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 241, 243 (1998)
(performing services necessary to maintain property and co-owners' testimonies that
arrangement was a tax partnership sufficient to be tax partnership); Gabriel v. Comm'r,
66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1283, 1287 (1993) (finding that an arrangement with little or no
business activity was not a tax partnership); Marinos v. Comm'r, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 97, 100
(1989) ("[Tlhe distinction between mere co-owners and co-owners who are engaged in a
partnership lies in the degree of business activity of the co-owners or their agents.");
Estate of Levine v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 780, 785-86 (1979) (involving a tax partnership
where partners engaged in an active business and performed various services); McShain
v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 154, 160 (1977) (leasing under a net lease not sufficient activity to
make co-owners tax partners); Hahn v. Comm'r, 22 T.C. 212, 214 (1954) ("Tenants in
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test: "The regulations and relevant case law indicate that the
distinction between mere coowners and coowners who are
engaged in a partnership lies in the degree of business activities
of the coowners or their agents." 67 As thus articulated, the
degree-of-activity test focuses on the arrangement's degree, or
quantum, of activity. If an arrangement performs more than a
specific quantum of business activity, it will be a tax partnership.
6. The Type-of-Activity Test. Under the type-of-activity test,
two or more parties who co-own property are not a tax
partnership if they hire someone to provide services that only
support the income-producing function of the property.36 The
Second Circuit appears to be one of the first appellate courts to
rely upon the type-of-activity test to rule that an arrangement
was not a partnership, even though the arrangement conducted
some business activity."' The court found that the regular and
continuous activity of maintaining the property in rental
condition and supplying such services for the tenants as were
needed to rent the property to good advantage constituted a trade
or business under section 1231.370 Because they satisfied the
section 1231 trade or business requirement they should also
satisfy the business activity requirement of the substantive-law

common who rent their property are not ipso facto tax partners for tax purposes."); Rev.
Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261 (noting that a co-ownership arrangement is not a tax
partnership if the manager hired by the co-owners' only provides customary tenant
services); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (as amended in 2006) (stating that a separate
entity may exist if co-owners provide services to the occupants).
367.
Cusick, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 243. The court discussed the level of business
activity, but because the degree of business activity seemed to be so low, it appears this
was not the sole basis of the court's decision. Id.; see also, e.g., Gilford, 201 F.2d at 736
(holding that an arrangement with similar degree of activity was not a tax partnership).
368.
As the discussion in this Part of the Article indicates, the cases and rulings that
apply the type-of-activity test always involve a manager who performs the services.
369.
The court used the term "degree", but its discussion and holding indicate it was
considering the type of business activity. Gilford, 201 F.2d at 736. In Gilford, two
individuals hired a real estate agent to manage the real property and account to them. Id.
The case was before the court because the taxpayer wished to deduct losses from the sale
of the property as capital losses to obtain carry forward opportunities. Id. If the taxpayer
had been deemed to be in a tax partnership with the other co-owners, the sale would have
been of a partnership interest and the loss would have been a capital loss. The IRS
prevailed and the court's holding that the arrangement was not a tax partnership
resulted in the loss being ordinary. Id.
370.
Id. These are the same type of activities the IRS has referred to as customary
tenant services. See Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261 (explaining that such provisions as
heat, air conditioning, and normal repairs are customary tenant services). The Treasury
also allows arrangements to perform such services without becoming tax partnerships.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (as amended in 2006) ("[Mlere co-ownership of property
that is maintained, kept in repair, and rented or leased does not constitute a separate
entity for federal tax purposes.").
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test. 71 Because the members of the arrangement also shared in
the profit of the arrangement,372 the arrangement would be a tax
partnership under the substantive-law test.373 Nonetheless, the
court held that
the co-ownership arrangement was not a tax
374
partnership.

Services provided to maintain the property in rental
condition are customary tenant services.7 5 Such services support
the income-producing function of rental property and are thus
support services. The type-of-activity test does not address
arrangements that provide additional services. Nor does it
address arrangements that provide only support services if a
member provides the services. In fact, of the various types of
services arrangements, the type-of-activity test only governs two.
a. Pure Co-Ownership Arrangements. Two individuals, Ali
and Bill, create a pure co-ownership arrangement. They each
own an equal share of a piece of raw land that they lease longterm to a rancher who grazes cattle on the land. The lease
requires the lessee to maintain the property and pay all the taxes
and other expenses associated with the property, so the owners
provide no services to the lessee. The sole source of Ali and Bill's
income from this arrangement is the rent which the property
generates.7 6 In this simple economic arrangement, the property
generates income without the members providing any services.
The arrangement has no activity, so the arrangement would not
be a tax partnership under the type-of-activity test, or the
degree-of-activity test for that matter.
b. Manager-Provided Support Services Arrangements.
Manager-provided support services are support services provided
by a person other than a member of the arrangement (i.e., a
371.
See I.R.C. § 1231(a)(3), (b)(1) (2000) (explaining that a section 1231 loss is a loss
from the sale of property used in a trade or business).
372.
Gilford, 201 F.2d at 736.
373.
See supra text accompanying note 229 (defining partnership under substantive
law).
374.
Gilford, 201 F.2d at 736 (looking in part to the intent of the parties to determine
that they had not formed a partnership but basing its holding on the type of activity and
explaining that "the mere holding of business property by tenants in common does not
make such tenants partners in the tax sense, in the absence of any showing of an
intention to become partners").
375.
Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. at 261.
376.
This assumes the lease is long term, not requiring frequent negotiation.
Although the co-owners would be required to negotiate the original lease, such services
would be nominal. Such nominal amounts of services have generally been ignored in
considering the definition of tax partnership. See supra note 366 (identifying cases in
which services were provided but no tax partnership held to exist).
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manager). If the services are provided by a manager who is paid
a fair market management fee,3 77 the type-of-activity test will
exclude the arrangement from the definition of tax partnership.
Thus, if, in the example above, Ali and Bill agreed to maintain
the fences on their property merely to keep it in rental condition,
the arrangement would not be a tax partnership if they hired
Carol to maintain the fences and paid her market rate. The typeof-activity test does not answer whether the arrangement would
be a tax partnership if either Ali or Bill provided the services.
The source-of-activity test addresses that issue.
c. Additional-Services Arrangements. Additional-services
arrangements are co-ownership arrangements that provide more
than customary tenant services. 78 For example, in addition to
maintaining the fences, Ali and Bill may agree to ride herd on
the tenant's cattle for a separate fee. Riding herd does not merely
enhance the income-producing function of the property; it
generates additional income. Therefore, the type-of-activity test
would not exclude this arrangement from the definition of tax
partnership. The type-of-activity test does not, however, answer
whether providing additional services creates a separate tax
partnership.37 9 Perhaps the property and customary tenant
services should be treated as a tax partnership separate from the
provision of additional services. The additional-services
arrangement should be treated like a pure services arrangement.
d. Pure Services Arrangements. A simple two-member
firm is an example of a pure services arrangement.
attorneys' services generate income. They do not support
income-producing function of any property. Therefore,

law
The
the
the

377.
The fee paid to the manager does not have to be a fixed fee to avoid tax
partnership classification. Several courts have allowed agents to receive a share of profits
in exchange for services without being treated as tax partners. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Banks,
543 U.S. 426, 436 (2005) (finding that client retained control of lawsuit, so no tax
partnership existed even though attorney shared in profits); Estate of Kahn v. Comm'r,
499 F.2d 1186, 1190 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that employee had a subordinate interest in
profits, so there was not a tax partnership); Badger Co. v. Comm'r, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 869,
873-74 (1967) (concluding that because compensation was stated as "an amount equal to"
a percentage of payments and not as a share of payments, the agent was not a tax
partner); Luna v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1079 (1964) (finding that no tax partnership
existed even though taxpayer compensation was determined as a share of profits);
Copeland v. Ratterree, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) J 9895, at 58,195 (N.D.N.Y. 1957)
(emphasizing that control, not profit-sharing, is the most important factor).
378.
Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. at 261.
379.
In Revenue Ruling 75-374, the IRS implied that sharing in profits from the
additional services would create a tax partnership. Id. That ruling does not, however,
indicate whether the tax partnership would consist of the property ownership and
provision of additional services or just of the provision of additional services.
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arrangement does not satisfy the type-of-activity test, so it will
not be excluded from the definition of tax partnership under that
test.
e. Dealer Arrangements. Dealer arrangements involve both
property and services, but the property supports the incomeproducing function of the services, which are the primary source
of the arrangement's income. The classic example of this is the
subdivision and disposition of real estate."' For example, if
Developer and Seller each pay 50% of the acquisition cost of
property and Developer subdivides it and Seller sells it, income is
derived from the subdivision and selling activity, not the
appreciation in the investment property. 381 Because the activity
generates separate income, the arrangement would not be
excluded from the definition of tax partnership under the type-ofactivity test.
7. The Source-of-Activity Test. Under the source-of-activity
test, an arrangement is a tax partnership if at least one member
of the arrangement contributes services, the arrangement's
property and services provide an economic benefit, and all the
members of the arrangement share in that economic benefit.382
This test was most prominently applied in the computer-leasing
cases of the 1980s and 90s." 3 In those cases, investors borrowed

380.
Dealers in other property experience the same phenomenon. For example,
securities dealers may own securities, but the economic benefit comes from their skills of
buying and selling, not from holding the property for investment. The question of whether
a party is a dealer or investor is not a simple question. There are a significant number of
cases that address the issue with no apparent consistency. Compare Suburban Realty Co.
v. United States, 615 F.2d 171, 181-82 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that taxpayer was a dealer
on basis of sufficient activity), Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 41617 (5th Cir. 1976) (concluding that taxpayer was a dealer as a result of the subdivision
and selling activities), and Bynum v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 295, 300 (1966) (same), with Estate
of Barrios v. Comm'r, 29 T.C. 378, 383-85 (1957) (holding that taxpayer was not a dealer
despite subdivision and selling activity). In the tax partnership context, having
established that an arrangement is a dealer, the economic benefit comes from the
services, not the property.
381.
By treating the income from the sale of dealer property as ordinary income, the
tax system treats the gain as derived from the activities of the owners, not from the
investment in the property. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains
Taxation: What's Law Got to Do with It?, 39 Sw. L.J. 869, 890 (1985) ("The distinction
between investor and businessman is critical here, as it was in Britain, because the
former held his capital to produce income in the form of rents, dividends, or interest; the
latter used his capital to buy and sell assets such that the act of buying and selling
produced income in the form of the gains realized from the increased value.").
382.
See Borden, supra note 115, at 56 (explaining what the source-of-activity test
requires for a tax partnership to exist).
383.
Bergford v. Comm'r, 12 F.3d 166, 166-67 (9th Cir. 1993); Alhouse v. Comm'r, 62
T.C.M. (CCH) 1678, 1678 (1991), affd sub nom. Bergford, 12 F.3d 166; Bussing v. Comm'r,
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money from an unrelated party-the manager-and, with
additional personal money, acquired undivided interests in
computer equipment. 84 The manager arranged to triple-net lease
the property to unrelated parties and performed all other
activities necessary to lease the property." 5 These activities
appear to be nothing more than support services. Because a
member of the arrangement contributed them to the
arrangement,386 however, the type-of-activity test did not apply to
the computer-leasing cases.
The source-of-activity test connects the source of activity to
the source of economic benefit."7 The Tax Court stated that "the
economic benefits to the individual participants were not
derivative of their coownership of the computer equipment, but
rather came from their joint relationship toward a common
goal."388 The joint relationship consisted of the investor's
contribution of property and the manager's contribution of
services, both of which created an economic benefit that was
shared by all members."8 The following examples demonstrate
the connection between contributions and economic benefit.
An arrangement may provide services in one of three ways:
(1) one or more of the members may contribute services to the
arrangement, (2) the members may hire an unrelated party at
fair market value to provide the services, or (3) the arrangement
may pay one or more of the members fair market compensation
(not a share of the profits) to perform the services.
a. Member-Contributed Services. Assume two individuals,
Ephraim and Fran, own an apartment complex. Their standard
lease agreement provides that they will perform all services

89 T.C. 1050, 1051-52 (1987); Bussing v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 449, 449-51 (1987).
384.
Bergford, 12 F.3d at 167; Alhouse, 62 T.C.M. at 1678-79; Bussing, 89 T.C. at
1052; Bussing, 88 T.C. at 452.
385.
Bergford, 12 F.3d at 167; Alhouse, 62 T.C.M. at 1679; Bussing, 89 T.C. at 1052;
Bussing, 88 T.C. at 453-54. A triple-net lease is a lease that generally requires the lessee
to pay the tax, insurance, and other expenses of the property. United States v. Stoddard,
875 F.2d 1233, 1235 (6th Cir. 1989). The lessor generally takes a passive role and merely
receives rental payments. See Estate of Abraham v. Comm'r, 408 F.3d 26, 28 n.1 (1st
Cir.), amended by 429 F.3d 294 (1st Cir. 2005).
386.
See Bergford, 12 F.3d at 170 (opining that although the manager did not have
an interest in the income from property's operation, the interest in the gain from the
property (i.e., the property's residual value) was an economic benefit the manager shared
with the owners).
387.
See Cusick v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 241, 241-42 (1998) (showing the
connection between the activity (maintenance tasks and bookkeeping) and the economic
benefit (collecting rent and splitting the profits)).
388.
Bergford, 12 F.3d at 169.
389.
Id. at 169-70.
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needed to maintain and repair the complex. In addition, the coowners negotiate and execute leases for the apartment units;
collect rent payments from the tenants; and pay taxes,
assessments, and insurance premiums with respect to the
property. These are customary tenant services that merely
support the property's income-producing function. Because
Ephraim and Fran provide the services instead of hiring a
manager, the type-of-activities test will not exclude the
arrangement from the definition of tax partnership.3 9 ° Instead,
their providing the services brings them within the source-ofactivity test and the definition of tax partnership.
b. Third-Party-Compensated Services. Assume, alternatively,
that Ephraim and Fran hire a manager to perform the support
services and pay the manager a fair market management fee. This
arrangement is very similar to Bill's and Ali's manager-providedsupport-services arrangement, which would be excluded from the
definition of tax partnership under the type-of-activity test."1 Since
the services are paid for, instead of being contributed, the source-ofactivity test would not include this arrangement within the
definition of tax partnership.
The distinction between this arrangement and the membercontributed-services arrangement is that although the members
derive economic benefit from the manager's services (enhanced
rental income), the members and the manager do not share a
common goal. The members derived their economic benefit from
the apartment complex, enhanced by the manager's services. The
manager separately derived economic benefit solely from the
services sold to the arrangement in exchange for the
management fee.
c. Member-Compensated Services. An arrangement that
pays a fair market fee to a member of a co-ownership
arrangement to provide support services should not be a tax
partnership under the source-of-activity test. If the member is
compensated at fair market rates for the services, the serviceproviding member's separate capacities must be distinguished for
tax purposes.392 The member, as a service provider, individually

390.
See, e.g., Cusick, 76 T.C.M. at 241, 243 (finding members who contributed
customary tenant services to be tax partners).
391.
See supra Part V.B.6.b (applying the type-of-activity test to manager-provided
support-services arrangements).
392.
This is common in the tax partnership context. For example, partners can
interact with the partnership in their capacities as partners or in their capacities as
nonpartners. See I.R.C. § 707(a)(1) (2000) ("If a partner engages in a transaction with a
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derives economic benefit from selling services to the
arrangement. The members, as co-owners, derive economic
benefit from the property, enhanced by the service-providing
member's separately compensated services. This separates the
provision of services for a fee from the common goal of owning the
property for a profit. Thus, the arrangement would not be a tax
partnership under the source-of-activity test.
d. Profits Interest as Compensation. The source-of-activity
test does not include principal-agent relationships within the
definition of tax partnership. It is not unusual for principals to
compensate agents with a share of profits.393 The distinction
between tax partnerships and principal-agent relationships is the
service provider's control.394 If one party retains control over the
income of and the right to make withdrawals from the
arrangement, the relationship is a principal-agent relationship.3 95
One party's lack of control over the income indicates that such a
party is an agent who has sold, not contributed, services to the
arrangement.39 6 The agent's lack of contributed services keeps
principal-agent relationships outside the scope of the source-ofactivity test.397
8. The Business-PurposeTest. Under the business-purpose
test, courts may disregard an arrangement if the members'
purpose for forming the arrangement is "not the creation and
partnership other than in his capacity as a member of such partnership, the transaction
shall, except as otherwise provided in this section, be considered as occurring between the
partnership and one who is not a partner.").
393.
See, e.g., Copeland v. Ratterree, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9895, at 58,195
(N.D.N.Y. 1957) (sharing in profits is not important to the tax partnership question); Tate
v. Knox, 131 F. Supp. 514, 515 (D. Minn. 1955) (describing a buy-in provision for the
general manager to be paid by forgoing his share of profits); Luna v. Comm'r, 42 T.C.
1067, 1074 (1964) (finding that profit share was compensation to an employee);
Bartholomew v. Comm'r, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 302, 303 (1950) (noting that an engineer was
"paid a per diem of $50 plus expenses and participate[d] in the final profits").
394.
See Tate, 131 F. Supp. at 517 (explaining that control is often used with
proprietorship).
395.
See Copeland, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9895, at 58,195 (concluding that
because there was no equal control, there was no tax partnership).
396.
See Comm'r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 436-37 ("The relationship between client
and attorney, regardless of the variations in particular compensation agreements or the
amount of skill and effort the attorney contributes, is a quintessential principal-agent
relationship.... The attorney is an agent who is duty bound to act only in the interests of
the principal, and so it is appropriate to treat the full amount of the recovery as income to
the principal.... The portion paid to the agent may be deductible, but absent some other
provision of law it is not excludable from the principal's gross income." (citations
omitted)).
397.
But see Fishback v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 621, 626 (D.S.D. 1963)
(declaring that equal control is not required for tax partnership).
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carrying on of a new joint enterprise or uniting their joint efforts
or substance in a new undertaking[, ... [but] the[ir] real
39 This test was used
purpose ... [is] to minimize income taxes.""
to deny tax partnership classification to simple family
partnerships.9 In the family partnership context, courts were
concerned that the parties were using partnerships to shift
income from husbands to wives. 00
Courts disallow the use of tax partnerships as a device for
assigning income:
[I]n considering a gift of income by assignment, the court
held that the operation of the taxing statute was not
controlled by attenuated subtleties, but rather by the
import and reasonable construction of the Act; that the
court was not so much concerned with the refinements of
title as with the command over the income. Concerning
attempts to avoid the effect of a taxing statute by various
devices, the court held that one having the right to enjoy
income could not escape the tax by any kind of anticipatory
arrangement, however skillfully devised, by which he
procured payment to another.4 '
Courts have also used the business-purpose test in the
shelter cases which involve taxpayers attempting to create tax
losses and siphon taxable gain to tax-exempt foreign entities
through the use of "elaborate partnerships.""2 In holding that
398.
See Earp v. Jones, 131 F.2d 292, 293-94 (10th Cir. 1942). Earp v. Jones appears
to be the first case to apply the business-purpose test to the definition of tax partnership,
preceding Commissioner v. Tower by a few years, but having similar facts (i.e., a husband
and wife formed a partnership to shift the husband's income to the wife). Courts had
previously disregarded the formal structure of arrangements to decide other issues. See
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 336-37 (1940) ("[Wlhere, as in this case, the benefits
directly or indirectly retained blend so imperceptibly with the normal concepts of full
ownership, we cannot say that the triers of fact committed reversible error when they
found that the husband was the owner of the corpus for the purposes of § 22(a). To hold
otherwise would be to treat the wife as a complete stranger; to let mere formalism obscure
the normal consequences of family solidarity; and to force concepts of ownership to be
fashioned out of legal niceties which may have little or no significance in such household
arrangements.").
399.
See Earp, 131 F.2d at 293-94 (holding that no partnership existed between
husband and wife despite their agreement giving her full rights as a partner because it
was never intended that she have any control of the business).
400.
See id. at 294 (declaring that "[tlhe real purpose of the partnership was to
minimize income taxes").
401.
Id. at 293 (emphasis omitted) (citing Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579
(1941)).
402.
See Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, 314 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir.
2003) ("[Where taxpayers use an 'elaborate partnership' with entities created solely for
the purpose of the questioned transaction, 'the absence of a non-tax business purpose' is
fatal to the recognition of the entity for the tax purposes." (quoting ASA Investerings
P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505, 512 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); see also TIFD III-E Inc. v. Comm'r,
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such arrangements were not tax partnerships, the D.C. Circuit
focused on language in Commissioner v. Culbertson, which
provides that the existence of a tax partnership depends on
whether, "'considering all the facts[,] ...the parties in good faith
and acting with a business purpose intended to join together in
the present conduct of the enterprise." ' 3 The D.C. Circuit
interpreted this language to require "that a legitimate non-tax
business necessity exist for the creation of the otherwise sham
entity... in order to meet the [Culbertson] intent test.' °4 In one of
the tax shelter cases, the court noted that the taxpayer could have
purchased the assets acquired through the partnership without
incurring the significant costs of creating the partnership and
paying premiums to the foreign partners. 45 This indicated that the
partnership had no nontax business purpose and should be
disregarded for tax purposes. 4 6 Thus, the business-purpose test
requires that an arrangement have a nontax business purpose to be
a tax partnership. The business-purpose test thus serves as an
overriding anti-abuse tool for the courts and the IRS.
9. The Estoppel Test. The estoppel test subjects taxpayers to
the form of an arrangement they choose if they also otherwise
operate in that form. 4 7 Thus, if parties form a valid state-law
partnership, represent the arrangement is a partnership to obtain
licenses from the federal government, file a federal partnership tax
No. 05-0064-cv, 2006 WL 2171519, at *5 (2d Cir. Aug. 3, 2006); Andantech L.L.C. v.
Comm'r, 331 F.3d 972, 973-74 (D.C. Cir. 2003); SABA P'ship v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 1135,
1136 (D.C. Cir. 2001); ASA Investerings P'ship, 201 F.3d at 513, 516 (describing the
rationale of the business-purpose test and applying it to find that the arrangement was
an "elaborate partnership-with a pair of partners concocted for the occasion").
403.
ASA Investerings P'ship, 201 F.3d at 511 (quoting Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337
U.S. 733, 742 (1949)).
404.
Boca Investerings P'ship, 314 F.3d at 630.
405.
Id. at 631.
406.
Id. at 631-32.
407.
See Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97, 97-98 (9th Cir. 1952) (appearing to be
the first case to apply the estoppel test to define tax partnership). Several later cases
relied upon it. See, e.g., Demirjian v. Comm'r, 457 F.2d 1, 5 (3d Cir. 1972) (relying on
Sterno Sales Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 552, 554 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (disallowing
taxpayer's adjustment of reported gross income downward after also disallowing excessive
deductions); Sherman v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 369, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (denying an
attempt to revoke a partnership in order to gain tax advantages because the partnership
was held to be a bona fide one). Under substantive law, partners can similarly form
partnerships by estoppel. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 308(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 128
(2001) ("If a person, by words or conduct, purports to be a partner, or consents to being
represented by another as a partner, in a partnership or with one or more persons not
partners, the purported partner is liable to a person to whom the representation is made,
if that person, relying on the representation, enters into a transaction with the actual or
purported partnership."). Thus, partnership by estoppel under substantive law requires
reliance upon a representation.
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return, and obtain the tax benefits of being a tax partnership for
some tax years, the IRS may later prevent the parties from claiming
that the arrangement is not a tax partnership. 4° Even if the
arrangement may not otherwise be a valid tax partnership, the
estoppel test allows courts and the IRS to estop the parties from
disclaiming the tax partnership." 9 Thus, the estoppel test, like the
business-purpose test, is an anti-abuse tool.
10. The Fact-QuestionTest. The fact-question test treats an
arrangement as a tax partnership if the facts indicate that it is a
tax partnership. The test does not state a legal definition of tax
partnership, even though an inquiry into facts requires a legal
definition of tax partnership.410 Nonetheless, several courts have
adopted what appears to be a pure fact-question test."' Other courts
state that the determination of tax partnership is a question of fact,
but apply some other test. 2
VI. THE ANALYTICAL PLATFORM FOR EVALUATING THE TESTS
The analysis now turns to evaluating the tests. The analysis
begins by establishing an analytical platform based on four
fundamental principles of a sound tax system: (1) certainty,

Maletis, 200 F.2d at 97-98. Although a valid state-law partnership, this
408.
arrangement may not have been a tax partnership under other tests. For example, it may
have been a co-ownership arrangement that provided only customary tenant services and
would thus have been excluded under the type-of-activity test. See supra text
accompanying note 375; see also supra text accompanying notes 368-74.
409. Demirjian, 457 F.2d at 5; Maletis, 200 F.2d at 97-98; Sherman, 141 F.
Supp. at 370-71.
410. See, e.g., Estate of Kahn v. Comm'r, 499 F.2d 1186, 1189 n.4 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[Ilt
follows that since the Tax Court applied the proper legal standard, both its findings on
each individual factor and its overall assessment of their varying weights must be upheld
unless clearly erroneous.").
411.
See, e.g., Leahy v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 56 (1986) (looking only to the facts of the
case and never stating the definition of tax partnership); Melbourne Ranches, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1132, 1138 (1971) ("The question of the existence of a joint
venture is essentially factual. All of the facts and circumstances, and not just the written
agreements, must be examined. The record herein contains substantial evidence to
support both the position of Melbourne, that a joint venture was formed, and the position
of the Government, that such a venture was not established. We have carefully reviewed
the record as a whole, and although the matter is by no means free from doubt, we have
concluded that petitioner has met its burden of proof and has established the existence of
a joint venture." (citations omitted)).
See, e.g., Kelly v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1090, 1101 (1970) (applying the
412.
substantive-law test, and opining that "[w]hether the arrangement among McCartan,
Chamberlin, and Robinson constituted a partnership with McCartan as a partner under
section[s] 761(a) and 7701(a)(2), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, is a
question of fact to be determined from all existing circumstances"); Baughn v. Comm'r, 28
T.C.M. (CCH) 1447, 1455 (1969) (same); Badger Co. v. Comm'r, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 869, 873
(1967) (same).
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(2) equity, (3) neutrality, and (4) simplicity/administrability.
Using these criteria, the Article evaluates each of the ten tests
used to define tax partnership. Although these policy
considerations are often used to evaluate tax laws,413 this section
of the Article reviews each and adjusts them as needed to suit
the task at hand.
A. Certainty
Certainty requires that "the time, manner, and amount of

[tax] payment[s] ... be clear and certain."4

14

Both the taxpayer

and the tax collector should be certain of their obligations under
the law. 15 Part IV of the Article discussed how the application of
the tax rules may affect the obligations of taxpayers and tax
collectors.4 1 ' The definition of tax partnership determines the
applicability of those rules. Thus, a certain definition of tax
partnership is required to inform taxpayers and tax collectors of
their respective obligations under the law. The evaluation of each
test will ask whether the test is certain.
B. Equity
The accepted definition of equity "require[s] that taxpayers
with equal economic income before imposition of a tax have equal
economic income after imposition of the tax. 4 1' Defined more
413.
See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Case Against Passive Investments: A Critical
Appraisal of the Passive Loss Restrictions, 42 STAN. L. REV. 15, 48-49 (1989) (applying
equity and neutrality to evaluate the passive loss restrictions); Fred B. Brown, Proposalto
Reform the Like Kind and Involuntary Conversion Rules in Light of Fundamental Tax
Policies:A Simpler, More Rational and More Unified Approach, 67 MO. L. REV. 705, 70814 (2002) (using efficiency, equity, and administrability to evaluate sections 1031 and
1033); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 146-47 (1992)
(considering whether laws excluding certain recoveries for injuries are equitable and
neutral); John E. Donaldson, The Future of Transfer Taxation: Repeal, Restructuringand
Refinement, or Replacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 545 (1993) (critiquing the
income and compensation tax using neutrality and equity); Edward J. McCaffery, A New
Understandingof Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 829-30, 848-49, 892-93 (2005) (applying
equity, neutrality, and simplicity to evaluate transfer taxes); Robert J. Peroni, A Policy
Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 103 (1988) (arguing
that the enactment of section 469 has increased inefficiency, complexity, and inequity in
the federal income tax system).
414.
Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteriaof Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV.
567, 572 (1965).
415. Id. at 573.
416.
See supra Part IV (explaining that the definition of tax partnership affects
timing, accounting, transactional and procedural rules).
417.
Bankman, supra note 413, at 41; see also Peel, supra note 30, at 2 (arguing that
"the double tax on corporate dividends is unfair... [and it] violates.., horizontal
equity"). Another goal of equity is vertical equity, which "requires that individuals be
taxed according to their ability to pay." Mark L. Louie, Note, Realizing Appreciation
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generally, equity requires "treating like taxpayers alike."4 18 The
negative inference of this principle is that unlike taxpayers may
be treated differently by subjecting each to different tax rules.
This negative inference does not, however, provide license for
treating different taxpayers differently in all cases. Disparate tax
treatment should be allowed only if a difference between two
taxpayers justifies disparate treatment.4 19
Congress appeared to consider the effect of the partnership
tax rules when it adopted them. 2 ' It also recognized that the
rules would treat members of tax partnerships differently from
other taxpayers.42 ' This being the case, Congress attempted to
enact rules that were justified by some other policy criteria,
generally simplicity and administrability.4 22 Because the
definition of tax partnership determines which taxpayers will be
subject to the partnership tax rules, it should include only those
arrangements that have the accounting and reporting concerns
the partnership tax rules were enacted to alleviate. Reaching this
objective generally requires the application of standard equity, as
opposed to deviation equity.
1. StandardEquity. Standard equity compares all taxpayers
to the standard taxpayer. 22 If a taxpayer's situation differs from the

Without Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capital Gains on Marketable Securities, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 857, 863 (1982); see Sneed, supra note 414, at 581 ("[Tihe magnitude of the
inequality between two taxpayers should be measured on the same scale employed to
determine the presence or absence of equality."); see also Paul R. McDaniel & James R.
Repetti, Commentary, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange,
1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 607 (1993) (providing definitions for both vertical and horizontal
equity).
418. Bankman, supra note 413, at 41. Vertical equity generally applies when
considering the appropriate rate structure to apply to taxpayers with different economic
income. Since rate structure is beyond the scope of this Article, it does not address
vertical equity.
419. See McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 417, at 611 (suggesting that vertical equity
is a "derivative" concept, based on what is considered "appropriate" in terms of
distinguishing between taxpayers); see also Jones, supra note 138, at 1062 (arguing that
there must be something different about the taxpayers to justify different tax treatment).
420. See supra Part III (discussing the history and purpose of partnership taxation).
421.
See, e.g., supra note 81 and accompanying text (delineating how each individual
partner in a partnership could conceivably operate under a different tax structure).
422. See, e.g., supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the once yearly
income tax computation requirement for a tax partnership, which was introduced by the
Revenue Act of 1917).
423. The standard taxpayer would be an individual. In the business context, the
standard taxpayer would be a sole proprietor. If an arrangement conducted similar
business activity, its rulings would be compared to the sole proprietor to apply standard
equity. See, e.g., Yin, supra note 224, at 137 ("If the proprietorship is not treated as a
separate taxpayer, it is difficult to see why, for example, a two-person general partnership
should be so treated."); see also Jones, supra note 138, at 1067-77 (observing that prior
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standard taxpayer's, standard equity allows, or perhaps requires,
that the taxpayer and the standard taxpayer be subject to
different tax rules.424 The difference between the taxpayer and
the standard taxpayer must, however, be such as to justify the
different tax treatment. For example, Congress created the
partnership taxable year so a partnership would not have to
compute taxable income multiple times during the year.2 The
use of a separate taxable year by a tax partnership may treat
partner taxpayers differently from the standard taxpayer by
deferring a partner taxpayer's recognition of partnership taxable
income. 426 Congress justifies this disparate treatment on the
grounds of simplicity. Without a separate partnership taxable
year, the arrangement would be required to compute taxable
income several times during the year. 427 Other differences
between the standard taxpayer and members of other
arrangements may not justify the application of the partnership
taxable year rule. For example, if Ali and Bill triple-net lease
their property to a cattle rancher, 2 8 they can each compute their
income from the land without computing partnership income.
Thus, the administrative convenience justification is absent, and
Ali and Bill's co-ownership arrangement should not be allowed to
use the partnership taxable year rule.
2. Deviation Equity. Once a deviation from the standard is
justified, the temptation arises to compare other taxpayers to the
deviant taxpayer. If other taxpayers are similar to the deviant
taxpayer, logic would appear to dictate that the similarly
situated taxpayer should be subject to the same rules to which
the deviant taxpayer is subject. This may create mischief if the
other taxpayer, although similar to the deviant taxpayer, is not
exactly like the deviant taxpayer. Factors that make the other
taxpayer similar to the deviant taxpayer may not be the factors
that justified treating the deviant taxpayer differently from the

attempts to assign tax benefits and burdens have improperly ignored or skipped over the
relationship between partnership taxation and individual taxation). In the property
context, the standard taxpayer would be the sole owner of property.
424.
See supra text accompanying note 418 (noting that equity requires "treating like
taxpayers alike").
425.
See supra text accompanying note 82 (addressing the purpose behind the
Revenue Act of 1917).
426.
See supra text accompanying notes 164-69 (explaining the policy intent behind
effective deferral).
427.
See supra note 81 (providing an illustration of such an administrative
inconvenience).
428.
See supra Part \T.B.6.a (discussing pure co-ownership arrangements).
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standard taxpayer. For example, members of Partnership A
may be treated differently from the standard taxpayer due to the
administrative inconvenience of determining the members'
income from Partnership A.43 Partnership A may be a Texas
limited partnership. Partnership B similarly may be a Texas
limited partnership, but have no business activity. If deviation
equity only considers the legal form of these two arrangements,
Partnership B should be a tax partnership because it is similar to
Partnership A. Without business activity, Partnership B may
have none of the characteristics that justify the application of the
partnership tax rules. Thus, treating the members of Partnership
B differently from the standard taxpayer would violate deviation
equity.
Congress and courts have relied, to a large extent, on
deviation equity to define tax partnership.4 3 ' Deviation equity
recognizes the existence of tax partnerships and strives to ensure
that all members of arrangements similar to tax partnerships are
taxed similarly.4 32 This has contributed to the confusion in this
area for two reasons. 3 3 First, a standard definition of tax

429.
An algebraic formula illustrates this point. Assume "S" is the standard and "D"
is the deviant. That relationship can be signified with this formula: S 7 D. If another
arrangement "A" is exactly like D, then A = D. Thus, the following also would be true: S
A. If, however, A is not exactly like D, then it follows that A # D, and S $ D. Under these
facts, it is impossible to conclude that S A. If, however, A is compared to S, it is possible
to determine whether A is sufficiently dissimilar from S to justify treating A differently
from S for tax purposes. Understanding the difference between standard equity and
deviation equity is critical in analyzing the definition of tax partnership. Standard equity
requires that the definition test arrangements by comparing them to the standard
taxpayer. This will produce a better result by guaranteeing that only members of those
arrangements that justify a deviation from the standard are subject to rules different
from those to which the standard taxpayer is subject. On the other hand, the use of
deviation equity may produce the wrong result by comparing arrangements to a deviant
taxpayer, instead of to the standard taxpayer. Unless the two comparison arrangements
are identical, deviation equity may not produce the correct result. Under deviation equity,
comparing an arrangement to the deviant taxpayer produces the correct result only if the
other taxpayer is exactly like the deviant.
430.
See supra text accompanying notes 80-82 (explaining that Congress allowed
partnerships to compute taxable income and have a taxable year for administrative
convenience).
431.
See supra text accompanying notes 58, 94-95 (showing that the legislative
history of the Revenue Act of 1932 supports reliance on deviation equity and
demonstrating that courts have applied the concept of "relevant" case law broadly,
frequently analogizing unrelated areas to each other, such as family income assignment
cases to employment or business cases).
432.
See supra text accompanying notes 100-01 (noting that Congress believed such
a broad definition would eliminate uncertainty as to tax treatment).
433.
For almost ninety years, the definition of tax corporation relied on deviation
equity. Arrangements were compared under a multifactor test to determine if they were
similar to corporations. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. The check-the-box
regulations change this practice. See supra text accompanying note 28. Corporate tax is
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partnership was never established.43 4 Thus, comparison was
initially difficult. Second, with no criteria against which to test
different arrangements, the application of the definition became
haphazard and precedent became confused.4 35 Perhaps the
starkest example of this is the Tax Court's statement that the
statutory definition of tax partnership "does not require a profit
motive; rather it merely requires
'an unincorporated
organization, through or by means of which any business,
financial operation, or venture is carried on."'436 This example of
double-deviation equity 37 demonstrates how deviation equity can
create uncertainty. The partnership tax rules were enacted to
govern substantive-law partnerships.438 Since joint profit is an
element of substantive-law partnerships, Congress enacted the
rules to govern arrangements with joint profit.4 39 The Tax Court's
statement demonstrates how deviation equity disregarded that
original purpose.
C. Neutrality
Neutrality requires that tax laws not affect taxpayer
decisionmaking.41 In the partnership tax context, the definition
of tax partnership should not affect taxpayer decisions to join a
particular arrangement or to use a particular type of legal form
in structuring the arrangement. 4 1' To apply the neutrality
difficult to evaluate on policy grounds because of its uncertain tax policy. See supra text
accompanying note 33.
434.
See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (indicating that the debate over
the precise definition has been ongoing for a hundred years).
435.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-64 (noting the lack of predictability in
the IRS's conclusions on whether a tax partnership exists under a given set of facts).
436.
Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 521, 561-62 (1979) (quoting I.R.C.
§ 761(a) (2000)).
437.
The statutory definition listed arrangements similar to partnerships. See
supra text accompanying note 95. The Tax Court extended the statute by comparing the
listed arrangements to the arrangement it was considering. Madison Gas & Elec. Co.,
72 T.C. at 561-62.
438.
See supra text accompanying notes 104-05 (suggesting that the absence of a
definition for tax partnerships in the early revenue acts signals Congress's intent for the
rules to govern substantive-law partnerships only).
439.
See supra notes 342-46 and accompanying text (outlining the IRS's jointprofit test).
440.
See McCaffery, supra note 413, at 849 ('Tax policy typically invokes neutrality
in a specifically economic sense. Economic efficiency is obtained when tax systems are
neutral relative to a hypothetical no-tax world. This means that taxes do not distort the
relative prices that emerge from such a no-tax state .... As long as any tax equally
impacts all pretax prices, there is no relative change in prices, and hence no distortion in
the allocation of resources, which is the exclusive concern of economic efficiency."
(footnotes omitted)).
441.
This ought to be the result if the neutrality principle is properly embedded in

TAX PARTNERSHIP

20061

1007

principle in evaluating the definition of tax partnership, the
analysis inquires whether a particular definition will be more
likely to affect taxpayers' decisions. In particular, the analysis
asks whether a test used to define tax partnership encourages
taxpayers to use a particular type of legal entity over some other
form. Thus, if a test used to define tax partnership includes
limited liability companies but not limited partnerships,
taxpayers who wish to have an arrangement be a tax partnership
will choose to form a limited liability company instead of a
limited partnership.
D. Simplicity lAdministrability
Tax law should be simple and administrable, but equity
should not be sacrificed to ensure that a system is simple."' The
efficient administration of the tax system depends, however, on
simplicity,44 3 and a system that cannot be administered is not
equitable." ' One example of how complexity can negatively affect
equity is a complex tax law that requires taxpayers to incur costs
to comply with it and encourages them to organize their affairs to
minimize taxes.4 5 Because tax planning is available only to
taxpayers who can afford such services, laws of this sort violate
equity."' More important, tax laws must be administrable to be
equitable. "Otherwise, any rules developed risk being a mere
facade, a nice theoretical way of imposing taxes.., that is not
matched by real world consequences to most taxpayers.47 This
builds on simplicity because a tax law that is too complex cannot
be administered, 44 8 and taxpayers will invariably treat similar
the rules.
442.
Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX
REV. 645, 739 (2003) ("Congress should reject simple rules that thwart equity or
efficiency.... Unlike equity and efficiency, simplicity lacks inherent virtue.").
443.
Id. at 741. "IT]he benefit of simplicity is its advancement of the standards of
efficiency[, which encompasses administrability." Id. at 743.
444.

MICHAEL J.

GRAETZ & DEBORAH H.

SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:

PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 27 (4th ed. 2001) ("[Clomplexity is inequitable because
taxpayers with equal abilities to pay may have different tax burdens because of their
unequal abilities to understand or manipulate the tax rules.").
445.
Id.
446.
Yin, supra note 140, at 149-50 ("The elective tax treatment of private firms
under current law undermines... equity ....Although in theory, similarly situated
businesses have the same opportunity to be treated in the same tax-advantageous
manner under current law, the practical reality is probably to the contrary, due to
disparities in the quality of advice the businesses receive. By permitting such disparate
choices without any apparent underlying conceptual foundation, current law has simply
provided a tax benefit for the well-advised and a trap for the ill-advised.").
447.
Yin, supra note 224, at 142-43.
448.
DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266-67 (1986) (referring to
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items differently. Thus, complexity and inability to administer a
law may make it inequitable. As demonstrated above, simplicity
and administrability are the criteria justifying many of the
partnership tax rules.44 9

VII. THE EVALUATIONS
The following evaluations approach each test systematically.
First, they consider whether the subject test is certain. Second,
they consider whether the test promotes or violates equity. In
that part of the evaluation the focus is on standard equity, asking
whether the test considers how arrangements that come within it
create accounting and reporting complexity or curb abuse,
justifying the use of the partnership tax rules. The equity
analysis often requires consideration of tax principles. For
example, analyzing the joint-profit test requires an examination
of the use of both the accounting and dictionary definitions of
profit in the partnership tax context. Also, two of the "of-services"
tests450 require an examination of the assignment-of-income
doctrine and the partnership tax allocation rules. Third, the
evaluations consider whether the subject test is neutral. Based
on those evaluations, the analysis either rejects a test outright,
recommends that it be modified, or accepts it.
A. Tests That Fail Tax Policy Scrutiny
The following tests fail to satisfy any of the criteria of the
analytical platform. Those attempting to define tax partnership
should abandon these tests.
1. The Substantive-Law Test. The substantive-law test is
uncertain. The substantive-law test has grown from the
deceptively simple substantive-law definition of partnership to a
metastasizing multifactor list.' The recent factor proliferation
demonstrates a potential problem of multiple-factor tests: the
number of factors can grow uncontrollably, with no policy
justification.4 52 Multiple-factor tests are popular with the courts
and may provide a sense of wellness,"' but they do not provide a
the complexity in complying with the law as "compliance complexity").
449.
See supra Part III.B (discussing the imposition of tax reporting requirements).
450.
These refer to the type-of-services test and the source-of-services test.
451.
See supra text accompanying notes 280-307 (providing an overview of the
evolution of the substantive-law test).
452.
See supra notes 300-07 and accompanying text (discussing the increased
number of factors in the substantive-law test).
453.
See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of
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definition. Instead, they are merely unweighted items to be
considered in determining whether an arrangement is a tax
partnership4 54 and appear to be little more than a list of factors to
consider in examining parties' intent. Additionally, they provide
significant leeway for interpreting the multiple factors, making
the test uncertain.455 To the extent the factors refer to the
substantive-law definition, the IRS has had difficulty applying
the definition. 5 ' Furthermore, although Congress enacted
partnership tax law to govern substantive-law partnerships, the
substantive-law
definition
(even with
the
subsequent
permutations) is inadequate for partnership tax law because
(1) it does not consider tax policy, (2) its terminology and
concepts often have no meaning or relevance in tax law, and (3) it
evolves independent of tax laws and policy.4 17 All of these factors
contribute to the substantive-law test's uncertainty to the extent
it still relies upon the substantive-law definition of partnership.
The substantive-law test violates standard equity. The test
does not address whether the arrangement creates tax
accounting and reporting concerns that justify treating the
arrangement as a tax partnership. For example, a co-ownership
arrangement may perform significant business activity for profit
and be a tax partnership under the substantive-law test, but as
discussed below, business activity and profit sharing alone do not
necessarily cause tax accounting and reporting complexity.4 By
failing to draw this distinction, the substantive-law test may
treat as tax partnerships some arrangements that do not present
the concerns the partnership tax rules were enacted to address.
Thus, the substantive-law test treats members of certain
arrangements differently from the standard taxpayer, even
though tax policy may justify such disparate treatment.

Standards,14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 805-06, 809-10 (2005) (hypothesizing that
law makers convert standards to rules to maximize their own policy preferences over
time, to reduce the number of available choices that may be disturbing or paralyzing, to
reduce the number of choices available in areas of the law considered less interesting, and
to concentrate wisdom into a single rule to help them make decisions better).
454.
Luna v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077 (1964) ("The following factors, none of
which is conclusive, bear on the issue . . ").
455.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 356-57, 436 (exemplifying that the Tax
Court rejected the substantive law's joint-profit requirement).
456.
See supra text accompanying note 270-78 (discussing the substantive-law test
and the IRS's struggle to devise a consistent definition).
457.
See supra Part V.A-B.1 (describing the evolution of the test, and the manifold
challenges vis-&-vis a disconnect between the test, its nomenclature, and tax policy).
458.
See infra Part VII.B.2, C.3 (showing that the type or source of activity triggers
partnership tax and reporting complexity).
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The substantive-law test also violates neutrality. Some
taxpayers will structure arrangements to fail one of the elements
of the substantive-law definition of partnership or one of the
factors of the substantive-law test to avoid tax partnership
classification.
2. The State-Law Test. The state-law test is uncertain.
State laws defining the various entities that would be tax
partnerships are not uniform across jurisdictions. 4 9 The lack of
uniformity creates uncertainty.4 6 Additionally, the state-law
definitions of entities that are treated as tax partnerships have
proliferated over the years and continue to change, making the
state-law test even more uncertain."' Finally, the jurisdiction
that would govern the state-law determination of an
arrangement's classification may not be clear.46 These several
factors make the state-law test uncertain and place an undue
burden on the IRS to apply the various states' laws.6
The example of Ali and Bill demonstrates how the state-law
test violates equity. Recall that Ali and Bill owned raw land as
tenants in common.6 4 They leased the land to a rancher who
grazed cattle on the land, but they provided no services. This was

459.
Only thirty-three states have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act of 1997.
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 101 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 24-27 (Supp. 2006). Even states that
have adopted uniform acts may interpret them differently. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN,
supra note 231, § 1.04 ("[D]espite the U.P.A.'s and R.U.P.A.'s exhortations for uniform
interpretation, it is evident throughout this book that courts have not construed it
uniformly. Now that variations on R.U.P.A. and limited liability partnership provisions
are being adopted by legislatures, partnership law is becoming less uniform than ever."
(footnotes omitted)).
460.
The lack of uniformity may also result in similar arrangements being treated
differently for tax purposes, violating both standard and deviation equity. See Palmer v.
Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1933) (stating that technical distinctions of local laws will
be disregarded and tax statutes will be applied uniformly). For example, an arrangement
that is a partnership in one state may not be a partnership under the laws of another
state. Thus, two arrangements that are identical in every other way may be treated
differently under the laws of two separate jurisdictions. This has also become an issue in
the like-kind property area where taxpayers have traditionally looked to state law to
determine whether property was real or personal to answer whether two properties were
of a like kind. See Alton & Weller, supra note 13, at 36 (demonstrating that identical
property may be classified differently in different states).
461.
See, e.g., supra note 14 (describing the recent development of series limited
liability companies).
462.
See generally BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 231, § 1.04 (discussing
difficulties that arise in determining the applicable law).
463.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 270-75 (questioning whether the IRS
correctly applied the substantive-law test). Requiring the IRS to interpret and apply the
laws of each state would place unrealistic responsibility on that administrative body.
464.
See supra Part V.B.6.a (addressing pure co-ownership arrangements).
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not a tax partnership under the type-of-activity test. 65 Now
assume that Ali and Bill contribute the property to a limited
liability company, but otherwise the economic arrangement
remains the same. Under the state-law test, the limited liability
company would be a tax partnership.4 6 Indirectly owning the
property through the limited liability company does not create
the complexity or administrative inconvenience the partnership
tax rules were enacted to alleviate. 46 7 Thus the state law creates
unjustified disparate tax treatment, violating standard equity in
this situation.
The state-law test also violates neutrality. Taxpayers
wishing to have an arrangement classified as a tax partnership
will use a limited liability company or other state-law entity.6
Taxpayers wishing to avoid being a tax partnership will
structure arrangements that are not state-law entities. 469 The
explosion of syndicated tenancy-in-common structures is a
present-day example of how the state-law test affects entity
structure. 470 Real estate investors are buying interests in socalled syndicated TIC arrangements to avoid the use of state-law
entities.4 '
3. The Fact-QuestionTest. The fact-question test egregiously
violates certainty, leading to inequity. Because the fact-question
test provides no standard, neither taxpayers nor the IRS can
know, prior to a judge's decision, whether a particular
arrangement is a tax partnership. Because courts have no
standard against which to compare the facts of various
arrangements, similarly situated taxpayers will invariably be
classified differently. The fact-question test does not violate
neutrality, however, because it provides no basis for taxpayers to
rely upon when making decisions.4 72 Finally, the fact-question
465.
See supra Part V.B.6 (discussing the type-of-activity test).
466.
See supra Part V.B.2 (examining the state-law test).
467.
See supra notes 82-100 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's ongoing
attempt to streamline partnership tax rules).
468.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting that under state law, income
realized by a business may be classified as belonging to the entity, and not the owners).
469.
See supra note 320 and accompanying text (citing the TIC industry as one such
avoidance mechanism).
470.
In Revenue Procedure 2002-22, the IRS adopted the state-law test by
identifying direct ownership of property as a condition for obtaining a no-tax-partnership
ruling for a co-ownership arrangement. See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, 2002-1 C.B. 733, 735-36.
The IRS also acknowledged the state-law test in Revenue Ruling 2004-86. See Rev. Rul.
2004-86, 2004-33 I.R.B. 191, 193 (acknowledging that if an entity is formed under state
law for valid business reasons, it will generally be recognized for federal tax purposes).
471.
See supra note 13 (discussing TIC arrangements).
472.
See supra Part V.B. 10 (reviewing the fact-question test).
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test does not provide for consideration of the policy justification
for the partnership tax accounting and reporting rules.
Therefore, the fact-question test fails the certainty and equity
criteria, overshadowing any positive neutrality score.
B. Tests That Pass Tax Policy Scrutiny
The following tests satisfy certain of the tax policy criteria,
but not all of them, or they satisfy all of the tax policy criteria,
but only in limited situations. Thus, they are not completely
without merit, but nor are they meritorious.
1. The Degree-of-Activity Test. The degree-of-activity test
receives only a passing score, helped along by the potential of the
de minimis exception of the source-of-activity test. The degree-ofactivity test violates both certainty and standard equity. It
violates certainty because it does not identify the threshold
degree or quantum of activity that transforms a co-ownership
arrangement into a tax partnership. Courts have referred to
degree of activity but have not identified the threshold degree.473
Three examples demonstrate how the degree-of-activity test
violates standard equity. Consider a power-generating co-owned
joint-production arrangement. Such arrangement may conduct
significant business-like activity but not be subject to subchapter
K.474 An increase or decrease in the degree of such arrangement's
activity would not affect its eligibility to make the section
761(a)(2) election. 75 The lack of a joint-profit motive, not the
degree of activity, exempts the arrangement from full tax
partnership classification.4 76
The ditch-digging arrangement in the regulations further
illustrates weaknesses of the degree-of-activity test. The
regulations may refer solely to two individuals joining forces,
with shovels in hand, to dig a small ditch to drain surface water
off adjoining properties. More likely, however, the regulations
refer to an arrangement that requires bulldozers, backhoes,
trucks, a surveyor, and machine operators to dig and maintain a
473.
See supra note 366 (providing a list of cases implementing the degree-of-activity
test).
474.
See Rev. Rul. 68-344, 1968-1 C.B. 569 (concluding that an arrangement
consisting of a group of electrical power corporations co-owning a power plant and
coproducing power is eligible for the section 761(a)(2) election).
475.
See I.R.C. § 761(a)(2) (2000) (noting that an organization is not excluded from
the application of the subchapter "if it is availed of... for the purpose of selling services
or property produced or extracted").
476.
See supra note 340 (discussing an IRS ruling where the absence of joint profit
led to the classification on an arrangement as a qualified tax partnership).
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large ditch needed to properly drain hundreds of acre-feet of
water each year. Such an undertaking would require a
significant degree of activity.477 Although both the co-owned jointproduction and the expense-sharing arrangements have
significant business activity, they have no gross income."'
Furthermore, each member of such an arrangement would be
required to contribute to the costs of digging the ditch, and each
member could individually account for the amount so
contributed. With no gross income, and traceable expenditures,
such arrangements should not be tax partnerships, even though
they have significant business activity. Because the substantivelaw test may classify them as such, it violates equity.
The degree-of-activity test satisfies standard equity in one
application: the de minimis exception to the source-of-activity
test.47 9 That exception would ignore contributed services if the
amount of services were nominal, contributed for the sole
purpose of obtaining tax partnership classification. The de
minimis exception epitomizes standard equity in this respect.
The premise of standard equity is that all taxpayers similar to
the standard taxpayer should be subject to the same tax rules
that apply to the standard taxpayer.4 8 ° Tax rules should deviate
from the standard only if a taxpayer is sufficiently different from
the standard taxpayer. ' The de minimis exception would
attempt to quantify the point at which members of an
arrangement sufficiently deviate from the standard taxpayer to
justify the application of different tax rules."'

477.

See generally MARK FIEGE, IRRIGATED EDEN: THE MAKING OF AN AGRICULTURAL

LANDSCAPE IN THE AMERICAN WEST (1999) (describing the significant undertaking of
digging the ditches that irrigate (and drain water from) Idaho's Magic Valley, many of
which the author spent time around while working on an Idaho farm during his youth).
See also Mt. Morris Drive-in Theatre Co. v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 272, 272 (1955) (involving a
taxpayer who spent $8,224 in 1950 to construct a drainage system to carry water from its
property across an adjacent piece of property to a public drain), affd, 238 F.2d 85 (6th Cir.
1956).
478.
See infra text accompanying note 502-03 (discussing co-owned joint-production
arrangements).
479.
See infra text accompanying notes 540-43 (delineating the source-of-activity
test).
480.
See supra Part VLB.1 (discussing standard equity).
481.
Id.
482.
Identifying the threshold would prove difficult. It adopts the degree-of-activity
test's concept of materiality. As stated earlier, the degree-of-activity test has not
identified the point at which the degree of services becomes sufficiently high enough to
treat an arrangement as a tax partnership. See supra text accompanying note 473. If
administrability justifies tax partnership classification, the threshold should compare the
tax attributable to allocation of items to the service-providing member with the costs that
would be incurred to determine income without classifying the arrangement as a tax
partnership. If the arrangement allocates one percent of the arrangement's $100,000 of
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The degree-of-activity test probably does not violate
neutrality. Except in borderline cases, members of an
arrangement would not increase or decrease activity merely to
obtain tax benefits, because doing so would significantly alter the
economic arrangement. In borderline cases, however, where the
modest increase or decrease in activity would alter the
arrangement's classification, taxpayers may make adjustments
to obtain the more favorable tax classification.
2. The Type-of-Activity Test. The type-of-activity test, by
focusing on classifiable activities, provides more certainty than
the degree-of-activity test. Under the type-of-activity test, an
arrangement is not a tax partnership if it only provides support
services. Since support services can be defined," 3 that part of the
test is certain. It leaves unanswered, however, whether a tax
partnership exists between property owners and parties who
provide additional services.48 It does not answer whether such
arrangements are single partnerships consisting of the property
ownership and the provision of the additional services, or
whether the ownership of the property is separate from the tax
partnership that provides the additional services. 85
To the extent the type-of-activity test excludes from the
definition of tax partnership those arrangements that provide
only compensated support services, it satisfies standard equity.
Members of such arrangements can trace income from the
property directly to the owners based on the owners' respective
ownership interests in the property. Thus, the arrangements do
not need the partnership accounting and reporting rules or the
allocation rules. Each member can compute income from the
property at the member level with relative ease. Thus, the
simplicity and administrability purposes of the partnership tax
rules do not justify treating members of such arrangements
differently from the standard taxpayer.
The type-of-activity test generally satisfies neutrality. To
earn income from property, the property owners must provide the

income, or $1000, and it costs only $500 to determine income without classifying the
arrangement as a tax partnership, the arrangement should not be a tax partnership.
483.
See Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261 (finding that co-ownership of property
whereby the owners merely provide maintenance services for the property is not a tax
partnership).
484.
See supra text accompanying note 379 (stating that type-of activity test does not
explain whether providing additional services alone creates a separate tax partnership
entity).
485.
See supra text accompanying note 379.
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support services.
The decision to provide additional services
would most likely turn on whether the property owners wished to
participate in a venture requiring such services. This decision
would be influenced by economic and business factors, such as
the owners' risk tolerance, their desire to join a venture that
provides additional services, and the income potential of the
services. If the property owners wished to keep the additional
services separate from the property ownership to prevent having
the services and property be treated as a single tax partnership,
they would structure the provision of the additional services in
such a way that providing them would be treated separately.
This causes the type-of-activity test to receive negative results on
neutrality.
3. The Estoppel Test. The estoppel test is certain. It provides
the IRS and courts the opportunity to estop taxpayers from
disclaiming a chosen business form." 7 Taxpayers may not be able
to predict every situation in which the IRS will use the estoppel
test. In some situations, the IRS may disregard a taxpayer's
treating an arrangement as a tax partnership."' In others, the
IRS may invoke the estoppel test.4 8' 9 The issue in the case will
determine what course the IRS takes. Nonetheless, taxpayers
know courts can estop them from disclaiming tax partnership
treatment.4 90 Thus, its meaning is fairly certain.
Courts are concerned that without the estoppel test, "the
taxpayer could commence doing business as a ...partnership
and, if everything goes well, realize the income tax advantages
therefrom; but if things do not turn out so well, [the taxpayer]
may turn around and disclaim the business form he created in

486.
See Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261 (holding that ownership as tenants in
common does not constitute a tax partnership where co-owners do not share in revenue
from additional services provided to tenants).
487.
See, e.g., Earp v. Jones, 131 F.2d 292, 294 (10th Cir. 1942) (holding that a
change in classification must be real and substantial to be recognized by the government
and the courts for taxation purposes); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 467-69 (1935)
(allowing the government to disregard the taxpayer's chosen business classification).
488.
See, e.g., Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 292 (1946) (holding that although the
wife was added as a partner, the "mere paper reallocation" would not override the
actualities of the relationship by which the husband still earned the income, and therefore
no tax partnership existed); Earp, 131 F.2d at 294 (showing that the government is free to
ignore the change in classification if the change is not real and substantial).
489.
See, e.g., Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97, 98 (9th Cir. 1952) (noting that
the Commissioner is free to sustain or disregard the taxpayer's fiction).
490.
See, e.g., Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940) (holding that the
government need not limit its inquiry to the form chosen by the taxpayers but may look at
the actualities of the relationship and choose to disregard the effect of the "fiction").
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Courts further

state:
[T]he burden is on the taxpayer to see to it that the form of
business he has created for tax purposes, and has asserted
in his returns to be valid, is in fact not a sham or unreal. If
in fact it is unreal, then it is not he but the Commissioner
who should have the sole power to sustain or disregard the
effect of the fiction since otherwise the opportunities for
manipulation of taxes are practically unchecked.492
These statements indicate that the purposes of the estoppel test
are to deter abuse and mete out punishment. These are worthy
purposes because they help maintain standard equity. If an
arrangement is not a valid tax partnership, the members of the
arrangement should generally be subject to the tax rules that
apply to the standard taxpayer. Although members of an
estopped partnership may not otherwise be sufficiently different
from the standard taxpayer to justify different treatment, the
members' treating themselves as partners creates a distinction
that may justify the deviation.
Perhaps, however, other means are more appropriate for
meting out punishment and deterring behavior. For example, the
law could impose penalties on taxpayers who treat themselves as
partners when the arrangement is not a tax partnership.49 The
estoppel test requires parties to continue to treat an
arrangement as a tax partnership even though they do not
otherwise satisfy the tax partnership definition.494 This violates
standard equity. Since the purposes of the estoppel test can be
achieved without treating the arrangements as tax partnerships,
such other means should be adopted to preserve standard equity.
The estoppel test probably satisfies neutrality. Taxpayers
estopped from disclaiming tax partnership classification probably
have not made nontax business decisions that affect the economic
arrangement. They have merely treated an arrangement as a tax
partnership. Because the estoppel test does not affect nontax
decisions, it satisfies neutrality.
491.
Maletis, 200 F.2d at 98.
492.
Id.
493.
Such penalties could include extending the statute of limitations, providing the
IRS the opportunity to assess taxes for years that the members obtained a tax benefit
from treating the arrangement as a tax partnership, and imposing a monetary penalty
based on percentage of tax saved during the prior years.
494.
See Maletis, 200 F.2d at 98 ("The Government may look at actualities and upon
determination that the form employed for doing business or carrying out the challenged
tax event is unreal or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best
serves the purposes of the tax statute." (quoting Higgins, 308 U.S. at 477)).

2006]

TAX PARTNERSHIP

1017

Although the estoppel test satisfies certainty and neutrality,
and serves an anti-abuse purpose, it should not necessarily be
retained. The estoppel test treats certain arrangements as tax
partnerships that otherwise may not satisfy the definition of tax
partnership. Such arrangements, if not otherwise within the
definition of tax partnership, do not possess those attributes that
justify the partnership tax rules. Therefore, they should not be
subject to those rules. To remedy this, Congress should enact
other means to accomplish the purposes of the estoppel test.
C. Tests That Receive Exceptional Scores
Some of the tests satisfy all of the tax policy criteria and
are an indispensable part of the definition of tax partnership.
Nonetheless, none of them alone is sufficient to define tax
partnership. Thus, a workable definition of tax partnership
must combine these tests.
1. The Joint-ProfitTest. The joint-profit test, if based on
the accounting definition of profit, satisfies the certainty
criterion. According to the Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit,
however, the appropriate definition of profit is the dictionary
definition.4 9 Unfortunately, the dictionary definition of profit
is unworkable and should not govern the joint-profit test. The
income tax system requires the computation of taxable
income, 9 6 which follows the accounting definition of income. 97
This signals inadequacies of the dictionary definition, which
does not account for the difference between revenue and
expenses. Tax partnerships must compute taxable income in
the same manner as an individual.9 Individuals compute
taxable income by subtracting deductions from gross income.9
The broad definition of gross income includes accessions to
wealth that a taxpayer clearly realizes and over which the
taxpayer has complete dominion."' It also requires gain

495.
See supra text accompanying note 355-57 (illustrating how various circuits have
addressed the tax motive requirement in assessing the existence of a tax partnership).
496.
See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(e) (2000) (listing the various tax thresholds and rates for
married couples, heads of households, unmarried individuals, married individuals filing
separate returns, estates and trusts).
497.
See I.R.C. § 63(a) (2000) ("[Tlaxable income' means gross income minus the
deductions ... ").
498.
See I.R.C. § 703(a) (2000) (describing the method of tax computation for
partnerships).
499.
See I.R.C. § 63(a) (defining the term "'taxable income' [as] gross income minus
the deductions allowed [under the] chapter").
500.
Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
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recognition." 1 Thus, for a tax partnership to have taxable
income, the tax partnership must have gross income. Assuming,
for the sake of analysis, that a co-owned joint-production
arrangement accedes to wealth when it produces something
using co-owned property, 502 the arrangement probably does not
have gross income because it does not realize or recognize income
and does not have complete dominion over the product.
Co-owned joint-production arrangements will struggle to
identify a realization event. Consider three possible realization
events: (1) the time at which the product is produced, (2) the time
at which the arrangement transfers the product to the individual
members, and (3) the time at which the members individually
sell the product. The first alternative violates the income tax
system's realization principle. The income tax system does not
consider production a realization event." 3 Instead, it requires a
disposition or change in ownership.0 4 The arrangement could be
deemed to dispose of the product when (1) it transfers the
product to its members or (2) the members subsequently sell the
product.

501.
See I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2000) ("Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the
entire amount of the gain or loss, determined under this section, on the sale or exchange
of property shall be recognized."). But see I.R.C. § 1033(a) (Supp. III 2005) (instructing
that reinvested proceeds from the involuntary disposition of property do not constitute a
recognizable gain or loss).
502.
A co-owned joint-production arrangement may accede to wealth when it
produces a product. Such accession would be imputed income the recognition of which the
tax system has resisted. See Alan Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
370, 383 (1979) ("The 'sacrifice' theory is a product of the erroneous idea that income
measures one's annual 'satisfactions.' We might say, pursuing this line, that a 'true'
measure of income would include all forms of imputed income from owning property or
performing services, and all nonpecuniary 'windfalls' like pleasant sunsets. Those who
take this position concede its impracticality, and so are willing to fall back on the more
conventional notions of income as a rough measure of the real thing." (footnotes omitted)).
503.
Commentators have argued that gross income should include accretions, even
without realization events. See, e.g., Louie, supra note 417, at 872 (proposing that
unrealized gain on marketable securities of publicly traded companies should be subject
to income tax); David A. Weisbach, A PartialMark-to-Market Tax System, 53 TAX L.
REV. 95, 96 (1999) (exploring whether it would be feasible to expand the mark-tomarket rule to cover most liquid assets). Nonetheless, citing administrative
inconvenience, courts require a disposition in most situations. See, e.g., Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1920).
504.
See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and
Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAx L. REV. 1, 12 (1992) ("In the
current tax system, however, realization generally means transfer in the sense of sale or
exchange, as well as the receipt of proceeds, constituting earnings rather than a return of
capital, from an ongoing investment such as a share of stock or a bond." (footnote
omitted)); Weisbach, supra note 31, at 1633 ("Under the realization requirement, income
is not taxed and losses are not deducted until the income or loss is 'realized.' Although the
Code does not define realization, it generally means the asset producing the income or
loss is sold or exchanged." (footnote omitted)).
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If the arrangement were treated as a tax partnership, the
transfer of product to the arrangement's members could be either
a distribution or a sale to the partners. 5" If the transfer were
treated as a distribution, the distribution could be the realization
event,5 °6 but partners generally do not recognize gain on
distributions from a partnership. 7 Thus, the arrangement would
have no gross income. If the transfer is treated as a disguised
sale, the distributee partner would have to pay or be deemed to
pay for the product.0 8 The distributee partner's only actual
payment is that paid as a share of the production costs. Under a
disguised sale analysis, perhaps that amount could be treated as
payment for the product.0 9 If so, the purchase price should equal
the cost incurred to produce the product.5 10 This would generate
no gross income for the arrangement, as the amount the
arrangement received should equal the arrangement's adjusted
tax basis in the produced property." The distributee member's
acquisition also would have no effect on the distributee member's
basis in the property. 12
Alternatively, under the disguised sale method, the members
could be deemed to pay fair market value for the product
acquired from the arrangement.5
If this were the rule, a

505.
See I.R.C. § 707(a)(1)-(2) (2000) (defining a partner not acting in capacity as
partner and addressing the treatment of payments made to partner for property or
services).
506.
I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2000) (instructing that realization events are sales or other
dispositions).
507.
I.R.C. § 731(a)(1) (2000) ("In the case of a distribution by a partnership to a
partner... gain shall not be recognized ... ."). This is an exception to the general
recognition rule in section 1001(c). See supra note 501.
508.
See I.R.C. § 707(a) (2000) (addressing property transfers between partners and
their partnerships, including situations where the partner is not acting in capacity as
partner).
509.
Payments made to a partnership within two years before or after a
distribution from the partnership are pressured to be consideration for the property
received. This presumption may, however, be overcome. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(c) to (d)
(as amended in 1991).
510.
This assumes that members' percentage of production costs equal their
percentage distribution of product. If the arrangement provides otherwise, this analysis
would break down, and the arrangement should be classified as a tax partnership.
511. See I.R.C. § 1001(a)-(b) (2000) (addressing methods of computing gains, losses
and amount realized); I.R.C. § 1012 (2000) (mandating that basis of property is
determined by its cost); I.R.C. § 1016(a)(4) (2000) (explaining adjustments to basis).
512.
For example, if it cost $100,000 to produce a member's share of product, the
member's basis in that share of product would be $100,000, whether the member was
deemed to acquire the product for that amount from the arrangement or whether the
arrangement was disregarded and the member was deemed to produce that amount of
product. Taking the same basis in the property under either scenario, the member's
subsequent disposition would produce the same tax result.
513.
This appears to be the position the Seventh Circuit took in Madison Gas &
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successful co-owned joint-production
arrangement
would
recognize gain on the disguised sale equal to the difference
between the deemed payment and the production costs. 14 After
receiving the deemed payment, the arrangement would hold
deemed cash, which would require attention.51 A rule could deem
the arrangement to make a distribution of the deemed cash to
the respective members who were deemed to pay it to the
arrangement. As part of this deemed transaction, the
arrangement should allocate to each member its distributive
share of gain recognized on the deemed sale of the product." 6
Assuming the allocations, cost-sharing, and distributions are all
made in proportion to the members' interests in the
arrangement, the arrangement would allocate to each member
gain equal to the amount of gain the arrangement recognized on
the disguised sale of property to the member. " Other than the
allocation of partnership gain from the disguised sale, the
members should not realize any gain, even on the subsequent
deemed distribution of deemed cash. 5 The members would take
Electric Co. Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 1980) ("The
difference between the market value of MGE's share of that electricity and MGE's share
of the cost of production obviously represents a profit."). Iacknowledge that the discussion
of the deemed sale is somewhat convoluted and presents a ridiculous proposition. The
convolution and ridiculousness are, however, in harmony with the equally absurd notion
of computing income of an arrangement that has no revenue. This discussion exposes that
absurdity.
514.
A successful arrangement would produce product at a cost below fair market
value. Thus, the arrangement's adjusted tax basis in the product would be below the
product's fair market value. The disguised sale would produce gain under section 1001(a).
I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
515.
Deemed transactions are not new to partnership taxation. The partnership tax
rules have deemed transfers of partnership interests in exchange for services to be
transfers of partnership property in exchange for the services followed by the transferee
contributing the transferred property to the partnership. See MCKEE ET AL., supra note
126,
5.07-.08 (describing a deemed transfer of assets to a service partner and that
partner's deemed re-contribution of the assets to the partnership). This circular flow of
partnership property will no longer be deemed to occur if recently promulgated temporary
regulations are finalized as they now read. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(l)(1), 70 Fed.
Reg. 29,680, 29,680-81 (May 24, 2005) (treating the partnership interest received as
property and requiring the taxpayer to include the value of that interest in gross income
and adjust capital accounts accordingly); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(xii), 70 Fed.
Reg. 29,681, 29,681 (May 24, 2005) (same).
516.
See I.R.C. § 702(a) (2000) (providing the general rule for computing the income
of a partner).
517.
For example, if the arrangement had three equal members and each paid
$50,000 of the arrangement's expenses and the arrangement produced $300,000 of
product that was distributed equally to the members, the arrangement would have
$150,000 of gain on the deemed sale to the members. That $150,000 would be allocated
equally to the members under section 704. Any disproportionate distributions would raise
uncertainty and reporting complexity requiring tax partnership classification, or would be
treated as a sales transaction between the members.
518.
Each partner's basis in the arrangement would equal the amount contributed
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a basis in the product deemed purchased equal to the fair market
price deemed paid.519 When the members later sold the product,
they should recognize little or no gain.520 The net tax result of this
disguised sale to the members is the same as the result that
would be obtained if the arrangement were disregarded for tax
purposes, with potential timing differences, largely negating the
effect of added complexity.52 '
Treating the owner's subsequent sale of the product as the
arrangement's realization event will not reflect the members'
economic arrangement. Under this alternative, when a member
sells the product, the arrangement would be deemed to have sold
the product. For tax purposes, the arrangement's taxable income
would include the member's gain on the sale of the product and
the costs the member incurred to sell the product. Because the
parties did not intend to bear the cost or enjoy the economic
benefit of each others' sales efforts and results, the costs and
results of such efforts should not be part of the arrangement's
accounting and reporting. As the joint-profit test currently stands
in the Seventh Circuit, the joint-profit test violates equity. If it
was modified to focus on whether an arrangement has gross
income, the test would satisfy standard equity. 2
Using the established definition of beneficial ownership as a
proxy for complete dominion, co-owned joint-production
arrangements probably do not have complete dominion over the
product. Under the definition of beneficial ownership, the party

plus gain allocated. I.R.C. § 705(a)(1) (2000). Thus, each member would have a $100,000
basis in its interest in the arrangement. If the arrangement distributed the $300,000 of
deemed cash received on the deemed sale of the product to the members, each member
would receive $100,000 of deemed cash, recognize no gain, and reduce its basis in the
arrangement to zero. I.R.C. §§ 705(a)(2), 731(a) (2000).
519.
See I.R.C. § 1012 (2000).
520.
If the fair market value of the property increases after the member acquires it
from the partnership, the member would recognize that difference as gain on the
disposition.
521.
If the arrangement were disregarded, the members would recognize gain on the
sale of the product equal to the difference between the amount received for the product
and the product's cost. This will equal the sum of the gain allocated to the member on the
disguised sale and the gain recognized on the subsequent disposition. Under the deemed
sale method, the partnership would recognize gain when the product was transferred to
the members. If the arrangement were disregarded, the members would recognize gain
individually when they sold the product.
522.
The focus should be gross income, not taxable income, because if the
arrangement has no gross income, it becomes a mere expense-sharing arrangement. In
such situations, the parties must make contributions to cover the arrangement's costs.
They can trace their contributions to the expenditure, which each party could account for
separately. If an arrangement has gross income and the income can be traced to the
respective members, the arrangement does not need the partnership tax accounting and
reporting rules.
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who holds legal title to the property, has an equity interest in the
property, and enjoys the benefits and bears the burdens of
owning property, is the tax owner of the property.5 23 If the
product were to appreciate in value, the members individually,
not the arrangement, would benefit from the appreciation.52 4
Similarly, co-owned joint-production arrangements do not
bear the burden of the produced property's risk of loss. For
example, if co-mined coal was extracted from the earth awaiting
shipment to a specific member, the member would individually
bear the cost if the coal was destroyed. Furthermore, the
members individually, not the arrangement, control the
disposition of the product."' All of these factors indicate that the
arrangement does not own the product or the proceeds from
selling it. Thus, the arrangement has no gross income.
This focus on gross income is a shift from the substantive
law's focus on profit. The shift is justified. First, gross income is a
defined tax term and the definition of tax partnership will be
more certain if it uses tax terms. Second, if an arrangement does
not have gross income, it cannot compute taxable income and
apply the partnership tax rules.526 Third, if an arrangement has
no gross income, its members must contribute all of the
arrangement's operating costs, 527 which they will be able to trace.

523.
See, e.g., Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237-38 (1981)
("Some of the factors which have been considered by courts in making this determination
are: (1) Whether legal title passes; (2) how the parties treat the transaction; (3) whether
an equity was acquired in the property; ...(5) whether the right of possession is vested in
the purchaser;... (7) which party bears the risk of loss or damage to the property; and
(8) which party receives the profits from the operation and sale of the property." (citations
omitted)).
524.
In Madison Gas & Elec. Co., the several members of the arrangement received
coproduced electricity. Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 513-14 (7th Cir.
1980). Each member was limited to distributing its share to the geographic area over
which it could distribute its self-produced electricity. Id. at 513. It is conceivable that the
price of electricity in the several different markets differed. If that were the case, the
arrangement would not enjoy the benefit of the produced electricity, but each member
would individually. Thus, the benefit of owning the property inures to the members
individually, not to the arrangement.
525.
Id. at 513-14 ("Electricity produced by the Plant is distributed to each of the
utilities in proportion to their ownership interests. Each utility sells or uses its share of
the power as it does power produced by its own individually owned facilities, and the
profits thereby earned by MGE contribute only to MGE's individual profits. No portion of
the power generated at the Plant is offered for sale by the utilities collectively, and the
Plant is not recognized by the relevant regulatory bodies as a separate utility licensed to
sell electricity.").
526.
See supra notes 496-99 and accompanying text (stating that partnerships are
required to calculate taxable income, which is derived from gross income computations).
527.
See, e.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 633 F.2d at 514 ("Each utility also pays a
portion of all expenditures for operation, maintenance and repair of the Plant
corresponding exactly to its respective share of ownership. Under utility accounting
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Thus, if the joint-profit test considers gross income instead of
profit, it will satisfy equity by only subjecting arrangements that
have tax and accounting complexity addressed by the
partnership tax rules to such rules.
The joint-profit test satisfies neutrality. Consider an
example that illustrates this: If each member of a co-owned jointproduction arrangement sells product to a different geographic
region, it is not likely that they would alter the economic
arrangement and share the costs and income from such sales
with each other to forego joint profit simply to be treated as a tax
partnership. Nor would they separate the arrangement simply to
avoid tax partnership classification.
2. The Expense-SharingTest. The expense-sharing test is
certain. If an arrangement produces no product or services that it
can dispose of, it is not a tax partnership."' The expense-sharing
test satisfies standard equity by excluding from the definition of
tax partnership arrangements that have no gross income, where
all expenses must be paid directly by the members. 9 The
members can individually account for such expenditures.53 °
Requiring such arrangements to compute taxable income would
require them to recognize imputed income."' This, of course, is a
deviation from principles of our tax system. 32 Because expensesharing arrangements do not create the complexity and
administrative difficulties the tax rules were enacted to alleviate,
they should not be treated as tax partnerships. By producing this
result, the expense-sharing test satisfies equity.

procedures mandated by the PSC and the FERC, these expenses are combined with and
treated in the same manner by MGE as expenses from its individually owned facilities.").
528.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1997) (establishing that joint
undertakings give rise to a tax partnership if the members carry on a trade or business
and divide the profits).
529.
See id.
530.
In the case of a ditch-digging arrangement, the members would be required to
capitalize the expenditures and add that to the bases of the property improved. See I.R.C.
§ 2 63(a) (2000) (instructing that a deduction is not allowed for permanent improvements
or betterments); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1994) (disallowing
deductions for "[alny amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements
or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate").
531.
The imputed income might be the rent-free use of the ditch in the example in
the regulation. See supra text accompanying note 364 (illustrating a joint venture by two
property owners building a ditch to drain their land).
532.
See Gunn, supra note 502, at 383 (criticizing the "sacrifice" theory of taxation as
unnecessary and inconsistent with the "ability-to-pay" principle because it measures
income in terms of the enjoyment and "satisfaction" obtained from the ownership of
property).
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The expense-sharing test is neutral. The taxpayers in the
ditch-digging example joined together to construct a ditch that
would drain water.533 They would not alter this arrangement to
produce product to be classified as a tax partnership. Other
parties engaged in selling product or services would not
discontinue such business to satisfy the expense-sharing test and
avoid tax partnership classification. Thus, the expense-sharing
test does not affect taxpayers' nontax decisions.
3. The Source-of-Activity Test. The source-of-activity test is
certain, satisfies equity, and is neutral. The test provides
certainty by examining whether any members of an arrangement
contribute services.534 Although this requires that the
contributions of services be distinguished from services provided
for compensation, courts have successfully made that
determination by considering who controls the arrangement.5 3
Thus, the source-of-activity test is certain.
The source-of-activity test satisfies standard equity by
distinguishing between arrangements that can trace income and
losses from their sources and those that cannot, subjecting only
those arrangements that cannot to the partnership tax rules.536
The example of Ephraim and Fran illustrates this. Recall that
they co-own an apartment complex. 537 If they hire a manager to
provide only support services, their sole source of income will
remain the property. 3 ' They can trace the income from the
property to themselves based upon their respective ownership
interests in the property. Any other allocation of the income
would violate the assignment-of-income doctrine.5 39 Thus, they
533.
See supra text accompanying note 364 (illustrating that the ditch-digging
endeavor would not create a tax partnership between the two property owners).
534.
See, e.g., Tate v. Knox, 131 F. Supp. 514, 517 (D. Minn. 1955) (using whether
someone "contributed his skill to [the] enterprise" as a factor in determining whether a
partnership exists); Bartholomew v. Comm'r, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 302, 305 (1950) (holding
that although the partners shared in gains and losses there was no tax partnership
because they did not both participate in the management and conduct of the enterprise),
vacated, 186 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1951).
535.
See supra notes 393-97 (discussing the various approaches to the control
requirement for a finding of a tax partnership).
536.
See supra text accompanying notes 382-97 (describing the source-of-activity test
and noting that the test "connects the source of activity to the source of economic benefit"
when determining tax partnership status).
537.
See supra Part V.B.7.a (concluding that two individuals owning an apartment
complex for which they perform all maintenance and repair services are not excluded
from the definition of a tax partnership under the source-of-activity test).
538.
See supra Part V.B.7.b (noting that if the two individuals who own the property
hire a manager to perform these services, the arrangement would be excluded from the
definition of tax partnership under both tests).
539.
See supra text accompanying notes 130-33 (stating that the assignment-of-
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should not be allowed to use the partnership tax rules. By
excluding their arrangement from the definition of tax
partnership, the source-of-activity test obtains this correct result.
Now assume that Ephraim and Fran contribute support
services to the arrangement. By doing this, they contribute
property and services toward a common goal and cease to be able
to trace income separately from the property and services. They
cannot know whether Fran's services, Ephraim's services, or the
property generate the income or what portion of the income is
produced by each. This inability to trace makes the assignmentof-income doctrine impossible to apply. It also creates complexity
that justifies treating Ephraim and Fran differently from the
standard taxpayer; specifically, the difference justifies their
using the partnership tax allocation rules.
As with all other tests, the source-of-activity test may
influence decisions regarding the structuring of arrangements.
Parties may wish to treat payments made to a service provider as
compensation to avoid tax partnership classification.54 Members
of a co-ownership arrangement may seek tax partnership
classification under the source-of-activity test either by
(1) granting a nominal profits interest to a service provider who
will provide nominal services, or (2) allowing at least one member
to perform nominal services for a share of profits.54 ' Although
performing nominal services could affect the ability to trace
income and expenses from their sources, this also creates
opportunities for taxpayers to game the system." 2 If the sourceof-activity test does not recognize this, taxpayers can take
advantage of tax partnership rules without creating an
arrangement that is sufficiently different from the standard
taxpayer. This would violate standard equity. Thus, the sourceof-activity test must incorporate a de minimis exception that
denies tax partnership classification to arrangements that admit
members who provide only a de minimis amount of services."'
income doctrine only considers the source of income regardless of where the funds are
directed after they are produced).
540.
For example, members of the arrangement may, for some reason, prefer to
deduct amounts paid to the service provider.
541.
The service-providing member would not have to receive a larger percentage of
profits. Simply contributing services creates tracing difficulty since a portion of the profit
is attributable to the services. If income from those services is not allocated to the serviceproviding member, the members may have assigned income from the service-providing
member to other members.
542.
For example, to come within the definition of tax partnership under the sourceof-activity test, taxpayers may give a service provider a 0.01% interest in the partnership
for the contribution of nominal services.
543.
The de minimis exception could determine the threshold level of services as a
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This would help preserve the source-of-activity test's equity and
neutrality.
4. The Business-PurposeTest. The business-purpose test
suffers from being less than certain,5' 4 but it serves such an
important role in preventing the abusive use of the partnership
tax rules that it must be preserved. "The business purpose
doctrine reduces the incentive to engage in such essentially
wasteful activity, and in addition helps achieve reasonable equity
among taxpayers who are similarly situated-in every respect
except for differing investments in tax avoidance."54' 5 By requiring
the examination of the real relationship between parties and the
purpose for which an arrangement is formed, the businesspurpose test identifies those arrangements that are "more
fanciful than real" and disregards them for tax purposes. 46 A
fanciful arrangement does not create a difference between its
members and the standard taxpayer that justifies members of
the fanciful arrangement using the partnership tax rules.
Because
the
business-purpose
test
excludes
fanciful
arrangements from the definition of tax partnership, it satisfies
standard equity.
The business-purpose test also satisfies neutrality because it
discourages taxpayers from making decisions that lack a nontax
business purpose. The business-purpose test, by requiring some
nontax business purpose, creates rule neutrality by minimizing
the effect tax rules have on decisionmaking.
VIII. A POLICY-BASED DEFINITION OF TAx PARTNERSHIP
Having evaluated the ten tests, the next step is to eliminate
the tests that fail tax policy scrutiny; therefore, the state-law
test, fact-question test, and substantive-law test must go.54 7 Next,
percentage of the arrangement's profits. Any aggregate profits interests transferred below
that percentage would be disregarded in applying the source-of-activity test.
544.
See, e.g., James M. Delaney, Where Ethics Merge With Substantive Law-An
Analysis of Tax Motivated Transactions,38 IND. L. REV. 295, 297-309 (2005) (discussing
varying judicial interpretations of the business-purpose test and the uncertainty of the
threshold level of economic substance required to satisfy it).
545. ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
546. Earp v. Jones, 131 F.2d 292, 293-94 (10th Cir. 1942).
547. Others have advocated eliminating the state-law test from the definition of a tax
corporation. See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, The Story of LLCs: Combining the Best Features
of a Flawed Business Tax Structure, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES, supra note 33, at 295,31011 ("Given the historical background of the evolution of corporate law and especially the
business and political climate of the early twentieth century as liberal general
incorporation laws proliferated across the states, relying on state law to conclusively
define corporate status for tax purposes may have made sense in 1913. Nearly a century
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those tests that pass scrutiny must be consolidated or eliminated.
The degree-of-activity test should be relegated to the de minimis
exception of the source-of-activity test. The type-of-activity test
should be used only to divide ownership arrangements from
arrangements that provide additional services. After which, the
ownership arrangement and the arrangement providing
additional services should be separately tested for tax
partnership classification.
The estoppel test should be replaced. It mainly serves
deterrent and punitive functions. Treating such arrangements as
tax partnerships is not supported by the purposes of the
partnership tax rules (other than the general anti-abuse purpose
of some rules). Instead of the estoppel test being a judicial tool for
meting punishment to members of some arrangements, Congress
should replace it with penalties requiring members to make
equalizing payments to compensate for prior year tax savings
and extend the statute of limitations to more accurately
accomplish what the estoppel test was intended to accomplish.
The third step is to consolidate the remaining tests into a
workable definition that tax policy supports. The source-ofactivity test, the joint-profit test (including by extension, the
expense-sharing test), and the business-purpose test must
remain a part of the definition. Each of these tests is necessary to
determine whether an arrangement is a partnership, but none of
them is sufficient. For example, the source-of-activity test
examines whether the parties share the economic benefit derived
from the various contributions, but it does not define economic
benefit. Thus, it is possible under the source-of-activity test to
inappropriately treat a mere expense-sharing arrangement as a
tax partnership. The joint-profit test should use the accounting
definition of profit to distinguish expense-sharing arrangements
and co-owned joint-production arrangements from arrangements
that should be classified as tax partnerships. Finally, the
business-purpose test is necessary to ensure that structures have
economic significance and preserve the general anti-abuse
concept of the partnership tax rules. These tests should be
combined to form a working definition of tax partnership.

later, however, those reasons are substantially less compelling because the state law
designation of business entities as incorporated or unincorporated no longer carries any
meaning towards identifying the true business characteristics of the firm and therefore
offers no rational policy concerning the appropriate taxation of the firm and its owners."
(citing Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxation of Domestic Limited Liability Companies and
Limited Partnerships:A Case for Eliminating the PartnershipClassificationRegulations,
73 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 598-608 (1995))).
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Based on the above analysis and retaining the tax-entity
default rule 4 ' a tax partnershipis two or more persons, at least
one of whom provides significantservices, who have (or will have)
common gross income. This proposed definition incorporates all of
the tests that pass policy scrutiny and are necessary for a
workable definition of tax partnership, and it disposes of the
tests that fail policy scrutiny. The proposed definition adopts the
source-of-activity test (including the de minimis exception) by
requiring at least one member to contribute significant services
for the arrangement to be a tax partnership. Thus, mere coownership arrangements or co-ownership arrangements that hire
a manager to provide support services would not be tax
partnerships under the proposed definition.
The proposed definition also preserves the distinction between
tax partnerships and principal-agent relationships, between tax
partnerships and financing arrangements, and between tax
partnerships and other arrangements, such as landlord-tenant
agreements. The proposed definition accomplishes this by requiring
that the persons have a common gross income. Gross income
requires complete dominion of the income, which incorporates
control.549 The distinction between a tax partner and a creditor, and
between a tax partner and an agent, is control over the source of
income.5 0 Only the party with control would have income from the
property or services producing the income.' The party lacking
control would receive compensation for providing services or the use
of capital. By requiring common control of gross income, the
proposed definition preserves this distinction.
The proposed definition incorporates the joint-profit test and
the expense-sharing test by requiring that the persons have a
common gross income. By using "gross income" instead of profit,
the definition adopts tax terminology, making the definition more

548.
See supra text accompanying note 43 (stating that an arrangement can be a tax
partnership only if it is not a tax corporation or tax trust).
549.
See supra text accompanying note 500 (stating that gross income is any realized,
clear accession to wealth over which the taxpayer has dominion); see also supra text
accompanying notes 523-25 (stating that under both co-owned joint-production
arrangements and beneficial property arrangements, the benefits and burdens of the
produced property go to the members individually and not to the arrangement).
550.
See supra Part V.B.7.d (explaining that under a principal-agent relationship,
the agent has sold rather than contributed his services to the arrangement, and therefore
the relationship is outside the scope of the source-of-activity test and does not qualify as a
tax partnership); see also Arthur Venneri Co. v. United States, 340 F.2d 337, 341 (Ct. Cl.
1965) (concluding that a taxpayer without an equal right to control is a creditor and not a
tax partner); Kelly v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1090, 1103-04 (1970) (opining that equal
control is necessary to be a tax partner).
551.
See supra Part V.B.7.d (discussing profits interest as compensation).
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certain and reflecting tax policy and the purposes of partnership
taxation. If two parties have common gross income and at least
one of them contributed services that help generate gross income,
the arrangement, not the parties separately, will have gross
income, and the parties will not be able to trace the income from
property of the arrangement or the contributed services.5 52
Requiring common gross income also requires a joint ownership
in property if property is part of the arrangement. If parties do
not have joint ownership, income from the property will be the
income of the separate property owners. If parties make
asymmetrical contributions of property to an arrangement,
income will become common only if both parties take a direct or
indirect ownership in the other party's property."' Otherwise,
each party will earn income separately.
The proposed definition also contemplates arrangements
that have begun operations but have no gross income. If such
arrangements are formed to earn gross income, they should be
treated as tax partnerships even before they have gross income.
This concept is not new to tax law, so it should not be difficult to
apply.554 It does, however, require that the activities be operating
activities that will generate gross income. Such activities must be
distinguished from pre-operating activities (i.e., organization and
syndication fees incurred to form the arrangement and bring
parties together), which are performed before the creation of a
tax partnership.555

552.
See supra Part VII.C.3 (explaining that the source-of-activity test only treats
arrangements which are unable to trace income and losses from their sources as tax
partnerships).
553.
For example, if Rob contributes land worth $900,000 to an arrangement and
Erik contributes a tractor worth $100,000 to the arrangement, gross income from the
combined use of the land and tractor will be common to both Rob and Erik only if they
both obtain an interest in the other's property. Otherwise, income from the land will
remain Rob's and income from the tractor will remain Erik's. Even if stated as a percent
of total income from the combined use of the land and tractor, the income will not be
common if both parties do not have an interest in both properties.
554.
See Frazell v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1405, 1413 (1987) (holding that an arrangement
that was fully subscribed, deposited contributed capital into its operating account,
employed capital in its business, and filed a partnership tax return for the year was a tax
partnership even though the arrangement reported no gross income for its first year of
operations).
555.
See Sparks v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1279, 1284 (1986) (holding that pre-operating
activities do not create a tax partnership). The Code contemplates organization and
syndication expenditures and requires that they be capitalized and amortized. See I.R.C.
§ 709(a) (2000) (providing that generally, "no deduction shall be allowed ... to the
partnership ... for any amounts paid or incurred to organize a partnership"). Such
expenditures are "incident to the creation of the partnership." I.R.C. § 709(b)(2)(A) (2000).
Because they are incident to the creation of the partnership, they are incurred before the
partnership is created. Such expenditures may be deducted as a deferred expense only
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The proposed definition also removes some pressure from,
but does not eliminate, the business-purpose test by requiring
that at least one party contribute services and both have common
taxable income. For example, in the tax shelter cases and family
partnership cases that have used the business-purpose test, the
first inquiry under the proposed definition would be whether the
parties shared control. If not, the arrangements would not have
been tax partnerships under the proposed definition. Even if they
share common control, at least one of the parties must contribute
significant services. 5 6 If the parties could satisfy the technical
requirements of the proposed definition, courts would still have
access to the business-purpose test if the arrangement lacked
business purpose.
An attractive feature of the proposed definition is that it
does not require Congress to enact new legislation or Treasury
and the IRS to significantly modify existing rules.55 7 Nonetheless,
it can have immediate effect. The current state of the law is fairly
loose."' Going forward, when courts interpret the definition of tax
partnership they should consider the purposes for which the
partnership tax rules were enacted. Doing this, courts will arrive
at the proposed definition. Treasury and the IRS should
reconsider the definition of tax partnership as now stated in the
check-the-box regulations and consolidate the different tests
stated therein into the proposed definition.
In considering the proposed test, some may wonder if it is
not simply a modified version of the substantive-law definition of
partnership. Such a conclusion is not wholly unfounded. The
proposed definition requires common control, activity, and
sharing in gross income. These requirements are similar to the
substantive law's association, business activity, and profitsharing requirements. The proposed definition, however, differs

after the partnership begins business. I.R.C. § 709(b)(1) (2000).
556. This definition would not abandon the allocation rules in section 704(e)(2),
which require allocating the fair market value of services to the service provider in
certain family partnerships. I.R.C. § 704(e)(2) (2000).
557.
Although such action might be ideal, the time required to enact legislation or
promulgate regulations would delay the application of the proposed definition, which is
not warranted.
558.
For example, jurisdictions around the country still disagree as to how much
independence a partnership has from its members. See, e.g., Decker Coal Co. v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 714 P.2d 155, 157 (Mont. 1986) (holding that the Uniform
Partnership Act's notion that partnerships are independent from their members
completely replaces the common law doctrine that partnerships are not independent from
their members). But see, e.g., Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 628 N.E.2d 1335, 1338 (Ohio
1994) (holding that a partnership is not a separate legal entity but an aggregate of
individuals).
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significantly from the substantive-law definition. First, it
incorporates tax terminology, eliminating the ambiguous term
"profit" which is not a part of the partnership tax lexicon. Second,
it disposes of such concepts as degree of activity, intent, and
multifactor lists, which are ambiguous, and do not reflect tax
policy. It replaces them with the source-of-activity test and
common gross-income requirement, which are supported by tax
policy. 9
IX. CONCLUSION

This Article examined the definition of tax partnership and
proposed a definition of tax partnership that is workable,
supported by tax policy, and supports the purposes of the
partnership tax rules. It confirmed that the definition of tax
partnership is currently in a state of disarray and remains the
sole tax entity definition that is not certain. This confusion
persists despite the significant effect the definition has on the tax
liability of many taxpayers and the significant resources that
have been expended to interpret the definition. A policy-based
definition will help facilitate tax planning and tax administration
and help curb litigation costs by providing more certainty. Tax
policy also helps make the definition more durable and provides
Congress, courts, Treasury, and the IRS a foundation for
considering the definition in new contexts in the future. Thus,
the proposed definition is able to handle those current
developments drawing attention to the definition of tax
partnership. It is also poised to handle future challenges. Above
all, future consideration of the definition of tax partnership
should be based on tax policy. Adhering to the Tax Court's sound
advice, those who make, interpret, administer, and comment on
the definition of tax partnership should allow tax policy to govern
their efforts.

559.
See supra text accompanying note 527 (asserting that replacing gross income
requirements with profit requirements satisfies equity because gross income
requirements subject entities lacking the addressed accounting complexities to tax
partnership rules); supra text accompanying note 534 (explaining that the source-ofactivity test is certain because it looks at who contributed noncompensatory services by
identifying who controls the arrangement).

